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Thesis Committee: 





As a religiously diverse society and self-proclaimed secular state, India is an ideal setting to 
explore the complex and often controversial intersections between religion and law. The 
religious freedom clauses of the Indian Constitution allow for the state to regulate and restrict 
certain activities associated with religious practice. By interpreting the constitutional provisions 
for religious freedom, the judiciary plays an important role in determining the extent to which the 
state can lawfully regulate religious affairs. This thesis seeks to historicize the related 
development of two jurisprudential tests employed by the Supreme Court of India: the religious 
denomination test and the essential practices test. The religious denomination test gives the Court 
the authority to determine which groups constitute religious denominations, and therefore, 
qualify for legal protection. The essential practices test limits the constitutional protection of 
religious practices to those that are deemed ‘essential’ to the respective faith. From their origins 
in the 1950s up to their application in contemporary cases on religious freedom, these two tests 
have served to limit the scope of legal protection under the Constitution and legitimize the 
interventionist tendencies of the Indian state. Additionally, this thesis will discuss the principles 
behind the operation of the two tests, their most prominent criticisms, and the potential 
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When left undefined, the concept of religious freedom is little more than a platitude. 
Although a majority of modern nations have constitutional provisions for religious freedom, the 
substance and meaning of this term is constantly being negotiated.1 It is certainly easier to 
champion religious freedom than to define, quantify, and evaluate it. Nevertheless, any 
meaningful discussion of this elusive concept is incomplete without a thorough consideration of 
the more difficult questions that it invokes. Such questions include: What specific rights should 
be protected by religious freedom? What restrictions on these rights, if any, are permissible? 
Who has the authority to determine the scope of religion? How should the government handle 
cases where the religious freedom of one group conflicts with that of another? Or where the 
rights protected by religious freedom conflict with other basic rights? In order to translate a 
promising yet vague concept into sound public policy, these complicated questions must be 
addressed. 
India is an exemplary setting to explore the complex unfolding of religion and state 
relationships. The nation’s unique religious, social, and political circumstances are ideal for 
examining the heated negotiations surrounding religious freedom and another highly contested 
term, secularism. This study will focus on the Supreme Court of India, the site where some of the 
most difficult legal issues involving religion are worked out. There are several factors that make 
India an important locus for understanding these themes. First, India’s diverse religious 
landscape brings the issue of plurality to the fore. As home to significant populations of Hindus, 
																																																								
1 According to the Comparative Constitutions Project, 186 in-force constitutions mention 
freedom of religion. Even the most egregious violators of religious freedom have some degree of 
constitutional commitment to this ideal; “Search: Freedom of Religion,” Constitute, accessed 
March 14, 2019. 
https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&key=freerel&status=in_force 
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Muslims, Christians, Jains, Sikhs, Buddhists, and an array of other religious sects and 
movements, the Indian state has to consider a variety of diverse religious commitments in its 
governance. Second, the provisions for religious freedom in the Constitution of India contain 
some notable ambiguities. Although largely similar to the constitutions of other democratic 
nations, the anomalies in the Indian Constitution make it a unique document as far as religious 
freedom is concerned. Finally, the rich debates surrounding secularism in India provide a 
theoretical backdrop to help us understand the potential implications of religion and state 
relations.  
This thesis will show how the Supreme Court of India has employed two jurisprudential 
tests to circumscribe religious freedom and interpret the interventionist impulses contained in the 
Constitution. These two innovations, the religious denomination test and the essential practices 
test, give the Court the authority to determine which groups qualify for legal protection, and 
which practices are protected. The rights of religious denominations and individuals are 
contingent upon these two tests, among other factors. I argue that the Court’s domineering 
approach to religion as well as the language of the Constitution encourages litigants to present 
their legal arguments in several particular ways. Groups are encouraged to identify as religious 
denominations, so as to qualify for protection under Article 26. Furthermore, religious adherents 
are encouraged to claim that their impugned practices are integral to their respective faiths. I also 
suggest that the Court’s pattern of ruling on religion demonstrates a characteristic feature of 
Indian secularism: the state’s propensity to intervene in religious affairs. As the administrator of 
the religious denomination and essential practices tests, the Indian judiciary plays a central role 
in balancing the right to religious freedom with other state and public interests.  
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India and Religious Plurality 
Plurality in India is not merely a descriptive fact. For some, it is a virtue that exemplifies 
an ancient tradition of acceptance and religious harmony, defining India’s identity as a diverse 
civilization. For others, it is a threat to the nation’s identity, and a source of hostility and conflict. 
That tensions exist between religious communities in India is unsurprising given the historical 
circumstances under which different groups have come into contact. The Indian subcontinent is 
the birthplace of several major religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. Islam 
arrived around the 7th century CE, and was expanded by conquests between the 12th and 16th 
centuries as well as the efforts of Sufi missionaries. The story of Islam in India is, among other 
things, deeply connected to political power. Many Muslim rulers during the Delhi Sultanate and 
Mughal Empire stand accused of religious intolerance, persecution, and bigotry. For many 
Indians today, the image of Islam is irrevocably tainted with ideas of invasion, persecution, and 
violent conquest. Christianity also has a long history in India, going back at least to the 6th 
century CE. Protestantism was introduced to India by the efforts of foreign missionaries, mostly 
between the 18th and 19th centuries. Just as history colors the perception of Islam, Christianity in 
India too is often associated with proselytization and imperialism. Most historians agree that the 
British colonial government exacerbated tensions between religious communities.2 Yet this does 
not tell the whole story: many Jewish and Parsi communities in India settled there precisely to 
escape religious persecution elsewhere. While some praise India for its tradition of religious 
tolerance, others see it as the textbook example of inter-religious strife amid rising Hindu 
																																																								
2 The colonial government was responsible for establishing separate law codes for religious 
communities, a system that persists today. The debate on religious personal laws is one of the 
most controversial issues in contemporary Indian politics.  
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majoritarianism.3 A term was even coined to describe the ideology of division along ethnic or 
religious lines witnessed in South Asia—communalism. 
According to the 2011 census, India is home to 966.3 million Hindus (79.8%) and 172.2 
million Muslims (14.2%). Collectively, Christians, Sikhs, and Buddhists account for 57 million 
persons, 4.72% of the population. Jains, Parsis, adherents of others faiths, and followers of no 
religion comprise 15.1 million individuals, 1.27% of the population.4 What the census does not 
reveal is an even more bewildering diversity internal to each of these traditions. Encountering 
others with differing beliefs is a reality of the Indian experience, both historically and in the 
present.  Furthermore, it is not only beliefs and practices that set religious communities apart. 
Differing conceptions of law, the state, and justice are often concomitant with religious 
convictions, which complicate further the government’s task of handling plurality and treating 
religious communities with equality.5 The nation’s courts naturally reflect this plurality, and 
attest to the complexity of religion-state relationships in a highly diverse society. 
 
Religious Freedom in the Constitution 
The Constitution of India came into force on January 26, 1950, thereby replacing the 
British Government of India Act, 1935 as the supreme governing document of the nation. Drafted 
by the Constituent Assembly between 1946 and 1949, the debates of this body give valuable 
insight into the diverse ideologies, concerns, values, and priorities that were involved in creating 
																																																								
3 See Additional Statement of Commissioner Tenzin Dorjee, United States Commission on 
International Religious Freedom, 2018 Annual Report (2018), 167. 
https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2018USCIRFAR.pdf 
4 Government of India, C-1 Population by Religious Community, Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, Delhi (2011). 
5 Akeel Bilgrami, “Secularism and the Very Concept of Law,” in The Crisis of Secularism in 
India, ed. Anuradha Dingwaney Needham and Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, (Durham, Duke 
University Press, 2007). 
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the Constitution. Drafting the Constitution was an understandably fraught process, as the 
Constituent Assembly debates occurred amid the turbulent early years of Independent India. This 
time period was marked by several pivotal events: the violent partition of India and the creation 
of Pakistan, a war over Jammu and Kashmir, and the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. Partly as 
a response to widespread communal violence, the question of minority rights assumed a new 
level of urgency.  
 Some of the most noteworthy personalities of the Constituent Assembly had strong 
opinions on the role of religion in society, which inevitably influenced the content and form of 
the Constitution’s religious freedom clauses. To say that the Constituent Assembly members’ 
ideological commitments shaped the Constitution and its outlook on religion would be an 
understatement. In this regard, two figures deserve special mention: Dr. B. R. Ambedkar and 
Jawaharlal Nehru. The Constitution that exists today is a result of profuse debate and negotiation 
by them and numerous other competing voices. Understanding their backgrounds and attitudes 
towards religion is crucial to contextualize this remarkable document.  
 Dr. B. R. Ambedkar was the chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee, and is 
known as the architect of the Indian Constitution. He was most recognized for his commitment to 
individual freedom and social reform, as well as his fierce opposition to caste hierarchy and 
discrimination. Ambedkar himself was subjected to caste-based discrimination from a young 
age, and made opposition to untouchability the cornerstone of his activism. His criticism of the 
caste system was intensely personal, and eventually led him to renounce Hinduism in favor of 
Buddhism. These experiences undeniably influenced his political views, for he conceived of 
politics as a vehicle through which social inequities could be redressed. His politics, in the words 
of Vidhu Verma, were aimed at “freeing individuals from the domination and violence of 
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coercive traditions.”6 Ambedkar advocated for a Uniform Civil Code in lieu of personal laws, 
and opposed giving religion a “vast, expansive jurisdiction” in the public sphere.7 
Unsurprisingly, he was a divisive figure among Hindus, as he remains today. 
Considered the architect of modern India, Jawaharlal Nehru was the chairman of two 
Constituent Assembly committees and the nation’s first prime minister. Most notably, he was 
one of the most prominent advocates of a secular state in India. In his vision, secularism was a 
means to ensure respect for the country’s religious and cultural diversity. Secularism is naturally 
in accord with everything else he imagined independent India to be: a modern, sovereign, 
socialist, democratic republic. With respect to his personal views, Nehru has been variously 
described as an atheist, an agnostic, a rationalist, a skeptic, and a scientific humanist. Although 
he acknowledged India’s religious heritage, he denounced the dogma, ritualism, and superstition 
that he associated with orthodox religion. The mixture of religion and politics was, in his mind, 
particularly insidious. Both Nehru’s model of secularism and his secularist policies have been the 
subject of criticism. Just as the individual sentiments of judges are bound to influence court 
decisions, so was the Constitution influenced by the views of the individual members of the 
Constituent Assembly. 
The articles relating to religious freedom are found in part III of the Constitution, under 
the heading Fundamental Rights. Overall, the language of these articles reflects the Constituent 
Assembly members’ close study of numerous foreign constitutions and the provisions for 
religious freedom contained within them. J. Patrocinio de Souza also suggests inspiration from 
																																																								
6 Vidhu Verma, “Secularism in India,” in The Oxford Handbook of Secularism, ed. Phil 
Zuckerman and John R. Shook (New York, Oxford University Press, 2017), 218-19. 
7 Parliament of India, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII (Speech by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar), 
Dec. 2 1948, 7.65.178.  
http://cadindia.clpr.org.in/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/7/1948-12-02 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations only a year before 
the Indian Constitution.8 Articles 25—28 are the most relevant to religious liberty. Collectively, 
these articles guarantee the right to profess, practice, and propagate religion to individuals; 
guarantee the right to manage religious affairs to religious denominations; ensure that no 
individual must pay taxes for the promotion of any particular religion; and prohibit religious 
instruction in state-administered educational institutions.9 Articles 29 and 30 are sometimes 
included in the religious freedom clauses as they guarantee rights to minorities, including 
religious minorities. The religious freedom clauses also contain provisions for the state to 
regulate the secular aspects of religion and take measures for social reform. This study will deal 
solely with the rights claimed under Articles 25 and 26, both of which will be analyzed more 
thoroughly in chapters one and two. The rights guaranteed by these two articles have been 
restricted not only by the conditions explicit in the Constitution, but also by the Court’s use of its 
two tests mentioned above. 
The contradictory impulses in the Constitution have resulted in major legal tensions, 
which have largely played out in the courts. Articles 25 and 26 guarantee rights to both groups 
and individuals, contain provisions for the reform of some religions and not others, and allow the 
state to intervene into secular affairs while granting full protection to matters of religion. Verma 
claims that the Constitution’s vague language “encourages questions about the proper scope of 
religious liberty.”10 The promise of religious liberty combined with a mandate to regulate, 
restrict, and reform certain aspects of religion has remained one of the most contentious aspects 
																																																								
8 J. Patrocinio de Souza, “The Freedom of Religion Under the Indian Constitution,” The Indian 
Journal of Political Science 13, no. 3/4 (1952). 
9 The Constitution of India, arts. 25, 26, 27, 28; Clause (2) of Article 28 provides an exception 
for educational institutions administered by the state but established under an endowment or trust 
which requires that religious instruction be imparted. 
10 Verma, “Secularism in India,” 222. 
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of India’s religious freedom clauses. It should be noted that the controversy surrounding these 
articles and their interpretation is far from a merely legal concern. At times, it could be better 
characterized as a raging public dispute. The aftermath of court decisions on issues of religion 
has resulted in major national crises and enraged religious communities throughout the nation. 
Although it is outside the scope of this study to explore the social and political consequences of 
every relevant case, it should be emphasized that court judgments do not exist in isolation.  
 
Indian Secularism and the Supreme Court 
The word secular was added to the Constitution in 1976 by the Indian National Congress 
government led by Indira Gandhi, yet the controversy surrounding this term and its relevance in 
India is rooted much deeper. Secularism most commonly refers to a political ideology in which 
government institutions remain separate from organized religion and the state adopts a stance of 
neutrality towards religious matters. In the Indian context, the meaning and connotation of 
secularism is different than understood in Western nations. India retains separate personal laws 
for religious communities, provides financial support to religious educational institutions, has 
advocated a “principled distance” between religion and state rather than a hands-off approach, 
and has made specific provisions for the reform of the majority religion while giving minorities 
more autonomy.11 To some, these features are exemplary of the Indian model of secularism, not 
contrary to it. To others, these same features suggest the failure of secularism in India, or its poor 
implementation. 
																																																								
11 Rajeev Bhargava, “The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism,” in The Future of Secularism, 
ed. T.N. Srinivasan (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2006), 2; Partha Chatterjee, “Secularism 
and Toleration,” Economic and Political Weekly 29, no. 28 (July 1994): 1772. 
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The most noteworthy academic critics of Indian secularism are Ashis Nandy, T. N. 
Madan, and Partha Chatterjee. With varying degrees of cynicism, they offer several arguments: 
that secularism is fundamentally incompatible with India’s deeply religious populace; that it is 
apt to exacerbate instances of religious violence; that India never has been nor can be truly 
secular; and that secularism is not a viable tool to address the emerging crisis of religious 
intolerance.12 Others such as Rajeev Bhargava, Achin Vanaik, Asghar Ali Engineer, and Javeed 
Alam defend the concept.13 Secularism, the proponents suggest, is imperative to protect the 
democratic rights of minorities and the oppressed. The debates on secularism represent one of 
the most contested issues in Indian political discourse today, and are by no means restricted to 
academe or the courts. Journalists, activists, and politicians have imbued the term with pejorative 
connotations, and accused various parties of pseudo-secularism, selective secularism, and 
minority appeasement.14 For the purposes of this paper, we need not enter these debates. It would 
be useful, however, to note what both critics and proponents of secularism have identified as a 
defining characteristic of religion-state relations in India—the state’s interventionist disposition.  
Commentators across the ideological spectrum have observed that India never erected a 
wall of separation between religion and the state as understood in the United States. Noting that 
																																																								
12 Ashis Nandy, “An Anti-Secularist Manifesto,” India International Centre Quarterly 22, no. 1 
(April 1995); T. N. Madan, “Secularism in its Place,” The Journal of Asian Studies 46, no. 4 
(1987); Chatterjee, “Secularism and Toleration.” 
13 Bhargava, “The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism;” Achin Vanaik, Communalism 
Contested: Religion, Modernity, and Secularization (New Delhi, Vistaar Publications, 1997); 
Javeed Alam, “Indispensability of Secularism,” Social Scientist 26, no. 7/8 (1998); Asghar Ali 
Engineer, State, Secularism and Religion: Western and Indian Experience (Delhi, Ajanta 
Publications, 1998). 
14 Yogi Adityanath, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, recently remarked, “Mera maanna hai ki 
azadi ke baad Bharat mein sabse bada jhooth dharmnirpeksh shabd hai… koi vyavastha 
dharmnirpeksh nahin ho sakti” (I believe that the word secular is the biggest lie since 
Independence… No system can be secular); The Indian Express, “Secular word is the biggest lie, 
says Uttar Pradesh CM Yogi Adityanath,” India, November 14, 2017. 
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the Indian Constitution enjoins the state to intervene in religion, Bhargava argues that this fact 
does not represent a “depart[ure] from secular principles.”15 Rather, he proposes that the 
endorsement of state intervention in religion is a distinctive aspect of Indian secularism, and a 
result of India’s “cultural background and social context.”16 Similarly, Chatterjee points out that 
“the independent Indian state, for various historical reasons, had no option but to involve itself in 
the regulation, funding, and in some cases, even the administration of various religious 
institutions.”17 Aditya Nigam, another political theorist, writes, “there is from the very 
beginning, for historical reasons, a way in which ‘Indian secularism’, has acquired distinct marks 
of identification—the most important being that the state must intervene in religious reform 
precisely to ensure secularization, at least in the self-understanding of the modernizing elite.”18 
Behind the heated debate on secularism and its fate in India is a broad consensus on this defining 
feature of the Indian state: its propensity to involve itself in religious affairs.  
The Supreme Court’s decisions on religious freedom, I argue, exemplify the 
interventionist tendencies of the Indian state. The Court is an ideal environment to examine the 
state’s approach to religion and its consequences for religious freedom. The debates that occur in 
the courtroom connect the highly theoretical arguments on secularism to immediate, tangible 
issues, felt deeply by the nation’s citizens. Because the Supreme Court is tasked with balancing 
religious liberty with the state regulation of religion—two competing impulses in the 
Constitution—its decisions are profoundly consequential for religious communities in India. 
																																																								
15 Bhargava, “The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism,” 23. 
16 Bhargava, “The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism,” 23. 
17 Partha Chatterjee, “The Contradictions of Secularism,” in The Crisis of Secularism in India, 
ed. Anuradha Dingwaney Needham and Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, (Durham, Duke University 
Press, 2007), 143. 
18 Aditya Nigam, The Insurrection of Little Selves: The Crisis of Secular-Nationalism in India 
(Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2006), 153. 
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Conflict is inevitable. In carrying out its duty to resolve disputes and interpret laws, the judiciary 
gives substance to the guarantee of religious freedom, and determines the degree of restriction 
that can be placed upon it. Speaking to the role of the courts, Tahir Mahmood writes, “In the 
secular India of our times, it is the law of the land that determines the scope of religion in the 
society, and it is the judiciary that determines what the laws relating to the scope of religion say, 
mean, and require.”19 As Chatterjee observes, religious liberty is an essential quality of a secular 
state.20 A secular state is required to permit the free practice of any religion, within reasonable 
limits. Analyzing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on religion will shed light on what limits on 
religious freedom are understood to be reasonable, and why. 
I suggest another reason why it is prudent to consider the Indian Supreme Court’s 
adjudication on religion. Several recent cases have made it clear that judges read, cite, and 
contemplate scholarship on the Court’s approach. Their engagement with this material will 
inevitably influence their decision-making. Indeed, the Court is comprised of individuals, some 
of whom bring a self-reflective attitude to their judgments. That being the case, the body of 
scholarship dealing with secularism, religious freedom, and the Supreme Court is not only 
descriptive of the judiciary’s approach, but may even influence its course. Ideally, contributions 
to this discipline could enrich the ability for the judges to consider the broader context of their 
judgments, perhaps leading to more enlightened decision-making.  
As the locus of this study, a few words should be said about the Supreme Court’s 
organization and operation. Like most supreme courts, the Supreme Court of India is the final 
arbiter of constitutional disputes in the nation. Including the Chief Justice of India, the Court 
																																																								
19 Tahir Mahmood, “Religion, Law, and Judiciary in Modern India,” Brigham Young University 
Law Review 2006, no. 6 (2006): 775. 
20 Chatterjee, “Secularism and Toleration,” 1771. 
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today consists of a maximum of thirty-one judges. The number of positions increased 
dramatically over the years due to an increase in cases and workload. The appointment process 
for judges also has seen considerable change. Previously, judges were appointed by the president 
on the advice of the union cabinet, an executive body led by the prime minister. In an effort to 
promote judicial independence, the Court later adopted the collegium system in the 1990s. Under 
this system, Supreme Court judges are appointed by the president upon the recommendation of 
the collegium, which consists of the Chief Justice of India and five senior judges.21 There is no 
fixed term for judges’ tenure, and they retire at age sixty-five. Typically, judges sit on benches of 
two or three members. Particularly important cases are heard by a larger bench of five or more, 
known as a constitution bench. That several recent cases involving religious freedom required a 
constitution bench attests to their significance.  
 
The Sabarimala Case and the Consequences of Rulings on Religious Freedom 
 The controversy surrounding a recent Supreme Court decision illustrates the social and 
legal magnitude of religious freedom adjudication in India. Here, we will preview this case in 
order to demonstrate the profound societal ramifications of the Supreme Court’s approach, and 
foreshadow the findings in the subsequent chapters. The case popularly known as the Sabarimala 
case concerns a Hindu temple located in the southern state of Kerala. Devotees making 
pilgrimage to Sabarimala typically observe a forty-one day period of austerity, fasting, celibacy 
and purification known as vratham preceding their worship in the temple. Furthermore, many 
pilgrims make an arduous journey on foot through remote mountains and forests to reach the 
Sabarimala temple, some as long as sixty kilometers. Historically, women of menstruating age—
																																																								
21 Of the five senior judges on the collegium, four are the senior-most judges of the Supreme 
Court and one is the senior-most judge from the high court of the prospective appointee. 
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defined as between ten and fifty years—have been prohibited from making the pilgrimage and 
worshipping in the temple complex. Although some have provided reasons relating to women’s 
health and safety, the primary justification for the restriction is religious. It is believed that Lord 
Ayyappa, the deity associated with the temple, is a dedicated celibate or brahmachari. The 
implication is that women’s presence at the temple would offend the deity. Others point to the 
impurity of menstruation, or the possibility that women would distract male devotees and 
interfere with their practice of vratham. 
 In early 2019, two women broke the longstanding prohibition and entered the Sabarimala 
temple for worship.22 Their actions were prompted by the 2018 Court decision, which found the 
restriction on women’s entry unconstitutional and compelled the local police to provide security 
for any women attempting the pilgrimage. Many women before them attempted to enter the 
Sabarimala temple, but were blocked or intimidated by protestors. The successful entry of 
women into the temple, some would argue, has irrevocably altered the local religious landscape. 
Following the two women’s visit to the shrine, temple officials temporarily closed Sabarimala to 
perform rituals of purification.  
 The Sabarimala decision was met with severe opposition in the state of Kerala. 
Demonstrations and protests turned violent. Several deaths were attributed to the riots, and 
numerous buses, police vehicles, businesses, and offices were damaged or destroyed. As a 
measure of security, the government shut down schools and public transportation across the 
state.23 These events attest to the intensely politicized nature of the Sabarimala issue. In 
articulating their response to the Supreme Court decision, communities in Kerala became 
																																																								
22 BBC News, “Sabarimala: Indian Women Make History by Entering Temple,” BBC World, 
January 2, 2019; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-46733750. 
23 BBC News, “Sabarimala: India's Kerala Paralysed Amid Protests Over Temple Entry,” BBC  
World, January 3, 2019; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-46744142. 
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infuriated and in some instances, violent. The larger controversy surrounding the verdict 
extended far beyond the state, and became nothing short of a national outrage. Protests were held 
in both Delhi and Mumbai, many of the nation’s most prominent politicians and pundits 
remarked on the issue, and news stations spent innumerable hours covering the story. I do not 
intend to simplify the complexities that precipitated such turmoil in the wake of the Sabarimala 
decision. Among them however, is a feeling that the avowedly secular government has failed to 
protect the religious sentiments of millions of India’s Hindus. In consequence, a religious shrine 
has become a conflict zone. 
 The name of the infamous case is Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State Of 
Kerala.24 In 1991, the Kerala High Court considered the constitutionality of the restriction on 
women, and upheld the restriction as “in accordance with the usage prevalent from time 
immemorial.”25 In 2018, the issue was raised again in the Supreme Court, which set aside the 
earlier decision. By a 4:1 majority, the Court declared the restriction upon women’s entry 
unconstitutional. The majority judgments were grounded in the language of human dignity, 
equality, and progress. Yet to arrive at their conclusions, the judges had to consider several 
seemingly mundane questions on the nature of Lord Ayyappa devotees and their practices. 
Interestingly, these questions were decisive for this groundbreaking decision: 
2. Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an “essential religious 
practice” under Article 25 and whether a religious institution can assert a claim in that 
regard under the umbrella of right to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion? 
3. Whether Ayyappa Temple has a denominational character and, if so, is it permissible 
on the part of a ‘religious denomination’ managed by a statutory board and financed 
under Article 290-A of the Constitution of India out of the Consolidated Fund of Kerala 
																																																								
24 Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State Of Kerala, 2018 SCC 1690. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/163639357/ 
25 S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore, 1993 AIR Ker 42, 16. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1915943/ 
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and Tamil Nadu to indulge in such practices violating constitutional principles/ morality 
embedded in Articles 14, 15(3), 39(a) and 51-A(e)?26 
 
Although other factors influenced their conclusions, the judges placed significant weight on 
these two questions. The devotees were compelled to prove their denominational status and the 
essentiality of the impugned practice in order to satisfy the Court’s jurisprudential tests. Behind 
each of these questions is a lengthy and convoluted history, which this thesis will explore. The 
Sabarimala case attests to the evolution of these contentious juristic techniques, the religious 
denomination test and the essential practices test. Furthermore, the public reaction to the case 
establishes the relevance of religious freedom adjudication in India, and demonstrates the 
interrelationship between several distinct realms: the religious, the public, and the judicial.  
 
The Contents of this Thesis 
 This thesis is divided into two chapters, each devoted to one of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudential tests. Chapter one explores the religious denomination test, which the Court has 
employed to limit the beneficiaries of legal protection under Article 26 to particular groups. The 
Court has devised a technique to interrogate the nature of groups claiming the right to manage 
their own religious affairs, and determine whether they qualify as a religious denomination. The 
criteria sourced from the Oxford English Dictionary became the guiding principles behind this 
test: common faith, common organization, and distinctive name. Some multi-faith religious 
institutions may complicate the question of what constitutes a religious denomination. While the 
Court’s finding on a group’s denominational status is by no means decisive to the outcome of a 
case, the religious denomination test serves as a prerequisite condition for protection under 
Article 26. 
																																																								
26 Indian Young Lawyers Association at 3. 
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 Chapter two will consider the essential practices test, which the Court has applied in 
order to determine which religious practices receive legal protection. Unlike the religious 
denomination test, the essential practices test lacks a clear constitutional basis. It also contains a 
relatively greater number of components, which have changed considerably over time: 
compulsoriness, antiquity, prevalence, and scriptural basis have all been taken into account to 
determine a practice’s essentiality. Furthermore, the fundamental nature of the test changed over 
time, from determining whether a practice is religious or secular, to whether it is essential to 
religion. The question of whether religious communities or the Court hold the authority to 
determine essential practices has been in dispute throughout the history of the test. Like the 
religious denomination test, a litigant’s ability to prove the essentiality of a practice does not 
necessarily determine the outcome of a case, but it is an important factor. Chapter two will end 
with a review of the criticisms of the essential practices test, and the alternatives offered by the 
critics. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the findings from the previous two chapters and 
relate them to the broader discussion on secularism and religious freedom.27 
  
																																																								
27 The page numbers for the Supreme Court cases mentioned in this thesis refer to the judgments 
available on the Supreme Court of India’s official website: https://www.sci.gov.in/judgments. 
Another excellent resource for accessing court transcripts is Indian Kanoon (literally, Indian 
law): https://indiankanoon.org. The link to each judgment’s entry in Indian Kanoon is included 
with its respective citation. For high court cases, the page numbers refer to the PDF file of the 
judgment available on Indian Kanoon. In describing the circumstances of each case, I attempted 
to retain the spelling and vocabulary used in the original document. When spelling and 
vocabulary vary, the most common variation is used. 
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Chapter One: Religious Denominations in Court 
India’s courtrooms are the battleground for the nation’s most contentious legal dramas. In 
cases where the deep sentiments of religion are involved, there is a good chance that other 
sensitive issues of public concern are also at stake. Gender equality, caste discrimination, public 
safety, minority rights, secularism, and religious freedom are just some of the themes associated 
with these divisive proceedings. If the Sabarimala case has proven anything, it is that the 
Supreme Court’s decisions on religion are far from trivial, and often incredibly multifaceted. 
One would expect the content of Supreme Court trials addressing religion to reflect the 
magnitude of their social and political consequences. On that account, why would the courts be 
assessing whether a particular guru was a philosopher or a religious teacher, or whether a 
religious sect is in fact distinct from other Hindus? How did such debates—seemingly 
inconsequential to judicial discourse—become so commonplace in the highest court of the land, 
and what bearing do they have on judicial interpretation of the law? 
The answer lies in the language of Article 26 of India’s Constitution, which concerns the 
rights of religious denominations. By granting denominations autonomy in their religious affairs, 
Article 26 provides religious groups a legal defense against state intervention. The caveat is that 
claims of denominational status are rarely taken at face value. Religious groups are burdened 
with proving that they constitute a religious denomination, in order to validly invoke the 
protection of Article 26. Not only has the Court interpreted the scope of protection that Article 
26 provides, it has also defined, and thereby imposed limits on, the term religious denomination. 
This chapter will explore how and why religious groups have sought to be recognized as 
denominations. The notion of denominational rights is a recurring feature of the legal arguments 
put forward to defend religious practices and institutions from regulation by the state. Because of 
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the advantages that denominations enjoy over non-denominational parties, religious groups are 
encouraged to emphasize their distinct, denominational nature. By tracing the history of judicial 
decisions on the topic of religious denominations, this chapter will also consider how the 
Supreme Court has responded to the claims made on behalf of religious groups, and the criteria it 
has developed to assess those claims. 
 
Article 26 and Denominational Rights 
When conflicts arise between religious freedom and various statutes or constitutional 
rights, those who claim to be members of religious denominations often invoke Article 26 of the 
Constitution, which specifically confers rights to “every religious denomination or section 
thereof.” The full text of the Article reads: 
26. Freedom to manage religious affairs  
Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section 
thereof shall have the right 
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; 
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; 
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and 
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law1 
 
Both the content and interpretation of Article 26 are central to understanding the legal conflicts 
involving religious denominations. Every word and phrase of Article 26 is relevant to unraveling 
the rights of religious denominations, as well as the limits upon those rights. 
There are several notable points about the language of Article 26. First, the rights 
guaranteed by the Article are not absolute; the state reserves the power to place reasonable 
restrictions on religious freedom in the interest of public order, morality, and health. Certain 
rights, although avowedly religious, may be regulated by these limitation clauses if it is found 
																																																								
1 The Constitution of India, art. 26. 
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that they threaten public welfare. On many occasions, the courts have considered the breadth and 
meaning of these restrictions. The rights of Article 26 can also be struck down if it is found that 
they are in conflict with other constitutional rights. For example, Article 25(2)(b) protects the 
validity of laws for “throwing open of Hindu institutions…to all classes and sections of Hindus”; 
if a particular usage by a religious denomination contravenes a law protected by this Article, the 
courts may decide to give precedence to Article 25(2)(b) over the denominational rights 
guaranteed by Article 26.2 
Second, the text does not define or explain what constitutes matters of religion as 
mentioned in clause (b). The courts have considered Article 26(b) in conjunction with Article 
25(2)(a)—which mentions “economic, financial, political or other secular activity…associated 
with religious practice”—to surmise that non-religious matters involving religious communities 
are subject to state regulation. Thus, in its interpretation, Article 26(b) only protects matters that 
are purely and essentially religious. Furthermore, the courts have taken up the task of 
distinguishing between religious and secular affairs, which the following chapter will further 
examine. Article 26(b) is arguably the most ambiguous of all the clauses; therefore, religious 
groups have invoked it in a variety of different contexts. Matters of religion have been argued to 
include the rights to the management and administration of religious institutions, to regulate 
entry into places of worship, the right to excommunicate dissidents from a religious 
denomination, and more.  
 Third, and most important for this chapter, the fundamental rights in Article 26 are 
granted to religious denominations, not individual persons. Although the Constitution guarantees 
freedom of religion to both groups and individuals, Article 25 separately grants “freedom of 
																																																								
2 The Constitution of India, art. 25. 
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conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion” to “all persons” while 
Article 26 only deals with the collective rights of religious denominations.3 Several critics have 
discussed the consequences of making groups a bearer of rights.4 As what constitutes a religious 
denomination is undefined in the article, this central question has been left to the courts. 
Beginning with The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra 
Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (hereinafter, Shirur Mutt) in 1954, the Supreme Court has 
considered the term’s definition and developed criteria for determining whether a collective of 
individuals qualifies as a religious denomination. Qualification by these criteria is an important 
process, as it determines a group’s eligibility to invoke the rights guaranteed by Article 26. 
 
Why Claim Denominational Status?  
 The earliest rulings on religious freedom conferred significant autonomy to religious 
denominations, by allowing them to determine which practices are essential to their respective 
faiths. The Supreme Court observed that Article 26 was exclusively limited to matters of religion 
or the essentially religious as opposed to secular activities. By granting denominations the right 
to determine what constitutes matters of religion, the Court virtually gave denominations the 
power to determine the scope of Article 26, i.e., which practices were subject to state regulation 
and which were not. In this respect, Shirur Mutt as well as Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The 
State Of Bombay And Others were seen favorably by religious denominations. This relationship 
will be further explained in chapter two. Significant for this chapter is that those decisions 
created an incentive for religious denominations by granting them (theoretically, at least) 
																																																								
3 The Constitution of India, art. 25. 
4 Chatterjee, “Secularism and Toleration,” 1773-4; Gautam Bhatia, “Freedom from Community: 
Individual Rights, Group Life, State Authority and Religious Freedom under the Indian 
Constitution,” Global Constitutionalism 5, no. 3 (2016).  
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considerable autonomy. Long after the Court divested denominations of this autonomy and 
adopted a more interventionist stance, groups claiming denominational status continued to cite 
these early cases in an attempt to reclaim their self-determination.  
Compared to Hinduism and Islam generally, sub-sects or denominations of these faiths 
enjoy a relatively greater freedom to determine their own essential, and therefore legally 
protected, practices. The Court has expounded the tenets of Hinduism rather liberally, upholding 
the faith’s progressive and universal character. Islam has been largely interpreted via the Court’s 
own reading of the Quran, often dominated by a literalist approach. Particular denominational 
communities on the other hand, are in a better position to argue which of their practices are 
essential according to their tenets. For instance, in Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Others v. The 
State Of Mysore and Others and Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State Of Bombay, 
the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins and the Dawoodi Bohra community were both found to 
constitute religious denominations; they also successfully argued that their impugned practices 
were essential ones. In Dr. Noorjehan Safia Niaz And Anr v. State Of Maharashtra And Ors and 
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala, the religious groups concerned were 
denied denominational status, and the respective courts proceeded assuming that they 
represented Muslims and Hindus in the general sense. Neither group could successfully prove to 
the courts that the impugned practices were essential to Hinduism or Islam, respectively. 
Denominations do not always enjoy this advantage, but I suggest that they are relatively better 
positioned than so-called generic Hindus and Muslims. As a consequence, I argue that religious 
groups are encouraged to emphasize their distinctness from the mainstream forms of these faiths, 
and present themselves as separate religious denominations. The following chapter will further 
detail the relationship between religious denominations and essential practices. 
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 Groups have also presented themselves as religious denominations and invoked Article 
26(b) to challenge legislation regulating religious institutions. Although Article 26 guarantees 
denominations the right to manage their own institutions, a wide variety of places of worship, 
particularly Hindu temples, have come under regulatory control by state governments. Under the 
guise of tackling corruption, state governments across the nation have placed religious 
endowments under the control of statutory boards, and placed state-appointed officials in charge 
of managing religious institutions. Rajeev Dhavan and Fali Nariman call this process the 
“nationalization of religious endowments.”5 Legislation enabling this has been justified under 
Article 25(2)(a); it is argued that the administration and management of religious institutions 
amounts to a secular activity, and is therefore subject to state regulation and restriction. 
Nevertheless, denominations have challenged such legislation in Court, invoking their right to 
manage their own affairs as guaranteed by Article 26(b). 
 Similarly, Article 25(2)(b) protects legislation enacted on the grounds of social reform. In 
some cases, such legislation conflicts with a religious community’s claimed rights under Article 
26(b). This is particularly true for Hindu communities, as Article 25(2)(b) specifically protects 
legislation providing for the “throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character 
to all classes and sections of Hindus.”6 In order to argue that legislation enacted on behalf of 
social reform contravenes Article 26(b), it is necessary for the collective in question to prove that 
it is indeed a religious denomination, and therefore can invoke that Article validly.  
   
																																																								
5 Rajeev Dhavan and Fali S. Nariman, “The Supreme Court and Group Life: Religious Freedom, 
Minority Groups, and Disadvantaged Communities,” in Supreme But Not Infallible: Essays in 
Honour of the Supreme Court of India, ed. B. N. Kirpal (New York, Oxford University Press, 
2000), 263. 
6 The Constitution of India, art. 25. 
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The Supreme Court Rulings on Religious Denominations 
Introduced in the Shirur Mutt case of 1954, the religious denomination test became an 
important juristic tool for determining which groups can claim protection under Article 26. 
Although this study will be confined to the Supreme Court, high courts across India make use of 
the religious denomination test as well. Usually, a group’s denominational status is questioned in 
conjunction with other legal questions. If a group satisfies the denomination test, then the Court 
proceeds to consider the scope of their rights under Article 26. The three criteria of the test were 
sourced directly from the Oxford English Dictionary: common faith, common organization, and 
distinctive name. These conditions were further detailed in subsequent cases, and the test 
remains based on these criteria today. When religious groups do not meet the Court’s criteria to 
qualify as a religious denomination, their chances of winning a case are slim. When religious 
groups satisfy the religious denomination test, the results are more mixed, and highly dependent 
on the larger circumstances surrounding the case. By no means is denominational status alone a 
determinative factor in the outcome of a case. In some cases, however, the group’s 
denominational status does have a major bearing on the Court’s opinion. 
The Court has reserved the sole authority to determine which groups are religious 
denominations and which are not. In some instances, it must consider a wide variety of 
contradictory evidence to reach a conclusion. It appears that its findings are to some degree 
based on intuition. While some groups must justify their identity as a religious denomination, the 
Court treats other groups’ status as more obvious. Because of the special status conferred to 
religious denominations under Article 26, religious groups are encouraged to present themselves 
as such in Court. In reviewing the relevant cases chronologically, we will see how the 
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interpretation of the term religious denomination gradually unfolded over time, and has been 
applied to a wide variety of different religious collectives. 
 
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar 
of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 
 
The meaning of the term religious denomination was first articulated in Shirur Mutt. In 
several respects, this case laid the foundation for legal discourse on religion in India: the judges 
considered the constitutional meaning of religion, the scope of Article 26(b), the distinction 
between religious and secular affairs, and the definition of religious denomination. In Ronojoy 
Sen’s analysis of the case, he claims that it set forth “the guidelines as to who qualified as a 
religious denomination.”7 Although the Court’s discussion of the denomination question was 
somewhat brief, it established the principles upon which future decisions were based. Shirur 
Mutt has been cited in almost every subsequent case where a religious group’s denominational 
status is in dispute. 
 The Shirur Mutt case was an appeal against an earlier judgment made by the Madras 
High Court. In the earlier case, the mathadhipati or superior of Shirur Mutt, sought to prohibit 
the Hindu Religious Endowments Board, a statutory body responsible for the supervision of 
religious endowments, from settling a scheme for the administration of the Mutt.8 In 1946, a 
series of financial difficulties prompted the Board to exercise its powers and appoint an agent to 
manage the affairs of the institution. The Board claimed that the endowments of the Mutt were 
																																																								
7 Ronojoy Sen, Articles of Faith: Religion, Secularism, and the Indian Supreme Court (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 46. 
8 A Mutt (also spelled Math) is an ancient form of Hindu religious institution that functions akin 
to a monastery, and is usually affiliated with a particular school of Hindu philosophy. Shirur 
Mutt is one of the eight Mutts of Udupi, which were established by the renowned philosopher Sri 
Madhwacharya.  
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being mismanaged, and intended to frame a scheme which would deal with the administration of 
the Mutt. This scheme became the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 
1951, the validity of which was challenged. The head of the Mutt accused the Board of a number 
of inappropriate actions, and claimed that the legislation interfered with his right to manage the 
Mutt and violated the fundamental rights guaranteed to religious denominations under Article 26. 
Most concerning for the respondent, was that the legislation abolished the Board and vested the 
administration of religious endowments in a government department. As the head of this 
department, the proper administration of endowments was to be overseen by the Commissioner. 
The Madras High Court found several sections of the impugned act to be ultra vires of the 
Constitution, and the Commissioner was prohibited from proceeding further with a scheme to 
manage the Mutt. The Commissioner was allowed an appeal before the Supreme Court, which 
delivered its decision on the Shirur Mutt case in 1954. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found 
some sections of the Act to conflict with the rights of the mathadhipati, yet declared the rest of 
the Act to be valid. 
 Before examining the impugned sections of the Act, the Court considered whether a Mutt 
does in fact constitute a religious denomination. First, the Court referenced the opinion of the 
High Court, which found that Shirur Mutt “is really an institution belonging to Sivalli Brahmins, 
who are a section of the followers of Madhwacharya and hence constitutes a religious 
denomination within the meaning of article 26 of the Constitution.”9 The Court then offered its 
own opinion on the question, “what is the precise meaning or connotation of the expression 
																																																								
9 The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha 
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005, 9. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1430396/ 
	 26 
‘religious denomination’ and whether a Math could come within this expression.”10 B.K. 
Mukherjea, who authored the judgment, referred to the Oxford English Dictionary for guidance; 
the definition of denomination offered there is: “a collection of individuals classed together 
under the same name: a religious sect or body having a common faith and [o]rganisation and 
designated by a distinctive name.”11 He then applied this definition to the institution of Mutts, 
which were first established by Sankara in the first millennium: 
After Sankara, came a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded the 
different sects and sub-sects of the Hindu religion that we find in India at the present day. 
Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be called a religious denomination, as it 
is designated by a distinctive name, in many cases it is the name of the founder,-and has a 
common faith and common spiritual organization. The followers of Ramanuja, who are 
known by the name of Shri Vaishnabas, undoubtedly constitute a religious denomination; 
and so do the followers of Madhwacharya and other religious teachers.12  
 
These criteria, sourced directly from the Oxford English Dictionary, came to define the Court’s 
approach to assessing a group’s claim of denominational status—distinctive name, common 
faith, and common spiritual organization.  
 The Shirur Mutt case is also significant because it upheld the notion of denominational 
rights and explained the purview of Article 26. The Court pronounced that the freedom of 
religion guaranteed by the Constitution extended to both beliefs as well as acts done in pursuance 
of religious beliefs. It went further to claim that denominations themselves are the sole authority 
in determining which practices are regarded as essential to their faith, which I argue creates an 
additional motive for religious groups to identify as denominations. Another case from the same 
year, Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State Of Bombay And Others, also upheld the rights of 
religious denominations, although unlike the Shirur Mutt case it did not contemplate the meaning 
																																																								
10 Shirur Mutt at 12. 
11 Shirur Mutt at 12.  
12 Shirur Mutt at 13; italics added. 
	 27 
of the term itself.13 This combination—upholding a broad interpretation of denominational rights 
(covering both beliefs and acts) and granting denominations the freedom to determine the scope 
of these rights—gave substantial power to religious groups. Although the Court later adopted a 
more restrictive approach, this decision greatly incentivized religious denominations. It also 
introduced the fundamental criteria that have defined the religious denomination test to the 
present.  
 
Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Others v. The State Of Mysore and Others (with connected 
petition), 1957 
 
 The Devaru case represents a key conflict in the interpretation of religious freedom: how 
to negotiate the rights of individuals versus those of religious denominations. The Court had to 
balance the rights of the Hindu public guaranteed by Article 25 with the denominational rights 
guaranteed by Article 26. Devaru also included a more thorough debate on a group’s 
denominational status than Shirur Mutt, and thus contributed to the further elucidation of the 
religious denomination test. Most importantly perhaps, the Devaru case demonstrates how 
denominational status influences larger conflicts over constitutional rights.  
The Devaru case was an appeal by the trustees of a temple dedicated to Sri 
Venkataramana of Moolky Petta, situated in present-day Karnataka nearby Mangalore. The 
trustees made a plea to the government that the temple was a private one, founded exclusively 
for the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, and therefore outside the scope of the Madras Temple Entry 
Authorisation Act of 1947, which intended to give prohibited Hindus complete rights to enter 
Hindu public temples. After the government rejected their plea, the matter was brought to court. 
																																																								
13 Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State Of Bombay And Others, 1954 SCR 1035. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1307370/ 
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The trustees made the case that the temple was a denominational one, and on that account the 
Act did not apply. Although the High Court held that the public is entitled to worship in the 
temple, it also passed a limited decree that allowed the trustees to exclude the general public 
during certain ceremonies which are reserved for members of the denomination alone.  
The central question for determination in Devaru was the validity of section 3 of the Act, 
which opens all Hindu temples to members of the excluded classes.14 While the petitioners 
maintained that their denominational rights guaranteed by Article 26(b) entitled them to exclude 
persons who are not authorized to worship at the temple, the respondents argued that section 3 is 
protected by Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution.  It was determined that denominational temples 
could not be excluded from the purview of Article 25(2)(b); rather, the Court held that the 
protection of that Article should be “construed liberally in favour of the public”, yet harmonized 
with the rights conferred to religious denominations.15 In effect, this meant recognizing the right 
of the public to enter into the temple for worship, as well as the right of the denomination to 
exclude the public during certain ceremonies reserved exclusively for the Gowda Saraswath 
Brahmin community. The Supreme Court upheld the decree issued by the High Court, which it 
claimed, “strikes a just balance between the rights of the Hindu public under Art. 25(2)(b) and 
those of the denomination of the appellants under Art. 26(b).”16 
																																																								
14 Section 3(1) of the Act reads: “Notwithstanding any law, custom or usage to the contrary, 
persons belonging to the excluded classes shall be entitled to enter any Hindu temple and offer 
worship therein in the same manner and to the same extent as Hindus in general; and no member 
of any excluded class shall, by reason only of such entry or worship, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act, be deemed to have committed any actionable wrong or offence or be 
sued or prosecuted therefor.” 
15 Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Others v. The State Of Mysore and Others (with connected 
petition), 1958 SCR 895, 16. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1896039/ 
16 Devaru at 17. 
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 In every case relating to Article 26, the question of whether a group qualifies as a 
religious denomination carries a different weight. It is clear that in the Devaru case, the argument 
of the petitioners was highly contingent on the group’s denominational status. The Court listed 
the questions to be decided in order: 
(1) Is the Sri Venkataramana Temple at Moolky, a temple as defined in s. 2 (2) of Madras 
Act V of 1947? 
(2) If it is, is it a denominational temple? 
(3) If it is a denominational temple, are the plaintiffs entitled to exclude all Hindus other 
than Gowda Saraswath Brahmins from entering into it for worship, on the ground that it 
is a matter of religion within the protection of Art. 26(b) of the Constitution?17 
 
Because each question is dependent on the prior one being in the affirmative, the temple’s 
denominational status is integral to their argument for legal protection under Article 26. The 
petitioners also contended that denominational temples are not included within the expression 
“religious institutions of a public character” in Article 25(2)(b). If the institution were a general 
Hindu temple and not a denominational one, this argument would be without merit.  
 The timeline of the petitioners’ case also supports my claim that the language of Article 
26 incentivizes groups to present themselves as denominations. Recall that the initial contention 
of the trustees was that the temple was a private one, and therefore outside the purview of the 
Act. Their case was later modified to include the claim that the temple belonged to a religious 
denomination. The court transcript notes that this change occurred only briefly after the 
Constitution was made effective: 
On January 26, 1950, the Constitution came into force, and thereafter, on February 11, 
1950, the plaintiffs raised the further contention by way of amendment of the plaint that, 
in any event, as the temple was a denominational one, they were entitled to the protection 
of Art. 26, that it was a matter of religion as to who were entitled to take part in worship 
in a temple, and that s. 3 of the Act, in so far as it provided for the institution being 
																																																								
17 Devaru at 7. 
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thrown open to communities other than Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, was repugnant to 
Art. 26(b) of the Constitution and was, in consequence,' void.18 
 
There is little doubt that their revised argument based on the notion of denominational rights is 
anything but a response to the language of the recently adopted Constitution.  
 To determine whether the temple in question was denominational, the Court first referred 
to the decisions of the subordinate courts. The High Court held that the temple was a 
denominational institution, as it was founded for the benefit of Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. 
According to the Solicitor General, however, this fact alone does not establish that the temple is 
a denominational one, merely a communal one. He argued that it is necessary to prove that there 
are religious tenets and practices particular to the community, because the Court is concerned 
with the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins “not as a mere denomination, but as a religious 
denomination.”19 The petitioners put forth evidence in response to this claim: a document from 
the year 1826-27, which showed that “the head of the Kashi Mutt settled the disputes among the 
Archakas, and that they agreed to do the puja under his orders.”20 It also revealed that persons 
not belonging to the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community were excluded during certain 
ceremonies. The three gurus of the community in Moolky Petta were followers of the head of 
Kashi Mutt; recall that the Shirur Mutt decision affirmed that a Mutt qualifies as a religious 
denomination. The Court was satisfied with this argument, and allowed them to proceed on the 
grounds that the Sri Venkataramana temple at Moolky is a denominational institution: “This 
evidence leads irresistibly to the conclusion that the temple is a denominational one, as 
contended for by the appellants.”21 In its scrutiny of the group’s denominational status, the Court 
																																																								
18 Devaru at 5. 
19 Devaru at 8. 
20 Devaru at 8. 
21 Devaru at 9. 
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looked favorably on affiliation with another established religious denomination (Kashi Mutt) as 
well as exclusivity in its religious rituals. These additional factors expanded the religious 
denomination test beyond the three principles introduced in Shirur Mutt. 
 
The Durgah Committee, Ajmer And Others v. Syed Hussain Ali And Others, 1961 
 
The Durgah Committee case was an appeal of a decision issued by the Rajasthan High 
Court, in which the khadims of Durgah Khwaja Saheb in Ajmer challenged the validity of the 
Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955. Much like the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable 
Endowments Act, 1951, the Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955 vested the management and 
administration of the Durgah in a government-appointed committee. The Durgah, a major 
pilgrimage site for members of all faiths but especially for Muslims, is the tomb of the Sufi saint, 
Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti—also known as Khwaja Saheb Syed. The khadims are the 
descendants of two of Khwaja Saheb’s most devoted disciples, and have historically played a 
role in the maintenance and religious functions of the Durgah. They claimed to represent the 
Chishti Sufis, which they held was a religious denomination or a section thereof. Their 
contention was that the Act interfered with their fundamental right to manage the affairs of the 
Durgah, guaranteed by Article 26(b). Among the impugned sections of the Act were sections 5 
and 2(d). Section 5 provides for the organization of a Durgah Committee consisting of Hanafi 
Muslims, yet does not restrict that they shall be of the Chishtia order. Section 2(d) declares that 
the offerings received on behalf of the shrine, which the khadims regarded as their private 
property, shall be included in the Durgah Endowment. The khadims contended that these 
sections and several others infringed on their rights as a religious denomination. The High Court 
ruled in their favor, and declared that the impugned provisions of the Act were ultra vires. 
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 After the case was heard in the Supreme Court, the appeal on behalf of the Durgah 
Committee was successful and the High Court decision was set aside. Upon examining the 
history of the Durgah, the Court found that the khadims never had the right to administer the 
shrine; rather, the management of the Durgah had been in the hands of state-appointed officers 
for at least several centuries. On that account, the Court concluded: 
Art. 26 could not create any rights which the denomination or the section never had; they 
could merely safeguard and guarantee the continuance of such rights which the 
denomination or section had. Where right to administer properties had never vested in the 
denomination or had been surrendered by it or had otherwise been effectively and 
irretrievably lost to it, Art. 26, could not be successfully invoked.22 
 
Furthermore, the state-appointed officer in charge of the Durgah had been a Hindu in the past. 
This further discredited the respondents’ argument that section 5 must restrict the position to 
Chishti Sufis, as that right had been effectively lost by the denomination. 
When considering whether the Chishtia Sufis constitute a religious denomination, the 
Court expressed a reluctance not seen in earlier cases. Ultimately, the Court did assume for the 
sake of their argument that the Chishti order of Sufis was a denomination or a section of one, 
whom the respondents represented. First, the Court quoted a section from the chapter on Sufism 
in Murray T. Titus’ Indian Islam: A Religious History of Islam in India, which states: 
It [Sufism] is not the religion of a sect, it is rather a natural revolt of the human heart 
against the cold formalism of a ritualistic religion, and so while Sufis have never been 
regarded as a separate sect of Muslims they have nevertheless tended to gather 
themselves into religious orders.23  
 
																																																								
22 The Durgah Committee, Ajmer And Others v. Syed Hussain Ali And Others, 1962 SCR (1) 
383, 2. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1262157/ 
23 Murray T. Titus, Indian Islam: A Religious History of Islam in India (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1930), 110-111, quoted in Durgah Committee at 12. 
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Then, the Court referred to the report of the Durgah Committee, which although recognizing that 
Sufis are divided into four main silsilas, expressed the opinion these are not sects.24 Rather, it 
maintains that each silsila is only characterized by a few distinct spiritual practices. It is 
interesting that the Court treated the term sect as synonymous with denomination, and order as 
not. A further examination of Titus’ chapter on Sufism seems to suggest that the various orders 
of Sufis, including the Chishtis, likely meet the criteria of a religious denomination as laid down 
in Shirur Mutt: distinctive name, common faith, and common spiritual organization. Titus 
himself claims that the religious orders of the Sufis have “taken on special forms of 
organization” and are characterized by “loyalty to the founders of the orders and the peculiar 
practices which they enjoined on their followers.”25 Although the Court dealt with the case on 
the basis that the Chishtia sect was a religious denomination, it did not declare that it was wholly 
satisfied with this claim. This approach allowed for some flexibility in the application of the 
religious denomination test by granting the group provisional approval as a denomination and 
considering the implications of its claims.  
 
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State Of Bombay, 1962 
 
 Unlike the Durgah Committee case, Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State 
Of Bombay (hereinafter, the Saifuddin case) was a success for the religious denomination 
involved. The petitioner was the 51st Dai-ul-Mutlaq of the Dawoodi Bohra community, a sect 
within the Ismā’īlī branch of Shia Islam. Literally meaning the unrestricted missionary, the Dai-
ul-Mutlaq or simply the Dai is the head of the Dawoodi Bohra community, vested with both 
																																																								
24 A silsila, literally meaning chain or succession, can also refer to a spiritual lineage; the term is 
particularly used in Sufism, denoting a religious order under a sequence of teachers. 
25 Titus, Indian Islam, 112. 
	 34 
religious and temporal authority. One of his powers is that of excommunication, a practice 
appropriate under certain circumstances according to the tenets of the community.  
 Saifuddin concerned the validity of the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 
1949, which prohibited the excommunication of any member of a community and declared it a 
penal offense. According to the petitioner, this legislation interfered with his rights and powers 
as the religious leader of his community, and amounted to a violation of Articles 25 and 26 of the 
Constitution. The majority opinion of the Court agreed with the petitioner that the right of 
excommunication is a matter of religion within the meaning of Article 26(b), that the power to 
excommunicate dissidents is necessary to uphold the identity and unity of a religious 
denomination, and that the impugned legislation is not protected by Article 25(2)(b). 
 The Saifuddin case is relevant to this chapter in two regards: it showed that some groups 
are burdened with proving their denominational status, while it is assumed for others; and it 
demonstrated how religious denominations are advantaged over non-denominational religious 
groups in the determination of essential practices. The Dawoodi Bohra’s status as a religious 
denomination was not in dispute. There are several other important cases where the Court did not 
challenge a group’s claim to constitute a religious denomination.26 In Saifuddin, the Court 
acknowledged that “members are knit together by reason of certain common religious doctrines 
																																																								
26 Adding to the record of cases in which groups claimed denominational status without dispute 
are Tilkayat (1963), Sajjanlal Panjawat (1973), and Shayara Bano or the Triple Talaq case 
(2017). In these cases, the followers of Vallabha known as the Pushtimargiya Vaishnava 
Sampradaya, the Swetambar and Digamber sects of the Jain religion, and Sunni Muslims were 
all assumed to constitute religious denominations;  
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State Of Rajasthan And Others, 1964 SCR (1) 561; 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1913766/ 
State Of Rajasthan And Ors v. Sajjanlal Panjawat & Ors, 1974 SCR (2) 741; 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/703666/ 
Shayara Bano v. Union Of India And Ors, 2017 9 SCC 1. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/115701246/ 
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and admittedly its members belong to the same religion or religious creed of a section of the Shia 
community of Muslims.”27 The petition in the Saifuddin case succeeded on the grounds that the 
Act violated a religious denomination’s fundamental rights. If the Court were not convinced that 
the petitioner represented a bona fide religious denomination, the case would have unfolded 
differently, and the decision would likely have differed as well.    
 What made it so obvious that the Dawoodi Bohras form a religious denomination? It is 
notable that their status did not require argument or justification. There are several possible 
explanations. One is that the community fits the judges’ and the respondents’ preconceived 
notions of a religious denomination. It is also possible that the respondents were aware of the 
criteria put forth in the previous cases, and knew that the group was likely to satisfy them. 
Indeed, the group has several grounds on which to assert itself as a religious denomination; in 
addition to the Dawoodi Bohra community, they could have claimed to represent the Ismā’īlī 
sect, or the Shia branch of Islam. In either of these alternative cases, the petitioner could have 
provided a compelling argument regarding the group’s denominational status. 
 The Saifuddin case also supports my argument that denominations are better positioned 
than generic Hindus and Muslims to argue the essentiality of their religious practices.28 As the 
next chapter will further detail, the essentiality of excommunication was upheld because the 
practice ensures the community’s continued identity and existence. This argument is only 
																																																								
27 Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State Of Bombay, 1962 SCR Supl. (2) 496, 11. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/510078/ 
28 Generic, in this usage, refers to Hindus and Muslims that are not granted denominational 
status. For instance, in Sri Adi Visheshwara (1997), the Court concluded, “believers of [the] 
Shaiva form of worship are not a denominational sect or section of Hindus but they are Hindus 
as such.” In this sense, Shaivites represent generic Hindus, and are unable to invoke Article 26; 
Sri Adi Visheshwara Of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi, and Ors v. State Of U.P. And Ors, 
1997  SCR (2) 1086, 18. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/923604/ 
	 36 
compelling, I suggest, for a religious denomination: a small, distinct religious community with a 
highly specific history and doctrine. It is exceedingly unlikely that the Court would consider 
excommunication essential to Islam in the general sense. Furthermore, the Court did not assess 
essentiality on the basis of the Quran, which it has done for practically every other Muslim group 
claiming an essential practice. Perhaps the Court’s exegesis is less relevant to a denomination 
with a distinct theology, and the Court’s typical Quran-based approach would have proved 
controversial or illegitimate. That being the case, the essentiality of the practice rested on more 
compelling factors, such as the claims of the believers.29 
  
Sastri Yagnapurushadji And Others v. Muldas Brudardas Vaishya And Others, 1966 
 
 The circumstances of Sastri Yagnapurushadji And Others v. Muldas Brudardas Vaishya 
And Others (the Satsangi case) were similar to those of the Devaru case: a religious group sought 
exemption from an Act that guarantees prohibited castes the right to enter into Hindu temples for 
worship. Instead of purporting to be a religious denomination, the appellants in this case claimed 
that their sect was distinct from Hinduism altogether, and that it comprised a separate religion. 
This case has been included in this chapter because it illustrates the reason why some religious 
groups claim denominational status—exemption from legislation backed by Article 25(2)(b). 
The main anomaly of the Satsangi case is how the concerned group argued for that exemption. 
																																																								
29 Shortly after Saifuddin, the Supreme Court heard Raja Birakishore (1964), in which the 
petitioner claimed that the worshippers of Lord Jagannath have a right to administer the 
Jagannath temple as a religious denomination. The Court found that the temple was not one of 
any particular denomination or sect. Rather, it was a public temple for Hindus, above all cults 
and creeds; 
Raja Birakishore v. The State Of Orissa, 1964 SCR (7) 32. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1510201/ 
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 The appellants of the Satsangi case were followers of the Swaminarayan sect, known as 
satsangis.30 Their argument was that the Bombay Harijan Temple Entry Act, 1947 and 
subsequently the Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship (Entry Authorisation) Act, 1956 did 
not apply to their temples because the sect was distinct from the Hindu religion. These claims 
prompted the Court to consider the definition and scope of the Hindu religion, which led to a 
long philosophical musing on the origins and history of Hinduism. The judges affirmed the 
“broad and comprehensive character” of Hinduism, and evaluated the grounds on which the 
appellants argued that the satsang sect was unique.31 Ultimately, the Court was not satisfied with 
the argument on behalf of the satsangis; it concluded that Swaminarayan was one of Hinduism’s 
many saints and reformers, and his followers are not distinct or separate from other Hindus. 
Temples belonging to the sect were therefore within the purview of the Act. 
 Sen points out that the Court’s interpretation of Hinduism in the Satsangi case 
emphasized its tolerant, assimilative, and progressive character.32 Gautam Bhatia concurs with 
this notion: “The Chief Justice’s vision of Hinduism, as many scholars have remarked, was that 
of a rationalistic and progressive religion.”33 Marc Galanter also notes, “In the eyes of the court, 
the true teachings of Hinduism are those which make it attractive, progressive, dynamic, alive, 
youthful, and vigorous.”34 What does this entail for Hindus in regard to their legal challenges? 
																																																								
30 The teachings of Swaminarayan (1781-1830) were part of a Hindu reform and revivalism 
movement in 19th century India. The movement is highly devotional and shows the regional 
influences of Gujarat, where it largely developed. The 20th century saw a significant international 
expansion of the sect. 
31 Sastri Yagnapurushadji And Others v. Muldas Brudardas Vaishya And Others, 1966 SCR (3) 
242, 19. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/145565/ 
32 Sen, Articles of Faith, 17. 
33 Bhatia, “Freedom from Community,” 362. 
34 Marc Galanter, “Hinduism, Secularism, and the Indian Judiciary,” Philosophy East and West 
21, no. 3 (October 1971): 475. 
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Under this definition, the essentials and therefore the legally protected parts of Hinduism are 
naturally construed in a reformist fashion; this is the standard that any Hindu denomination’s 
practices will be held against to assess its essentiality. Indeed, the Satsangi case was cited in 
subsequent cases where litigants sought to prove that Hinduism is, if truly understood, against 
any form of discrimination. Given that Hinduism had been defined in such a manner, and that the 
Constitution had specifically provided for the reform of Hinduism, it is not surprising why a 
religious group would seek to evade this restriction.  
 The Court did not specify whether or not the satsangis would qualify as a religious 
denomination by the criteria it had set forth. It was implied that they would, as the Court often 
referred to them as a sect—a term it has used synonymously with denomination. Nevertheless, 
the Act itself applied to every “section, class or sect or denomination of [the] Hindu religion,” so 
whether or not the group was a separate denomination had no bearing on the legal questions of 
the case.35 Galanter, discussing the Satsangi case, observed: 
While denominational differences within other religions lie outside state power, the 
constitution embodies the notion that divisions within Hinduism need not be accorded the 
same respect. Article 25(2)b establishes that the state may act to overcome caste and 
denominational barriers within Hinduism. The law may be used to create an integrated 
Hindu community by conferring common rights of entry in religious premises.36  
 
The rights of Hindu denominations therefore, are not likely to include any measure that conflicts 
with social reform as envisioned by Article 25(2)(b). In this respect, the Court has been largely 





35 Sastri Yagnapurushadji at 7; italics added. 
36 Galanter, “Hinduism,” 477. 
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S.P. Mittal Etc. Etc. v. Union Of India And Others, 1982 
 
 Also known as the Auroville case, S.P. Mittal Etc. Etc. v. Union Of India And Others 
probably represents the most exhaustive judicial deliberation on the meaning and scope of the 
term religious denomination. The Auroville case concerned the validity of the Auroville 
(Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980, which transferred the management of the cultural township of 
Auroville from the Sri Aurobindo Society to the Central Government. Mirra Alfassa, a disciple 
of Sri Aurobindo also known as “The Mother”, founded Auroville in 1968. The experimental 
community hosts people of different countries to engage in scientific, cultural, and educational 
pursuits, aimed at the realization of human unity. The international character of the project 
attracted the attention of UNESCO, which began to sponsor the township. After the death of The 
Mother, complaints of mismanagement arose, which prompted the government to investigate the 
matter and eventually pass the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act. The petitioners challenged 
the constitutional validity of the Act on several grounds, one of which was that it infringes 
Article 26 of the Constitution by denying the Sri Aurobindo Society its right to manage its 
affairs. Naturally, the question of whether the Society truly constituted a religious denomination 
came up. The majority opinion held that neither the Society nor Auroville constitute a religious 
denomination; furthermore, even if they did, the legislature can validly impose laws regulating a 
denomination’s right to manage property, as the right in question was not a matter of religion. 
 The petitioners contended that the followers of Sri Aurobindo fulfill the three conditions 
of a religious denomination as laid out by the Court: a shared system of beliefs or doctrines, a 
distinctive name, and a common organization. They referred to Shirur Mutt, where it was found 
that the followers of Ramanuja, Madhwacharya, and other religious teachers could be regarded 
as religious denominations. Therefore, they argued: “there is no reason on principle which 
	 40 
compels the conclusion that the followers of Aurobindo who share common faith and 
organisation and have a distinctive name do not constitute a religious denomination.”37 The 
Court then considered the philosophy and teachings of Sri Aurobindo. In addition to writings by 
both him and The Mother, the Court examined an astonishing variety of sources for information 
on the guru, including: The Encyclopaedia Brittanica, The Dictionary of Comparative Religion, 
Encyclopaedia Americana, The Gazetteer of India, Newsweek, Living Religions of the World 
by Frederic Spiegelberg, and Sri Aurobindo: The Perfect and the Good by Robert Neil Minor. 
The petitioners emphasized the religious nature of Sri Aurobindo’s teachings as described in this 
assortment of journalism, scholarship, and reference works. It was further averred that the 
followers of Sri Aurobindo chant mantras specially prepared by the guru and go on pilgrimage to 
the Samadhi38 of Sri Aurobindo and The Mother, supporting their claim to be a religious 
denomination. 
 Judge O. Chinnappa Reddy, representing the only dissenting opinion on the bench, 
agreed with the petitioners that the followers of Sri Aurobindo constitute a religious 
denomination, and that the members of the Sri Aurobindo Society are a distinct section of that 
denomination. In regards to the status of the Society, he concluded: 
Whatever else he was, he truly was a religious teacher and taught and was understood to 
have taught new religious doctrine and practice. I fail to see why ‘Aurobindoism’ cannot 
be classified, if not as a new religion, as a new sect of Hinduism and why the followers of 
Shri Aurobindo cannot be termed a religious denomination.39 
 
																																																								
37 S.P. Mittal Etc. Etc. v. Union Of India And Others, 1983 SCR (1) 729, 36. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/312939/ 
38 In Hindu tradition, a Samadhi is a shrine or temple commemorating a deceased person, 
typically a saint or guru. 
39 S.P. Mittal at 20. 
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In his opinion, the expression religious denomination must “be interpreted…in a liberal, 
expansive way.”40 Even though Sri Aurobindo denied that he was founding a new religion, 
Reddy did not find this to contradict the group’s claim. He pointed out,  
No great religious teacher ever claimed that he was founding a new religion or a new 
school of religious thought. The question is not whether Sri Aurobindo refused to claim 
or denied that he was founding a new religion or a new school of religious thought but 
whether his disciples and the community thought so. There is no doubt that they did, not 
only his disciples and followers, but religious leaders all over the world over and of all 
faiths.41 
 
Reddy gave the examples of Buddhism, Jainism, and Christianity; the founders of these faiths 
did not necessarily claim that they were founding a new religion. The case also brought up 
another complex question in the religious denomination test: how to weigh the opinion of the 
general public versus the testimony of the members of the purported denomination. Although he 
did not challenge the three criteria that Mukherjea laid out in the Shirur Mutt case, he did express 
that those three conditions should not be weighed equally; rather, “common faith of the religious 
body” should be treated as the most important feature of the three.42 Furthermore, he added that a 
religious denomination does not need to owe allegiance to a parent religion—new religious 
groups could be considered denominations even if there is no affiliation to an already established 
religion. 
 There were several reasons why the majority of the bench did not accept the petitioners’ 
claim that the Society constituted a religious denomination. First, and perhaps most importantly, 
the Court considered the numerous utterings by both Sri Aurobindo and The Mother that neither 
Auroville nor the Society are religious institutions. The beginning of the Charter of Auroville 
																																																								
40 S.P. Mittal at 14. 
41 S.P. Mittal at 20. 
42 S.P. Mittal at 18. 
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states, “Auroville belongs to nobody in particular. Auroville belongs to humanity as a whole.”43 
Sri Aurobindo himself frequently made statements such as “we are not a party or a church or 
religion”, and “I may say that it is far from my purpose to propagate any religion, new or old.”44 
On this account, the Court concluded: 
There can be no better proof than what Sri Aurobindo and the Mother themselves thought 
of their teachings and their institutions to find out whether the teachings of Sri Aurobindo 
and his Integral Yoga constitute a religion or a philosophy. The above utterings from time 
to time by Sri Aurobindo and the Mother hardly leave any doubt about the nature of the 
institution.45 
 
It was also significant that new members to the Society do not necessarily lose their previous 
religion. The Solicitor General pointed out that membership to the society is open to people 
everywhere, “without any distinction of nationality, religion, caste, creed or sex.”46 He argues 
that this undermines their claim to be a religious denomination, because a person “cannot be a 
member of two religions at one and the same time.”47 Finally, the Society has in the past 
mentioned on official documents that it was another kind of institution than a religious one. For 
example, it was registered under the Societies Registration Act as a charity, not a religious 
institution. The Society also received an income tax exemption on the grounds that it was a 
scientific research organization, and not a religious institution. This led the Court to conclude 
that the Society and Auroville were not religious institutions or denominations, and that the 
teachings of Sri Aurobindo only represented his philosophy, not a religion. 
																																																								
43 S.P. Mittal at 43. 
44 S.P. Mittal at 44. 
45 S.P. Mittal at 45. 
46 S.P. Mittal at 41. 
47 S.P. Mittal at 41; Particularly in East Asia, people have identified with multiple religious 
traditions simultaneously throughout history. Most religion scholars would dismiss the notion 
that this undermines the identity of any one religion. 
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 Jaclyn Neo, in an article criticizing the use of  “definitional tests” to determine 
constitutional protection, rejects that a court can justify any distinction between philosophy and 
religion as the Supreme Court did in the Auroville case.48 She writes, “the Court’s opinion 
presumes that a clear distinction can be made between what is ‘religious’ and what is 
‘philosophical’ and thereby ‘secular.’ This is over-simplistic since a particular belief or practice 
can take on a religious or secular character, depending on which viewpoint a person adopts.”49 
The religious denomination test is what Neo calls a “definitional test,” because it uses a 
definition—that of religious denomination—to demarcate the boundaries of constitutional 
protection. She criticizes such an approach and favors one which considers a group’s self-
definition of religion: 
As they observe, the central insight of such an approach is that self-definition is relevant 
and should often be a “deciding factor” in how courts decide whether a group or practice 
is religious. Thus, where a group self-identifies as a religion and or self-identifies its 
beliefs and practices as religious, this should be taken seriously and weigh heavily in 
favor of it being regarded as such by others. Conversely, should a group that may bear 
similarities to religions deny that it is a religion, such as the Falungong or the Humanist 
societies, this should weigh heavily, if not conclusively, against it being regarded as a 
religion.50 
 
This approach is complicated by the fact that some groups do not have a single self-definition, or 
perhaps, their self-definition changes throughout time. For example, how is the Court to weigh 
the competing evidence in the Auroville case? The organization’s own tax documents conflict 
with the petitioners’ claim; furthermore, what if other members of the Society take a different 
view? Neo considers the possibility of deceit: “there is an aversion toward broad construction of 
these definitional tests in order to avoid manipulation by certain groups such as where a group 
																																																								
48 Jaclyn L. Neo, “Definitional Imbroglios: A Critique of the Definition of Religion and Essential 
Practice Tests in Religious Freedom Adjudication,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 
16, no. 2 (2018). 
49 Neo, “Definitional Imbroglios,” 582. 
50 Neo, “Definitional Imbroglios,” 590. 
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adopts the façade of religiosity in order to evade legal regulation or to avail itself of benefits such 
as tax exemption.51 Dhavan and Nariman also acknowledge this risk, yet maintain that “obvious 
cases of fraud can be easily detected.”52 In the Sri Aurobindo Society’s denial of religious 
denomination status, it is perhaps implicit that the Court assumed the petitioners were 
disingenuous in their claims, and attempting to present an appearance of religiosity for their own 
benefit.53  
 
Nallor Marthandam Vellalar & Ors v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religions and Charitable 
Endowments and Ors, 2003 
 
  The appellants in the Vellalar case sought a declaration that their temple is a 
denominational one, and thus exempt from the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable 
Endowments Act, 1959.54 The objective of the Act was essentially the same as the Madras Hindu 
Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, which it replaced: supervise Hindu temples by 
placing their administration under the jurisdiction of a government department. Section 107 of 
the Act specifically safeguards the rights guaranteed to religious denominations under Article 26. 
																																																								
51 Neo, “Definitional Imbroglios,” 591. 
52 Dhavan and Nariman, “The Supreme Court and Group Life,” 263. 
53 Following the Auroville case, two cases relevant to the religious denomination test should be 
noted: Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta (1983) and Bramchari Sidheswar Bhai (1995). In 
the former case, the Court concluded that the organization Ananda Marga constitutes a religious 
denomination. In the latter, it concluded that the Ramakrishna Mission could be considered a 
religious denomination, although it is not separate from Hinduism as the petitioners claimed; 
Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta, Etc. v. Commissioner Of Police, Calcutta And Anr, 1984 
SCR (1) 447. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/798012/ 
Bramchari Sidheswar Bhai and Ors, Etc v. State Of West Bengal Etc, 1995 SCC (4) 646. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/967081/ 
54 Nallor Marthandam Vellalar & Ors v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religions and Charitable 
Endowments and Ors, 2003 SCR Supl. (1) 920. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/491463/ 
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It was submitted that the Vellala community owned the entire extant of the Sree Uchini Makali 
Amman temple in Marthandam, Tamil Nadu, which their ancestors established. The Court 
dismissed their appeal and upheld the judgment of the High Court of Madras, which did not find 
sufficient evidence to conclude that the community established the temple, or that it constitutes a 
religious denomination. 
 In support of their claim, it was submitted that the members of the Vellala community 
observed special religious practices and beliefs that form an integral part of their religion. The 
petitioners also claimed that the front mandappam of the sanctorum was only accessible to the 
members of that community, and no others.55 A similar argument was seen in the Devaru case, 
that a degree of exclusiveness in religious ceremonies is evidence of denominational status. 
Nonetheless, in an earlier decision, a judge found that the group was merely a sub-caste of the 
Hindu religion, and not a religious denomination. The distinction between a sub-caste and a 
denomination reflects another argument in Devaru, that the purported denomination must not 
only establish that it is a cohesive social unit, but also that the collective is bound together by 
religious faith. The high court judge held that even if the group shared common practices and 
observances, it does not entail that they profess certain religious tenets or have a shared faith. 
Because no new evidence was provided, the Supreme Court upheld the prior judgment and 
dismissed the appeal. The Vellalar case demonstrated that two peripheral arguments occasionally 
provided in support of denominational status—observance of distinct religious practices and 




55 Mandappam: a pillared outdoor pavilion for rituals 
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Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State Of Tamil Nadu & Ors, 2014 
 
Similar to Shirur Mutt and Vellalar, Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State Of Tamil Nadu & 
Ors was a conflict between religious leaders in Tamil Nadu and the government body 
responsible for overseeing their institutions. Behind the case was an extremely lengthy history of 
litigation stretching back to 1951.56 For the present purposes, it is only necessary to present the 
general facts of the 2014 case appeal. Subramanian Swamy concerned the validity of Section 45 
of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, which provides for 
the appointment of an Executive Officer to administer a religious institution—in this case the Sri 
Sabhanayagar temple at Chidambaram, Tamil Nadu. The Podhu Dikshitars, who have reportedly 
administered the temple since ancient times, challenged the Act on the grounds that it deprives 
them of their rights guaranteed by Article 26 of the Constitution.57 This matter was considered in 
a series of previous decisions. In the 2014 appeal, the Court sought to determine the applicability 
of the principle of res judicata, and whether it was permissible for the Madras High Court to re-
examine the question of whether the Podhu Dikshitars constitute a religious denomination, an 
issue settled in a 1951 decision.58 
 The Court cited this earlier decision, in which the Division Bench of the Madras High 
Court concluded, “it seems to us that it is a clear case, in which it can safely be said that the 
Podhu Dikshitars who are Smartha Brahmins, form and constitute a religious denomination or in 
																																																								
56 Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State Of Tamil Nadu & Ors, 2014 SCC (5) 75. 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/130581093/ 
57 The Podhu Dikshitars are the married male members of a Smarthi Brahmin community in 
South India, who serve as the hereditary trustees of the Chidambaram temple dedicated to Lord 
Nataraja. 
58 Res judicata: a matter that has been adjudicated by a competent court and may not be pursued 
further by the same parties 
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any event, a section thereof.”59 In further support of this finding, it added that the group is a 
“closed body,” meaning, “no other Smartha Brahmin who is not a Dikshitar is entitled to 
participate in the administration or in the worship or in the services to God.”60 In the Auroville 
case, it was similarly urged that some degree of exclusivity is a necessary feature of a religious 
denomination. The Supreme Court then held that the principle of res judicata applies to this 
declaration; thus, the group’s denominational status could no longer be in question. Res judicata 
is an important concept as it relates to the religious denomination test, as it brings finality to 
decisions on a group’s denominational status. This, of course, could either advantage or 
disadvantage the religious group in concern. The case also summarized some important 
developments concerning the rights of religious denominations. First, a religious denomination 
can only claim to maintain that institution which has been established by it. Second, if a religious 
denomination loses its property, it automatically relinquishes its right to administer that property. 
Finally, the Court reaffirmed a key finding from Shirur Mutt: that no law can take away the right 
to administer a religious denomination altogether and vest it in another authority. 
 
Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. v. The State Of Kerala & Ors, 2018 
 
As the facts and circumstances of the Sabarimala case have been detailed in the 
introduction, this analysis will solely concern the devotees of Lord Ayyappa’s claim to constitute 
a religious denomination. It need not be reiterated that the Sabarimala case was one of enormous 
public significance. The case also illustrates the evolution and contemporary relevance of the 
Court’s jurisprudence on religious denominations. Similar to Devaru, the Court outlined the list 
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of questions for the bench to consider, showing how the religious denomination test fit into the 
proceedings. Third among the questions was  
Whether Ayyappa Temple has a denominational character and, if so, is it permissible on 
the part of a ‘religious denomination’ managed by a statutory board and financed under 
Article 290-A of the Constitution of India out of the Consolidated Fund of Kerala and 
Tamil Nadu to indulge in such practices violating constitutional principles/ morality 
embedded in Articles 14, 15(3), 39(a) and 51-A(e)?61 
 
The majority opinion of the Court ultimately concluded that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa did 
not satisfy the test of religious denomination as laid out in prior cases. A review of the 
supporting and opposing arguments will show how the Court reached this decision. 
 The respondents of the case categorically asserted that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa 
constitute a religious denomination—an organization of worshippers who follow the “Ayyappan 
Dharma,” and have distinct beliefs and practices.62 They added that male devotees are called 
“Ayyappans” while female devotees below ten years and above fifty years of age are known as 
“Malikapurams.”63 Devotees, they claimed, must abide by the specific customs and usages of the 
temple if they are to undertake Sabarimala pilgrimage and enter the temple compound. The 
nature of worship and the practices followed by the temple are unique, and the devotees who 
have accepted these practices for centuries would surely amount to a denomination, the 
respondents urged. In support of their claims, they sought to apply the requirements of a 
denomination as put forth in Shirur Mutt. First, it was submitted that the Ayyappans hold a 
common faith and belief—they believe that the deity at Sabarimala practices the strictest form of 
penance, and on that account cannot be in the presence of young women; and that devotees can 
be one with Lord Ayyappa if they undertake a strict forty-one day regime of penance in the 
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manner prescribed by custom. In regards to a distinctive name, they form a denomination or 
section called “Ayyappaswamis,” and that pilgrims coming to visit the temple are called 
“Ayyappans.”64 Representing the only dissenting opinion of the case, Justice Indu Malhotra 
argued that the denominational character of the Sabarimala temple had already been settled and 
was thus not open for question, according to res judicata. The Division Bench of the Kerala High 
Court, upon reviewing documentary evidence and hearing testimony from the devotees, affirmed 
the denominational character of the institution. Justice Malhotra held that this declaration would 
be binding, as per the findings in the Subramanian Swamy case. 
 The petitioners challenged the respondents’ claims on several grounds. First, it should be 
noted that the burden to prove that the group constitutes a denomination is on the respondents in 
this case. The Court concluded that none of the three tests for determination of denominational 
status had been established. No evidence was offered to suggest any binding religious practice, 
and even if some practices of the temple were distinct, the petitioners claimed: “some mere 
difference in practices carried out at Hindu Temples cannot accord to them the status of separate 
religious denominations.”65 Recall that the petitioners in Durgah Committee also suggested that a 
few distinct spiritual practices or minor differences in rituals did not make a silsila a 
denomination. Similarly, in Vellalar, the presence of distinct religious practices was not a 
satisfactory argument. The claim to a distinctive name was also challenged: “There is no 
identified group called Ayyappans. Every Hindu devotee can go to the temple.”66 They go on to 
deny that the devotees have any common religious tenets or doctrines, other than those common 
to the Hindu religion. Even worship and religious ceremonies, they argued, are “akin to any other 
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practice performed in any Hindu Temple.”67 Furthermore, it was pointed out that there exist over 
a thousand other Ayyappa temples, attended by practicing Hindus of all kinds. In regard to the 
group’s belief in the celibate nature of the deity and the concomitant restriction of women, the 
Court found that even this tenet was not uniform throughout the ages. In line with the 
respondents’ argument in the Auroville case, it was observed that Muslims and Christians also 
visit the temple, and do not cease to be Muslims or Christians. Perhaps the most compelling 
argument was that the temple’s administration is centralized under the Travancore Devaswom 
Board. It was argued that a denominational temple should have its own administration, and not 
be administered through a statutory body. In the words of Chief Justice Dipak Misra, “any 
temple under a statutory board like a Devaswom Board and financed out of the Consolidated 
Fund of Kerala and whose employees are employed by the Kerala Service Commission cannot 
claim to be an independent religious denomination.”68 Failing to satisfy the religious 
denomination test, it was concluded that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are simply the followers 
of the Hindu religion. This case demonstrates the important legal distinction between general 
Hindus and denominational ones: the former are subject to restrictive legislation backed by 
Article 25(2)(b), and intervention into their managerial affairs backed by Article 25(2)(a); the 
latter, while sometimes subject to these same constraints, can challenge them by invoking Article 
26(b). Sometimes, regulatory legislation such as the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable 
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Multi-faith Institutions and Denominational Status 
Owing to India’s complex religious landscape, many religious institutions and pilgrimage 
sites attract believers of many faiths. It is not uncommon for Muslims, Christians, Parsis, and 
Hindus to pay homage to a renowned saint or spiritual leader alongside one another. Several of 
the religious institutions embroiled in legal controversy fall into this category, being multi-faith 
sites of worship. On the surface, it may seem that the multi-faith character of an institution would 
contradict any claim that a religious denomination has the sole right to administer it. After all, 
denominations by their very nature are defined by exclusivity, separateness, and individuality; 
multi-faith institutions by plurality, inclusivity, and universality. Multi-faith by its very meaning 
implies inter-denominational.  How then, might a site’s usage by several different religions 
influence a group’s claim to denominational status? 
 This issue was first considered in the Durgah Committee case. The Durgah dedicated to 
Hazrat Moinuddin Chishti in Ajmer is undoubtedly a pilgrimage site for persons not just Muslim 
but of all religious faiths, including Hindus, Christians, Khoja Memons, and Parsis. The Court 
was made aware of this fact. The respondents even claimed that these groups constitute the 
largest number of pilgrims and visitors to the shrine. On this account, the judges acknowledged 
that this “inevitably puts a different complexion on the whole problem,” and that “on theoretical 
considerations, it may not be easy to hold” that the concerned group constitutes a religious 
denomination.69 Although the Court dealt with the dispute on the assumption that the petitioners 
did represent a religious denomination, the multi-faith character of the institution seemed to act 
as counter-evidence to this claim. 
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 In the Auroville case, the respondents similarly criticized that the organization and 
township were open to people of all faiths—a fact inconsistent with a denominational institution, 
in their opinion. In Raja Birakishore, the Court upheld the public character of the Lord Jagannath 
temple in Orissa against its denominational character: “the temple did not pertain to any 
particular sect, cult or creed of Hindus but was a public temple above all sects, cults and, creeds, 
therefore, as the temple was not the temple of any particular denomination.”70 The judges in Sri 
Adi Visheshwara also upheld the multi-denominational nature of the Kashi Vishwanath temple in 
Varanasi, and denied that it belonged to a specific sect. Justice Ramaswamy, who authored the 
judgment, even went on to extoll the importance of multi-faith institutions in general: 
“Congregation and assimilation of all sections of the society, in particular in place of worship 
generates feeling of amity assured in the Preamble [of the Constitution] and fosters fraternity for 
social cohesion, harmony and integration.”71  Also in the Sabarimala case, the respondents had 
to reconcile the fact that Muslims and Christians undertake pilgrimage and enter the Sabarimala 
temple as worshippers. It was submitted, “A distinctive feature of the pilgrimage is that pilgrims 
of all religions participate in the pilgrimage on an equal footing. Muslims and Christians 
undertake the pilgrimage. A member of any religion can be a part of the collective of individuals 
who worship Lord Ayyappa.”72 This led the Court to conclude: “Religion is not the basis of the 
collective of individuals who worship the deity. Bereft of a religious identity, the collective 
cannot claim to be regarded as a ‘religious denomination.’”73 In her dissenting opinion, Justice 
Malhotra denied that the shrine’s multi-faith character undermines the group’s claim to be a 
religious denomination. She wrote, “This argument does not hold water since it is not uncommon 
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for persons from different religious faiths to visit shrines of other religions. This by itself would 
not take away the right of the worshippers of this Temple who may constitute a religious 
denomination, or sect thereof.”74 
The multi-faith nature of some religious sites may not have a decisive impact on the 
question of whether a group is a denomination, but it certainly seems to impact the overall 
judgment. As we have seen, in cases of multi-faith institutions, the Court’s opinion has varied on 
whether the concerned religious group can constitute a denomination: the khadims representing 
Chishti Sufis passed the religious denomination test, while the Sri Aurobindo Society and Lord 
Ayyappa devotees did not. What is more consistent is how the Court chose to render a decision. 
When considering matters that involve multiple religious communities, the Court understandably 
is concerned with the public nature of the institution. In such cases, there is a reluctance to 
privilege the rights of a specific denominational community, as the rights of various other 
religious and non-religious communities are also at stake. Even if the Court does concede that 
the group constitutes a religious denomination, it nonetheless is inclined to construe 
denominational rights “liberally, in favour of the public,” in the words of Justice Venkatarama 
from the Devaru case.75 
 
What Makes a Denomination? 
 While not every religious group ultimately wins its legal battle, those that cannot pass the 
Supreme Court’s religious denomination test have an especially slim chance. Of the cases 
analyzed above, the Court found in only three instances that the concerned group could not be 
considered a religious denomination—the Sri Aurobindo Society in the Auroville case, the 
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Vellala community in the Vellalar case, and the devotees of Lord Ayyappa in the Sabarimala 
case. None of these cases were victorious for the religious group involved. In the cases where a 
group did satisfy the religious denomination test, the results were more varied. The Court has an 
exceedingly complex task of negotiating social reform with denominational rights. Therefore in 
many instances, even though a group was found to form a denomination, it was concluded the 
impugned practice or right of administration is not a matter of religion protected by Article 
26(b). This attests to the relationship of the religious denomination test to the essential practices 
test; in the strongest legal arguments, a religious group is able to demonstrate that it constitutes a 
religious denomination and that the claimed rights form an essential religious practice. 
 On review, the Court found a wide variety of groups to be legitimate religious 
denominations: the followers of Ramanuja, Vallabha, and Madhwacharya; Gowda Saraswath 
Brahmins; Chishtia Sufis; Dawoodi Bohras; Swetamber and Digamber Jains; Ananda Marga; the 
Ramakrishna Mission; Sunni Muslims; and Podhu Dikshitars. Some of these groups, such as the 
two sects of Jains, Sunni Muslims, and the Dawoodi Bohras, were able to claim denominational 
status without dispute. Three judicially sanctioned requirements to constitute a religious 
denomination have been codified into the religious denomination test: (1) common faith, (2) 
common organization, (3) designation by a distinctive name. Of the three conditions, several 
Justices have suggested that the first is perhaps the most essential. In the Saifuddin case, Justice 
Rajagopala Ayyangar noted: “The identity of a religious denomination consists in the identity of 
its doctrines, creeds and tenets and these are intended to ensure the unity of the faith which its 
adherents profess and the identity of the religious views are the bonds of the union which binds 
them together as one community.”76 Similarly, Justice Reddy in the Auroville case stated, 
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“whatever the ordinary features of a religious denomination may be considered to be, all are not 
of equal importance and surely the common faith of the religious body is more important than the 
other features.”77 While the centrality of common faith has been emphasized, the importance of 
sharing common ritual practices has been downplayed. In both the Durgah Committee and 
Sabarimala cases, it was submitted that mere differences in practices would not amount to 
evidence that a group is a religious denomination.  
I also suggest that there are other implicit and explicit factors that influence whether a 
group qualifies as a denomination. Perhaps these other factors cannot be called requirements, but 
they certainly have proved helpful in legal arguments where a group’s denominational status was 
up for determination. First, in the Sabarimala case it was shown that a religious denomination 
must own some property with perpetual succession—hence, clauses (c) and (d) of Article 26. 
Secondly, the practice of exclusive ceremonies, in which only members of the group are allowed 
to participate, has served as compelling evidence for denominational status. Both in Devaru and 
in Subramanian Swamy, the petitioners referred to ceremonies that were reserved exclusively for 
their denomination and restricted to all others. Thirdly, a denomination should follow a particular 
set of practices and rituals to qualify for rights. Although this may be flimsy evidence of 
denominational status by itself, the observance of distinct religious practices clearly helps a 
group’s argument when paired with other compelling evidence. Finally, the Court has looked 
favorably upon groups that are affiliated with other established religious denominations. For 
example, the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins submitted that they follow gurus subordinate to the 
head of Kashi Mutt, the Chishti order claimed affiliation with Sufism, and the Dawoodi Bohras 
argued that they form a sect within the Ismā’īlī branch of Shia Islam. 
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In attempting to establish whether or not a certain collective of individuals is a religious 
denomination, the Court has scrutinized many different kinds of evidence. It has not however, 
ever declared what types of evidence it will consider valid. Thus, to support their arguments, 
parties have relied on scholarly articles, encyclopedias, dictionaries, prior court decisions, 
testimony, journalism, documents from religious institutions, and more. Naturally, there will be 
differences in opinion among scholars, journalists, and worshippers. The type of evidence 
brought forth will necessarily influence the Court’s decision. This dilemma was particularly 
apparent in the Auroville case, where the Court had to balance the words of the organization’s 
founders against the testimony of its constituents. In response, Justice Reddy concluded that the 
“perception of the community” should take priority.78  
Some critics of the essential practices test have suggested that the Court’s engagement 
with source material is unfairly biased towards English-language scholarship produced in the 
colonial era. This observation is just as applicable, if not more, to the religious denomination 
test. Commenting on the Satsangi case, Galanter writes, “It [the Court] draws a picture of 
Hinduism based on Western or Western-inspired scholarly sources and elicits principles from 
Hindu tradition by common-law techniques. But if the court cannot enter into Hindu tradition 
and work within it, how persuasive can it be to the living exponents of that tradition and to their 
followers?”79 Regarding the distinction between religion and superstition that Gajendragadkar 
made in the Durgah Committee case, J. Duncan M. Derrett claims, “This reflects the impact of 
foreign notions, for the distinction between religion and superstition is foreign to Hinduism.”80 
Bhatia observes that the Court has privileged English-language sources and colonial writings, 
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while Dhavan and Nariman argue that Supreme Court judges have used westernization to 
“consolidate their social and self esteem.”81 Sen points out the Court’s bias towards “high-culture 
classic texts,” and relates this to “a discourse on classical or high Hinduism that originated with 
the nineteenth century reformation of Hinduism” and the “thrust for [legal] uniformity” in the 
colonial courts.82 Due to the Supreme Court’s seemingly erratic choice of sources, it is difficult 
to draw any definite conclusions on this theme. Nevertheless, such a bias could further 
jeopardize the legitimacy of an already controversial judicial technique. By relying on obsolete 
or questionable sources, the Court risks making judgments based on inaccurate information 
about religious groups and their practices, and perpetuating colonial stereotypes about Indian 
religions. 
The religious denomination test has received relatively less attention from scholars and 
critics than the essential practices test. However, much of the criticism leveled at the essential 
practices test could apply to both: inconsistency, lack of rigor, arbitrary reliance on questionable 
sources, and the requirement that judges settle matters of religious faith. In a brief remark, 
Dhavan and Nariman observed the arbitrariness of the test: “The religious distinctness of some 
sects were recognized, those of others was not.”83 Unlike the essential practices test however, the 
religious denomination test has direct roots in the Constitution—essentially, it represents the 
interpretation of the meaning and scope of the term denomination as included in Article 26. The 
essential practices test, as we will see in the next chapter, involves assessing both the nature of a 
practice (whether it is religious or secular) as well as its relative importance (whether it is 
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essential to the religion or not).84 Similarly, the religious denomination test has been used to 
ascertain the character of a group in two respects: whether the group is a religious body or a 
secular one, such as in the Auroville and Devaru cases; and whether it is a denomination or a 
religion in the generic sense. While the essential practices test evolved considerably over time, 
the religious denomination test largely stayed true to the criteria introduced in Shirur Mutt. One 
last difference between the two tests should be noted: from the very beginning, the Court 
reserved the sole authority to determine who qualifies as a religious denomination. On the other 
hand, there were significant disputes surrounding who holds the right to determine which 
practices are essential. 
To sum up, denominational status does not grant any group immunity from legal scrutiny. 
Rather, once established, a religious denomination can proceed to defend its practices and 
institutions on the basis of Article 26. In order to be successful, this would require more 
compelling arguments besides simply proving its identity as a denomination. A group may 
decide to approach the courts if legislation interferes with its purported right to manage its own 
religious affairs. Such legislation may be protected by Articles 25(2)(a) or 25(2)(b). Even if a 
group proves its denominational status, the court may still give precedence to these Articles over 
Article 26(b). Furthermore, a religious denomination may defend a religious practice as an 
essential part of its religion. In applying the essential practices test, a court may disagree with the 
denomination on the essentiality of a practice; it may conclude that a supposed religious practice 
is actually a secular matter, or that it is not an integral part of the religion. Even if a group proves 
that it qualifies as religious denomination, and that its impugned right or practice is essential, the 
court has further means to impose restrictions. It may declare that a practice conflicts with the 
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notions of public order, morality, or health, or that it contravenes other constitutional rights. The 
denomination test does not determine the final allocation of rights and restrictions for religious 
communities; nevertheless, it is important because other legal arguments are contingent upon it.
	 60 
Chapter Two: Essential Religious Practices 
India’s courts have introduced a curious stipulation to the right to freedom of religion as 
guaranteed by its Constitution. The protection provided to religious practices in juridical 
decisions is not nearly as comprehensive as the Constitution may suggest; rather, it is limited to 
the essential core of religion, and does not include any of religion’s more extraneous elements. 
In line with Supreme Court’s progressive vision, the most contentious religious customs are 
almost entirely excluded from religion’s legally protected core. So what precisely constitutes the 
essential part of religion? The Supreme Court has answered this question time and time again 
with one of its most controversial juristic techniques. 
Variously known as the essential practices test, the integral practices test, the doctrine of 
essential practices, the essentiality test, the three-step test, and the essential elements doctrine, 
the Court has developed a body of principles to determine which practices are essential to each 
religion, and therefore which practices receive legal protection. While the religious denomination 
test determines who is entitled to rights under Article 26, the essential practices test determines 
what practices are entitled to protection under Articles 25 and 26.  
This chapter will explore the broad range of practices that religious groups and 
individuals have presented as essential to their faith. It will show both why litigants have been 
encouraged to argue the essentiality of those practices, and how they have done so. In reviewing 
the evolution of the essential practices test, this chapter will also examine the criteria that the 
Supreme Court has developed to determine whether a practice can be considered an essential 
one. Finally, it will review the various responses to the test, including criticisms and potential 
alternatives offered by scholars and other commentators.  
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Article 25 and Religious Practices 
The Supreme Court has employed the essential practices test to scrutinize rights claimed 
under both Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Article 25 makes reference to religious 
practices. In contrast to Article 26, Articles 25 guarantees the freedom of religion to individuals 
rather than religious denominations. The full text reads: 
25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion 
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all 
persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, 
practise and propagate religion 
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the 
State from making any law 
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular 
activity which may be associated with religious practice; 
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu 
religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus  
Explanation I The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included 
in the profession of the Sikh religion  
Explanation II In sub clause (b) of clause reference to Hindus shall be construed 
as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, 
and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly1 
 
A close reading of Article 25 is crucial to understanding the development of the essential 
practices test. Even more so than Article 26, the provisions of Article 25 are highly specific to 
the India’s socio-political context, despite the influence of other nation’s constitutions.2 
There are several noteworthy points about the Article itself. Similar to Article 26, Article 
25 places express conditions on the freedom of religion: public order, morality, and health. The 
courts have struck down practices that they have deemed to be social evils on the grounds of 
morality, and cited public order to restrain practices that are likely to offend the general public. 
Thus, freedom to religion is not absolute. Practices that conflict with those provisions are liable 
																																																								
1 The Constitution of India, art. 25. 
2 Rajeev Bhargava explores the features of India’s socio-cultural context that led the state to 
intervene in religion and accept community-based rights; Bhargava, “The Distinctiveness of 
Indian Secularism,” 23-24. 
	 62 
to be struck down by the Court. Also, similar to Article 26, religious practices that violate other 
constitutional rights are likely to be declared void. 
In addition to the three conditions noted at the outset, clauses (a) and (b) discuss further 
terms that qualify the right to freedom of religion. Clause (a) protects legislation regulating 
“economic, financial, political, or other secular activities” associated with religious practice.3 
Here, we see an explicit distinction between the religious and the secular. However, as there is 
no constitutional principle, guideline, or explanation provided to distinguish between the 
religious and secular, this task has been left to the courts. In terms of legal protection, this 
distinction is a critical one: essentially and purely religious matters are fundamental rights, while 
secular matters are subject to regulation and restriction by the state. As we will see, the question 
of whether a particular practice or activity is religious or secular is an important component of 
the essential practices test, particularly in the earliest cases. Clause (b) places another condition 
on freedom of religion, by protecting legislation enacted for “social welfare and reform,” as well 
as the “throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and 
sections of Hindus.”4 This provision is also relevant to this chapter, as the courts are entrusted 
with the difficult task of balancing the freedom of religion guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 
against legislation backed by Article 25(2)(b). Clause (b) also exemplifies a distinct 
characteristic of Indian secularism—the state’s intervention in religious affairs. 
Another notable point about Article 25 is that the terms essential or essential practices 
are curiously absent. While the religious denomination test is based on the interpretation of a 
term explicitly included in Article 26, the essential practices test was entirely formulated by the 
judiciary, and lacks a clear basis in the constitutional text. Critics have been quick to point this 
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out. Thus, the important caveat to Article 25—that only the essentials of a religion are 
protected—is an innovation created by the courts. The essential practices test further 
circumscribes freedom of religion, along with the legislation sanctioned by clauses (a) and (b). 
 
The Religious and the Secular 
We have seen that the Constitution itself distinguishes between religious affairs and 
secular ones, the latter including activities of a financial, economic, or political nature. The 
courts, however, have been left with a fraught philosophical question: how to disentangle the 
religious from the secular? This section will overview some of the difficulties involved in this 
complicated endeavor.  
Strictly speaking, secular refers to things that are not regarded as religious or have no 
affiliation with religious or spiritual matters. Critics of secularism in India often attribute the 
secular/religious distinction to a Judeo-Christian worldview, and therefore argue that secularism, 
as a political ideology, is fundamentally incompatible with Indian society.5 Scholars more 
generally have problematized the distinction between the religious and the secular.6 Jaclyn Neo 
observes that courts risk “intruding into the theological realm” by demarcating the religious and 
the secular, because the “very defining of religion itself could be seen as ‘a religious issue.’”7 At 
the very least, applying these concepts in India involves some degree of cross-cultural 
translation. Speaking to this difficulty, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of the nation, 
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once remarked, “We talk about a secular state in India. It is perhaps not very easy even to find a 
good word in Hindi for ‘secular.’”8 
The judges of the Supreme Court have acknowledged the inherent difficulties involved in 
separating the religious from the secular. In the Tilkayat case of 1963, Justice Gajendragadkar 
observed: “It is true that the decision of the question as to whether a certain practice is a religious 
practice or not, as well as the question as to whether an affair in question is an affair in matters of 
religion or not, may present difficulties because sometimes practices, religious and secular, are 
inextricably mixed up.”9 He then considered a traditional Hindu view, further confounding this 
distinction: “This is more particularly so in regard to Hindu religion because as is well known, 
under the provisions of ancient Smritis, all human actions from birth to death and most of the 
individual actions from day to day are regarded as religious in character. As an illustration, we 
may refer to the fact that the Smritis regard marriage as a sacrament and not a contract.”10 
Despite these reservations, disengaging the religious and the secular is, in his view, a difficult but 
necessary task, and one that must be undertaken in order to deal with claims for protection under 
Articles 25(1) and 26(b). 
Often, specific cases highlight this tension. The Supreme Court has consistently 
designated the administration and management of religious institutions as a secular activity, 
subject to regulation by the state. Religious groups have pushed back against these decisions, 
often criticizing the Court’s arbitrary demarcation of religious versus secular affairs. In a 1996 
case, Pannalal Bansilal Pitti & Ors. Etc v. State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr, the petitioners 
argued, “The regulation of administration and governance of the religious institutions or 
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endowments would amount to restriction on the religious practices or freedom of religion, since 
establishment, maintenance and administration of the religious institutions and endowments are 
intertwined with the very religious faith itself.”11 Similarly, in the 1973 Sajjanlal Panjawat case, 
the respondents held, “the establishment of a trust or a temple is a part of the Jain religion and, 
therefore, the administration and management of Nakedaji Parasnath temple is also a part of their 
religion.”12 
Gautam Bhatia, reflecting on this issue, looks to Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s remarks during 
the Constituent Assembly debates. In Ambedkar’s words:  
The religious conceptions in this country are so vast that they cover every aspect of life, 
from birth to death... I do not think it is possible to accept a position of that sort... [W]e 
ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of religion in such a manner that we shall 
not extend beyond beliefs and such rituals as may be connected with ceremonials which 
are essentially religious. It is not necessary that...laws relating to tenancy or laws relating 
to succession, should be governed by religion.13 
 
This speaks to the same concern of the religious and the secular being inextricably mixed up. 
Bhatia summarizes this predicament: “the private life of the individual, and the public life of the 
community, were inextricably bound together.”14 In his analysis, the very reason why Ambedkar 
sought to include a division between the religious and the secular in the Constitution was to bring 
secular matters under state control, and to deny religious groups “sweeping powers over their 
constituents.”15 Marc Galanter also recognizes this impulse in the Constitution: “[under India’s 
Constitution] religions are to be divested of their character as sources of legal regulation of 
																																																								
11 Pannalal Bansilal Pitti & Ors. Etc v. State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr, 1996 SCC (2) 498, 2-3. 
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12 Sajjanlal Panjawat at 15. 
13 Parliament of India, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII (Speech by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar), 
quoted in Bhatia, “Freedom From Community,” 358. 
14 Bhatia, “Freedom From Community,” 359. 
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family life.”16 In this sense, Bhatia argues that in the earliest cases, the essential practices test 
was faithful to the Constitution. It was necessary for the Courts to interpret the distinction 
between matters of religion and secular activities associated with religious practice as provided 
for in Articles 25 and 26. Nevertheless, precisely where the Court draws the boundary between 
religious and secular matters is bound to be controversial, and certainly does not reflect a 
universal consensus. 
 As expected, there is considerable tension surrounding how to distinguish the religious 
from the secular. What does this tension suggest? Critics of secularism locate the 
religious/secular divide in Christian theology, Hindus and Jains have argued that religion 
encompasses virtually every aspect of their lives, while the Supreme Court advocates a common 
sense approach to distinguishing between the religious and the secular. The underlying issue, I 
argue, is that conceptions of the religious and secular are deeply imbedded in one’s worldview, 
and extraordinarily subjective. Neo concurs: “Defining religion is a ‘normative exercise’ and the 
final outcome would reflect ‘a particular worldview.’”17 The way the Court draws these 
distinctions is at odds with how many religious adherents understand their own realities. Indeed, 
there is no objective way to ascertain the character and status of a particular act. There is another 
possible explanation for the tension around the religious and secular: some have suggested that 
religious groups, knowing full well that religion is a protected category, attempt to deceive the 
judicial system by presenting secular practices as religious ones—what Neo calls the “strategic 
exploitation of constitutional guarantees.”18 In fact, the Court itself has entertained this 
possibility. I would not dismiss the possibility that religious groups, in some instances, 
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intentionally mischaracterize their practices in the courts to receive a legal advantage. It is also 
true, however, that by characterizing practices as religious or secular, a court is engaging in a 
matter of opinion and interpretation, not of fact. The Supreme Court routinely deals with groups 
and individuals of differing religious convictions, and therefore conflicting notions of religion 
and its scope naturally will come into play.  
 Bhatia points out that courts in the United States, Canada, and Europe typically refuse to 
question whether a practice is religious or not. He argues, “This refusal is part of a deeper 
commitment to constitutional liberalism, which declines to impose particular substantive visions 
of the good upon individuals.”19 Many of these courts employ the “assertion test,” in which “a 
petitioner could simply assert that a particular practice was a religious practice” and the courts 
typically do not challenge that claim.20 This is not the case in India. The essential practices test 
allows the judiciary to make positive judgments on what constitutes religion, even if these 
assessments conflict with the understandings of the individuals who profess the faith in question. 
 
The Supreme Court Rulings on Essential Religious Practices 
The essential practices test has developed considerably since its inception almost seventy 
years ago. Several cases in the 1950s affirmed the liberty of religious denominations to 
determine for themselves what constitutes the essential parts of their religion. Originally, the 
essential parts of religion referred to matters that were essentially religious, as opposed to 
secular. By the late 1950s, the Supreme Court started questioning whether a practice, although 
established as religious, was an essential one to a particular faith. From the 1960s onwards, the 
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Court applied all three components of what Dhavan and Nariman termed the “three-step 
inquiry,” namely, “whether the claim was religious at all, whether it was essential for the faith 
and, perforce, whether, even if essential, it complied with the public interest and reformist 
requirements of the Constitution.”21 Furthermore, the Court established its authority to determine 
for itself which practices could be considered essential to any religion. Although it maintained 
that essential practices are to be ascertained according to a religion’s own doctrine and tenets, it 
wielded the considerable power to interpret these at its own discretion. In reality, the mandates of 
religious texts, as well as the testimony of adherents themselves were only treated as auxiliary 
factors in the question of essentiality. In my assessment, the Court referenced whichever sources 
were expedient in any given case, without any consistent pattern or order. As time went on, 
judges introduced new criteria to be used for discerning whether a practice is essential or not. 
Many of these criteria proved to be controversial, and were later rejected by individual judges in 
their dissenting opinions.  
Just as the decisions in the 1960s contradicted many of the guidelines put forth the 
decade prior, I argue that rulings from the last fifteen years represent a distinct shift in the 
essential practices test, marked by an increasing attitude of self-reflection and a skepticism 
towards the test. This trend is by no means dominant in the Court today; by and large, the 
majority in the Supreme Court continues to adjudicate using the essential practices test. 
However, there has been a notable change in the content of dissenting opinions in major cases 
dealing with religious freedom. As more components have been added to the essential practices 
test, judges have more liberty to emphasize certain aspects of the test and reject others, leading 
them to different conclusions. For instance, individual judges have rejected that the Court can 
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question the rationality of a religious practice, or that the recentness of a practice has any bearing 
on its essentiality to the faith, or even that the Court has a legitimate authoritative role in 
determining essential practices. Such opinions, often accompanied by criticism of the essential 
practices test (or, at least, of the dominant interpretation of it), are still in the minority, but their 
prevalence seems to be increasing.  
By reviewing the major decisions relating to the essential practices test chronologically, 
its development over time and major shifts will become apparent. Nevertheless, the test’s 
application in any particular case is highly dependent on the opinions of the judges and the 
attending circumstances. Each case, it should be noted, is the product of a distinct social, 
political, and cultural milieu that cannot be sufficiently analyzed here. Generally speaking, the 
Court has a strong reformist inclination and routinely rules against religious groups in disputes 
surrounding religious freedom. It is important to consider how the Court arrives at those 
decisions, as that process speaks to the Court’s interpretation of the provisions for religious 
freedom contained in the Constitution. The Court has upheld essentiality as the necessary 
prerequisite for legal protection under Articles 25 and 26. In response to this requirement, 
claimants of protection under these articles are encouraged to present their practices as inherently 
religious, ancient, sanctioned by scripture, and fundamental for the continuance of their faith. 
Even the most convincing arguments may be rejected, however, as the Court generally lends 






The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar 
of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954. 
	
The notion of essential practices was first articulated in the Shirur Mutt case, in 1954. As 
we will see, the meaning of essential has changed considerably since the original remarks in 
Shirur Mutt. This case is notable in that the Court conferred significant freedom to religious 
communities in determining the scope of their beliefs and practices. Despite the evolution of the 
test, which effectively transferred this responsibility to the Court, litigants continue to cite Shirur 
Mutt in an attempt to validate the autonomy of religious denominations when matters of religion 
are in question. The early views of the Court provide a stark contrast to its more skeptical and 
intrusive approach, which became dominant less than a decade later. In Shirur Mutt, the Court 
considered two major questions: what constitutes the essential part of religion, and how that is to 
be ascertained. 
Recall that the respondent in this case claimed that his right to administer the Mutt was 
protected by Article 26, particularly clause (b)—which guarantees every religious denomination 
the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. The petitioners focused on the word 
religion as used in this Article, claiming that it should be understood “in its strict etymological 
sense.”22 On that account, they held that religion is to be “distinguished from any kind of secular 
activity which may be connected in some way with religion on [sic] but does not form an 
essential part of it.”23 Secular activity is thus, by definition, non-essential to religion. Discussing 
the provisions of Article 25(2)(a), the Solicitor General added, “all secular activities, which may 
be associated with religion but do not really constitute an essential part of it, are amenable to 
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State regulation.”24 In other words, those secular activities mentioned in Article 25(2)(a), 
activities that are economic, financial, or political in nature rather than solely religious, must 
necessarily be excluded from the essential core of religion. The Court maintained that “rituals 
and observances, ceremonies and mode of worship… even… matters of food and dress” could be 
regarded as integral parts of religion.25 According to this view, it is only this essentially religious 
core of beliefs and practices that the Constitution protects. 
On the latter question—how the essential parts of religion are to be ascertained—the 
Court adopted a strikingly liberal position: “what constitutes the essential part of a religion is 
primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself.”26 Furthermore, 
denominations themselves are entrusted with the sole authority to determine which practices are 
to be considered essential, according to their respective tenets:  
Under article 26(b), therefore, a religious denomination or organization enjoys complete 
autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential 
according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any 
jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters.27 
 
It did not take long for the Court to breach this position. Ironically, the Court itself became the 
primary outside authority involved in this task. Nevertheless, religious denominations naturally 
favor an internal view on the question of which matters are religious (and later, which ones are 
essential), and have therefore invoked this maxim throughout the Court’s history—even as 
recently as the Sabarimala case.28 
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  Another 1954 case, Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State Of Bombay And Others, dealt 
with the validity of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. In that case, the Court upheld the 
freedom for religious denominations to determine which aspects are central to their faith: 
Thus if the tenets of the Jain or the Parsi religion lay down that certain rites and 
ceremonies are to be performed at certain times and in a particular manner, it cannot be 
said that these are secular activities partaking of commercial or economic character 
simply because the involve expenditure of money or employment of priests or the use of 
marketable commodities. No outside authority has any right to say that these are not 
essential parts of religion. 29 
 
The judges also cited a High Court decision from 1907, in further support of a non-
interventionist approach to determining religious beliefs: 
“If this is the belief of the community” thus observed the learned Judge, “and it is proved 
undoubtedly to be the belief of the Zoroastrian community, a secular Judge is bound to 
accept that belief—it is not for him to sit in judgment on that belief, he has no right to 
interfere with the conscience of a donor who makes a gift in favour of what he believes to 
be the advancement of his religion and the welfare of his community or mankind.”30 
 
These statements seem extraordinary when viewed in the context of contemporary legal cases. 
As the essential practices test further developed, the subsequent decades have been defined by 
outside authorities sitting in judgment on religious beliefs. Based on the Court’s usage of the 
term in the early 1950s, the word essential implied that a matter was truly a religious concern, 
and not a secular one. The test was based on distinguishing “essentially religious” matters from 
“incidentally religious” matters—the former receiving full constitutional protection, and the 
latter considered secular activities subject to regulation.31 Even as early as the Ratilal Gandhi 
case in 1954, the judges foreshadowed the difficulties involved in this task: 
The distinction between matters of religion and those of secular administration of 
religious properties may, at times, appear to be a thin one. But in cases of doubt, as Chief 
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Justice Latham pointed out in the case referred to above, the court should take a common 
sense view and be actuated by considerations of practical necessity.32 
 
At this stage, the Court was not sitting in judgment on whether a certain practice was essential or 
inessential to a religion according to its tenets; rather, it attempted to distinguish between 
religious and secular matters, in order to determine the purview of Article 26(b). 
In his discussion of Shirur Mutt, Bhatia also notes that the essential practices test, or 
perhaps an emerging version of it, was used to “distinguish between the religious (free from 
regulation) and the secular (subject to regulation),” and that the Court “look[ed] to the religion 
itself” to accomplish this task.33 In this respect, Shirur Mutt marked the “original sin” of the 
essential practices test, by giving religious communities such unrestrained freedom.34 Religion’s 
vast jurisdiction became the source of tension: “If religion itself claimed such a vast domain, 
making religion the arbiter of what fell within its domain seems self-defeating.”35 This tension 
prompted the Court to tweak the test in a way that gave itself “substantial powers of 
intervention.”36 
 
Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Others v. The State Of Mysore and Others, 1957 
 
  The Devaru case marked a departure from Shirur Mutt in that the Court began to carve 
out its own role in examining the essentiality of religious practices. Following Devaru, the Court 
began to question whether a practice is essential to a religion, in addition to whether it is 
religious or secular. Justice Chandrachud in the Sabarimala case summarized this observation: 
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Prior to Devaru, this Court used the word ‘essential’ to distinguish between religious and 
secular practices in order to circumscribe the extent of state intervention in religious 
matters. The shift in judicial approach took place when ‘essentially religious’ (as distinct 
from the secular) became conflated with ‘essential to religion.’ The Court’s enquiry into 
the essentiality of the practice in question represented a shift in the test, which now 
enjoined upon the Court the duty to decide which religious practices would be afforded 
constitutional protection, based on the determination of what constitutes an essential 
religious practice.37 
 
Bhatia also notes this transition: 
Here is the key shift: the word ‘essential’ went from qualifying the nature of the practice 
(i.e., whether it is religious or secular), to qualifying its importance (within the religion) - 
i.e., from whether something is essentially religious to whether it is essential to the 
religion. It was a minor grammatical shift, but with significant consequences, because it 
allowed the Court to address questions internal to religion in a judicial enquiry, and 
thereby define the nature of religion itself.38  
 
Thus, the essentiality of religious practices became a justiciable issue. The next case will make 
this change more apparent. The main shift in Devaru was that denominations enjoyed 
significantly less autonomy than granted in Shirur Mutt. Although their testimony remained a 
factor in whether or not a practice was essential (which at this point, still implied essentially 
religious as opposed to secular), denominations themselves were not the deciding authority. Sen 
also notes this change; he writes, “the other cardinal principal laid out in Shirur Mutt regarding 
the ‘autonomy’ of a religious denomination to decide what ceremonies are essential, was 
breached.”39 
 As the issue at hand in Devaru was the right to regulate temple entry, the Solicitor 
General urged, “exclusion of persons from entering into a temple cannot ipso facto be regarded 
as a matter of religion… [W]hether it is so must depend on the tenets of the particular religion 
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which the institution in question represents.”40 Contrary to the prior cases, the burden of proving 
that this practice is an essentially religious one fell on the religious group concerned—in this 
case, the petitioners. To reach a decision on this matter, the Court referred to the ceremonial 
rules laid out in the Agamas.41 It was observed in a previous case that the Agamas do contain 
prescriptions regarding who is entitled to participate in worship at Hindu temples. Therefore, the 
Court held that “under the ceremonial law pertaining to temples, who are entitled to enter into 
them for worship and where they are entitled to stand and worship and how the worship is to be 
conducted are all matters of religion.”42 Although the final judgment effectively gave precedence 
to Article 25(2)(b) over the denomination’s rights, it is important to note that the Court allowed 
for the right of excluding certain persons from participating in worship to be considered among a 
denomination’s essential religious practices. What is more significant than the Court’s 
conclusion on this issue however, is that the Court was directly involved in adjudicating on 
essential practices to a degree not seen before. 
 
Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Others v. The State Of Bihar (And Connected Petition), 1958 
 
 Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Others v. The State Of Bihar dealt with the validity of three 
separate pieces of legislation, all of which restrict or prohibit cow slaughter: the Bihar 
Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act, 1955; the U. P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 
1955; and the C. P. and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949. The petitioners in this case were 
Muslims butchers belonging to the Quareshi community. These acts, they claimed, infringed 
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their fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 25 of the Constitution.43 
Although the case largely revolved around the argument relating to Article 19(1)(g), this analysis 
will focus on how the petitioners invoked Article 25, prompting the essential practices test. The 
respondents’ primary defense of the legislations was that they were enacted in pursuance of the 
directive principles in Article 48 of the Constitution, which advise the state to “take steps for 
preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other 
milch and draught cattle.”44 Directive principles, while not enforceable by the Court themselves, 
lay down the guidelines according to which the state has a duty to govern.45 Ultimately, the 
Court found the restrictions imposed by the Acts to be “quite reasonable and valid” overall, yet it 
did make minor revisions to them, by declaring some of the impugned sections void.46 
 According to the petitioners, the impugned Acts contravene Article 25 by prohibiting 
Muslims from sacrificing a cow for Eid, which they held was a religious practice of their 
community.  By means of the essential practices test, the Court then questioned whether “the 
sacrifice of a cow is enjoined or sanctioned by Islam.”47 Note the phrasing here: the Court was 
not only asking whether the practice was a matter of religion as opposed to a secular activity, it 
was asking whether a specific religion mandates the impugned practice. It was submitted that on 
the occasion of Eid, poor community members usually sacrifice one cow per seven individuals—
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a considerably cheaper option than the one sheep or goat required per individual. To substantiate 
this claim, the petitioners referred to verses 23 and 28 in Surah 22 of the Quran, which mention 
animal sacrifice. They further submitted that Muslims have observed this practice since time 
immemorial, both in India and across the world.  
 The Court was unsatisfied with the “extremely meagre” evidence offered by the 
petitioners, and denied that the relevant verses from the Quran support their claim.48 It held, “No 
affidavit has been filed by any person specially competent to expound the relevant tenets of 
Islam… We have no affidavit before us by any Maulana explaining the implications of those 
[v]erses or throwing any light on this problem.”49 Based on these remarks, it is clear that the 
Court lends greater credence to exegesis performed by trained religious officials versus 
commonplace practitioners. Thus, it proceeded to take the submitted verses at face value. The 
Court observed that the Quran does enjoin people to pray and make sacrifice, but found no 
section that requires the sacrifice of a cow. Then, the Court referred to the Hedaya as translated 
by Charles Hamilton.50 The Hedaya affirms that every Muslim of a mature age has a duty to 
offer sacrifice for Eid, and that the established sacrifice for one person is a goat, while a cow or 
camel is sufficient for seven persons. On this basis, the Court concluded, “It is therefore, optional 
for a Muslim to sacrifice a goat for one person or a cow or a camel for seven persons. It does not 
appear to be obligatory that a person must sacrifice a cow. The very fact of an option seems to 
run counter to the notion of an obligatory duty.”51 Because the practice is not absolutely 
obligatory, and religiously sanctioned alternatives exist, the Court denied that sacrificing a cow 
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could be considered an essential practice for Muslims. In further support of their decision, it was 
pointed out that many Muslims do not sacrifice a cow on Eid, and that historically several 
Mughal Emperors prohibited cow slaughter.  
 The Court was now investigating specific practices to determine their relative 
significance within a religion, if it finds that they are religious at all. In doing so, it was imposing 
its own point of view to answer questions of religious doctrine. The Court’s rationale behind this 
decision demonstrates its inflexible conception of the religious and the secular. The petitioners 
pointed out a reality for many Muslims in India, who are generally poorer than their Hindu 
counterparts: “a person with six other members of his family may afford to sacrifice a cow but 
may not be able to afford to sacrifice seven goats.”52 To this, the Court responded, “So there may 
be an economic compulsion although there is no religious compulsion.”53 This places the 
petitioners, and all other Muslims who share their circumstances, in a dilemma. According to the 
Court, if a religion prescribes x, y, or z, then x alone could not be considered essential to that 
religion, even for an individual who cannot afford y or z. One would expect the essential parts of 
religion to be accessible to all adherents of the faith, even the poorest. Yet because the alleged 
requirement to sacrifice a cow stems from an economic, that is to say a non-religious or secular 
circumstance, the Court denied that it could be legally protected as an essential practice. Even if 
Muslims traditionally practice it, they argued, it could not be held to be a religious mandate of 
Islam. In reaching this decision, the Court introduced new criteria to the essential practices test 
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The Durgah Committee, Ajmer And Others v. Syed Hussain Ali And Others, 1961 
 
 In the Durgah Committee case, the respondents’ primary argument was that the Durgah 
Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955, which vests the administration and management of the Durgah in a 
government-appointed committee, infringed upon their rights guaranteed by Articles 26(c) and 
(d) of the Constitution.  The Court dismissed their claim on the grounds that the denomination 
had effectively lost or surrendered these rights, so Article 26 could not be invoked. Therefore, it 
was not necessary for the Court to delve into whether the alleged rights constitute an essential 
part of religion. Nonetheless, Justice Gajendragadkar, who authored the judgment, took an 
opportunity to reaffirm that Article 26 exclusively applies to the “essential and integral parts of 
the religion and no to others.”54  In an obiter dictum, he noted: 
Whilst we are dealing with this point it may not be out of place incidentally to strike a 
note of caution and [o]bserve that in order that the practices in question should be treated 
as a part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral 
part; otherwise even purely secular practices which are not an essential or an integral part 
of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being 
treated as religious practices within the meaning of Art. 26.55 
 
Since the Shirur Mutt case, the Court has attempted to separate the religious from its concomitant 
secular affairs, treating the latter as not only non-essential but also subject to regulation and 
restriction. The Court’s statement above expresses a degree of skepticism towards religious 
groups, suggesting that they are liable to mislead authorities by disingenuously presenting 
secular practices as religious ones. This attitude contrasts sharply with the Shirur Mutt and 
Ratilal Gandhi cases, in which the Court upheld the freedom of a denomination to dictate its own 
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essential practices, at least in principle. Furthermore, it provides a justification for the Court to 
become more involved in this issue of essential practices. 
 When attempting to identify which practices are essential to religion, it is not only secular 
practices that may muddy the waters. Justice Gajendragadkar continued, 
Similarly, even practices though religious may have sprung from merely superstitious 
beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself. 
Unless such practices are found to constitute an essential and integral part of a religion 
their claim for the protection under Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other 
words, the protection must be confined to such religious practices as are an essential and 
an integral part of it and no other.56 
 
Sen and Bhatia both comment on these remarkable statements. According to Bhatia, this attests 
to the conflation of two separate inquires: first, whether the practice is of a religious or secular 
nature; and secondly, whether the practice is essential to the religion.57 Sen claims that the 
statement “pushed the essential practices doctrine in a new direction.”58 He writes,	 
The Court was not only going to play the role of the gatekeeper as to what qualified as 
religion, but now it was also taking up the role of sifting superstition from ‘real’ religion. 
This was a clear statement of the Court’s role—which had not been so overt until that 
point—in rationalizing religion and marginalizing practices that did not meet the Court’s 
test.59  
 
Not only do Gajendragadkar’s remarks underscore the Court’s authority in determining essential 
practices, but they also attest to the Court’s emerging perspective on the nature of religion. By 
attempting to discard its secular and non-rational features, the Court effectively promulgated an 
essentialist definition of religion—one that will be more fully expounded in the Ananda Marga 
case (2004). According to this view, religions are characterized by a set of fundamental 
elements, a core of essential beliefs and practices. Everything other than these essential features, 
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be it temple administration or superstitious practices, is extraneous and therefore outside the 
scope of legal protection. As a consequence of this approach, legislation controlling the 
administrative and financial aspects of religious institutions was further legitimized. 
 
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State Of Bombay, 1962 
 
 One of the central questions in the Saifuddin case was whether excommunication could 
be considered an essential religious practice of the Dawoodi Bohra community. Initially, the 
Bombay High Court rejected this position. Not only did it deny that the practice was an essential 
part of religion, but it also denied that the right to excommunicate has any basis in religious 
doctrines. The impugned practice therefore failed the essential practices test in two regards: it is 
not essentially religious or distinct from the secular, as described in Shirur Mutt, nor is it a 
practice that the tenets of the religion prescribe as necessary. The High Court added that even 
assuming it is an essential religious practice, it would still run counter to public order, morality 
and health, the three conditions to which Articles 25 and 26 are subject. 
 The case unfolded rather differently when it reached the Supreme Court for appeal. The 
petitioner reaffirmed that the practice of excommunication is an “essential and integral part of 
the religion and religious belief, faith and tenets of Dawoodi Bohra community,” guaranteed by 
Article 26 of the Constitution.60 Although the Court reiterated the difference between essential 
and nonessential practices, the petitioner invoked Shirur Mutt to argue that the denomination has 
the right to determine what are the essential parts of its religion. It was maintained that the Dai-ul 
Mutlaq, as spiritual head of the denomination, has the right to remove members from the 
community who defy his authority or denounce the community’s fundamental religious 
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doctrines. For this reason, the practice was held to be “essential to the purity of religious 
denominations.”61 
 The Attorney General, supporting the respondents, insisted that there was no evidence on 
record to show that excommunication was an essential matter of religion. The Bombay 
Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949, according to the respondents, was solely intended to 
prevent the infringement of civil rights. The respondents emphasized the progressive aims of the 
Act and denied that it restricted the free expression of religion: 
The right to worship at a particular place or the right of burial in a particular burial 
ground [the rights that excommunicated persons were deprived of] were questions of civil 
nature, a dispute in respect of which was within the cognizance of the Civil Courts. The 
legislation in question, in its real aspects, was a matter of social welfare and social reform 
and not within the prohibitions of Art. 25(1) or Art. 26.62 
 
As per the High Court decision, the respondents urged that the Act would remain valid even if 
the practice of excommunication “touched certain religious matters.”63 Social reform, the 
respondents claimed, took precedence over any notion of denominational rights; in other words, 
Article 26(b) was subject to or controlled by Article 25(2)(b). It was clear that the respondents 
had no doubt that the impugned Act was firmly rooted in ideals of social welfare, as they 
declared it was “in consonance with modern notions of human dignity and individual liberty.”64 
 The Supreme Court’s opinion on this case was, perhaps surprisingly, rather sympathetic 
to the religious community involved. Although the Court refused to say whether or not every 
case of excommunication could be considered a matter of religion, it conceded that in some cases 
it might be based on religious grounds, such as an individual’s “lapse from the orthodox religious 
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creed or doctrine.”65 It likened this sort of excommunication to heresy, apostasy, or schism under 
Canon law—matters clearly based in religion. The practice of removing dissidents from the 
community helped maintain the strength and cohesion of the religious denomination, and was 
clearly a matter of religion as outlined in Article 26(b). As the impugned Act invalidates even 
excommunication performed on religious grounds, the Court concluded that, “it therefore, clearly 
interferes with the right of the Dawoodi Bohra community under cl. (b) of Art. 26 of the 
Constitution.”66 
 The Court seemed convinced by the petitioner’s argument, that excommunication was a 
matter of self-preservation for the religious collective. This argument linked the impugned 
practice to a denomination’s very right to existence. The Court observed, 
The right to such continued existence involves the right to maintain discipline by taking 
suitable action inter alia of excommunicating those who deny the fundamental bases of 
the religion. The consequences of the exercise of that power vested in the denomination 
or in its head—a power which is essential for maintaining the existence and unity of 
denomination must necessarily be the exclusion of the person excommunicated from 
participation in the religious life of the denomination.67 
 
Thus, the Court described a religious denomination as a “quasi-personality,” interested in 
ensuring its own continuity.68 On that account, the practice of excommunication was essential to 
maintain the integrity of the group. Without a mechanism to ensure that the members of a 
denomination adhere to its essential doctrines, it was suggested that “the community as a group 
would soon cease to exist.”69 
 The Court then discussed the application of Article 25(2)(b), as it pertained to the case. 
Recalling that the legislation in the Devaru case was saved by Article 25(2)(b), the Attorney 
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General argued that the validity of the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act was 
similarly protected by this Article, as a “measure of social welfare and reform.”70 The judges 
rejected this position. In the Devaru case, the Court upheld the impugned Act on the basis of 
Article 17, which abolishes untouchability, and the latter part of Article 25(2)(b), which throws 
open all public Hindu religious institutions. Both of these clauses are unconditional, and do not 
draw any distinction between essential and nonessential practices. The provision for “social 
welfare and reform” however, could not protect the validity of laws that invade the “basic and 
essential practices of religion which are guaranteed by the operative portion of Art. 25(1).”71  
This would, in effect, encroach upon the entire concept of religious freedom. As the practice of 
excommunication was found to be essential to the denomination’s survival as a distinct entity, 
the Court denied that the legislature could “reform a religion out of existence or identity” under 
the pretense of social reform. 
 The Saifuddin case was important in several regards. First of all, it identified the different 
categories the Court formulated to classify religious and non-religious practices, and how they 
operate in terms of the essential practices test. For example, the essentially religious or matters of 
religion under Article 26(b) were distinguished from activities associated with religious 
practices—the activities contemplated by Article 25(2)(a). Both the petitioner’s and respondents’ 
argument responded to whether the impugned practice is a matter of religion, and if so, whether 
it is an essential one. The conflict regarding who determines which practices are essential was 
also apparent. Although the petitioner invoked Shirur Mutt to uphold the denomination’s 
authority in deciding essential practices, the Court also noted, “what constitutes an essential part 
of a religious or religious practice has to be decided by the courts with reference to the doctrine 
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of a particular religion.”72 Even though the Court sided with the religious denomination and 
considered excommunication an essential religious practice, it was not clear to what extent this 
finding was based on the community’s own claims, versus the Court’s opinion. The fact that the 
respondents even challenged that the practice is a matter of religion shows that the denomination 
does not enjoy complete autonomy on this question. Future rulings will show that autonomy 
diminish even further. 
 
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State Of Rajasthan And Others, 1963 
 
 In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that the followers of Vallabha known as the 
Pushtimargiya Vaishnava Sampradaya were found to constitute a religious denomination. In this 
case (the Tilkayat case), the Tilkayat, or head of that denomination Shri Govindlalji Maharaj 
challenged the validity of the Nathdwara Temple Act of 1959. The Act, like much of the 
legislation pertaining to Hindu temples, provided for the appointment of a board to oversee the 
administration of the temple properties and the management of temple’s secular affairs. The 
Tilkayat claimed that the idol of Shrinathji in the Nathdwara temple and all the property 
pertaining to it were his private properties; thus, the State Legislature was not competent to pass 
the Act. He added that even if the Nathdwara temple was found to be a public temple, the Act 
still contravenes his fundamental rights as the spiritual head of the institution. Furthermore, it 
was urged that the provisions of the Act violate the rights of the denomination guaranteed by 
Article 26 of the Constitution.  
 In connection with these claims, the Court sought to determine not only whether the 
temple is a public or private one, but also whether the tenets of the religious denomination 
																																																								
72 Saifuddin at 25; italics added. 
	 86 
specifically mandate that devotees perform their worship in private temples. In other words, the 
Court inquired whether worship in private temples could be considered an essential religious 
practice. The petitioners, in support of this claim, referred to Vaishnavism Shaivism And Other 
Minor Religious Systems by R. G. Bhandarkar. In the section dealing with Vallabha and his 
school, it was that “Each Guru has a temple of his own, and there are no public places of 
worship. The devotee should visit the temple of his Guru at stated intervals, which are eight in 
number during the day.”73 The Attorney General, on behalf of the Tilkayat, also submitted that 
the tenets of the denomination enjoin devotees to worship in the house and temple of the Guru or 
Maharaj, not in a public place of worship. The fact that these temples are called havelis was also 
offered as support for their private character.74  
 Despite these claims, the Court urged a more comprehensive investigation into the 
practice in question and whether it can be considered essential to the denomination. Regarding 
the statements from Bhandarkar’s book, it was noted, “these observations are incidental and 
cannot be taken to indicate the learned Doctor’s conclusions after a careful examination of all the 
relevant considerations bearing on the point.”75 Then, the Court considered several other reasons 
why the devotees have historically worshipped in private temples, other than by prescription of 
their religious tenets. First, it was suggested that assembling in the haveli of the Guru encouraged 
collective and congregational prayers. Second, the Court posited that worship in Hindu public 
temples might have seemed overly formal and rigid for the denomination, interfering with the 
genuine, passionate bhakti of the devotees.76 Finally, the fact that the outside appearance of the 
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temples resembled a private structure likely served a historical function; religious persecution 
during Aurangzeb’s reign was a concern that led many Hindus to conceal their temples. On these 
grounds, the Court concluded that the Vallabha School did not prohibit worship in public 
temples, and that “neither the tenets nor the religious practices of the Vallabha School 
necessarily postulate that the followers of the school must worship in a private temple.”77 This 
conclusion demonstrates the rigidity of the essential practices test at this stage. Even 
longstanding religious practices, claimed by the community and corroborated by scholarship, can 
be deemed inessential if they are not obligatory and the alternatives are not specifically 
prohibited. In this respect, the Court’s conclusion follows the principles laid out in the Quareshi 
case. 
 The Court proceeded to consider whether the rights of the denomination under Articles 
25 and 26 of the constitution have been contravened by the Act. The major difficulty with this 
claim was the divided opinion of the denomination itself. On one hand, members of the 
denomination were inclined to support the Tilkayat’s case that he privately owned the temple and 
its properties. However, this claim contradicted the notion that the temple belonged to the 
denomination as a whole. In light of this contradiction, the Court recognized a dilemma inherent 
to the essential practices test: 
In deciding the question as to whether a given religious practice is an integral part of the 
religion or not, the test always would be whether it is regarded as such by the community 
following the religion or not. This formula may in some cases present difficulties in its 
operation…In cases where conflicting evidence is produced in respect of rival 
contentions as to competing religious practices the Court may not be able to resolve the 
dispute by a blind application of the formula that the community decides which practice 
is an integral part of its religion, because the community may speak with more than one 
voice and the formula would, therefore, break down.78 
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Thus, the internal diversity of religious communities complicates the entire notion of an essential 
practices doctrine. The Court’s response to this dilemma reaffirmed its own role in determining 
essential practices:  
This question will always have to be decided by the Court and in doing so, the Court may 
have to enquire whether the practice in question is religious in character and if it is, 
whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the religion, and the finding 
of the Court on such an issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced before it as 
to the conscience of the community and the tenets of its religion.79 
 
These are the first two steps of the “threefold inquiry” as described by Dhavan and Nariman, 
which once again is: “whether the claim was religious at all, whether it was essential for the faith 
and, perforce, whether, even if essential, it complied with the public interest and reformist 
requirements of the Constitution.”80 Nonetheless, the Court conceded that religious and secular 
practices may be “inextricably mixed up.”81 Disengaging the religious from the secular is a 
difficult but necessary task, for which the Court recommended a common sense approach to 
distinguishing obviously secular matters from religious ones. 
 Upon concluding that the temple is a public one, and that the Vallabha School does not 
necessarily require that the Tilkayat must manage the properties, the Court had no hesitation in 
rejecting the petitioner’s arguments. To the Court, it was clear that the right to manage the 
properties of a temple is a purely secular matter, and cannot be regarded as a religious practice 
protected by Articles 25(1) or 26(b). It is interesting to note that the Court acknowledged the 
difficulty in distinguishing the religious and secular, yet did not follow this idea to its logical 
conclusion—that the way the Court draws this line is often arbitrary, and that religious 
communities may understand these distinctions differently. There is perhaps some degree of 
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absurdity in the fact that the Court considers the administration of a religious institution an 
obviously secular matter.82 
 
State Of Rajasthan And Ors v. Sajjanlal Panjawat & Ors, 1973 
 
 State Of Rajasthan And Ors v. Sajjanlal Panjawat & Ors concerned the validity of the 
Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959. In the Rajasthan High Court, the respondents alleged that 
certain provisions of the Act contravened their rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26. The 
Act itself directed the state to constitute a committee for the management and administration of a 
prominent Swetamber Jain temple near Udaipur—the Shri Rikhabdevji temple, also known as 
Keshariyanathji temple. The petitioners, who claimed to represent the Swetamber Jain sect, 
challenged the right of the state to manage the temple on the grounds that it was against the 
usages, customs, principles, and tenets of the Jain religion. The High Court declared several 
sections of the impugned Act invalid. Then, the State of Rajasthan appealed the decision before 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision and largely ruled in 
favor of the state. A significant factor in their decision was the fact that the Jains lost any right to 
manage the temple in the pre-Constitution period. As the provisions of the Act are rather lengthy 
and the respondents challenged each section on unique grounds, this analysis will only deal with 
the claims relevant to the Court’s notion of essential practices. 
 The overall argument of the respondents was notable in that it challenged the Court’s 
very distinction between the religious and the secular. The respondents claimed that the 
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properties of the temple can only be used for purposes that are “pious, religious and charitable” 
according to the scriptures of the Jain religion, such as maintenance of the idol, and propagation 
of the Jain faith.83 Any outside interference, would therefore amount to a “direct and flagrant 
breach of the fundamental right of religious freedom and freedom of conscience of the Jains.”84 
Although in previous cases the Court has repeatedly denied that Articles 25 and 26 protect the 
secular administration of a religious institution, the respondents nevertheless claimed that “the 
establishment of a trust or a temple is a part of the Jain religion and, therefore, the administration 
and management of Nakedaji Parasnath temple is also a part of their religion.”85 To test the 
validity of this claim, the Court deemed it necessary to consider the impugned provisions of the 
Act as well as the tenets of the Jain religion that relate to endowments.   
 It was noted that the Jain scriptures contain “meticulous rules and regulations for the 
utilization of funds and management of the trusts.”86 The petitioners maintained that the state has 
no right to interfere with the observance of those tenets except on the grounds of public order, 
morality, or health. A variety of Jain scriptures dealing with matters such as the management of 
religious property were presented to substantiate this argument. The Court also referred to 
Chapter IX of a report by the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission, which summarizes the 
“peculiar characteristics” of Jain trusts and endowments.87 For instance, Jain scriptures have 
enumerated seven different types of funds called sat kshetras, and detailed the function of each. 
It was alleged that the observance of these religious principles is an essential part of the Jain 
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religion that was contravened by the Act, by divesting the denomination of its right to 
management. 
 In light of the principles outlined above, the Court proceeded to consider the validity of 
the respondents’ grievances. First, the respondents claimed that the tenets of Jainism prohibit 
increasing religious properties or earning income from them. The Court rejected this position, 
claiming, “What is prohibited is only certain methods for increasing the religious properties.”88 
The Court found support for its stance in the very scriptures submitted by the respondents. The 
next question concerned whether the state can direct the investment of the trust properties, in 
order to prevent depreciation and assure a regular income. On this matter, the respondents 
contended, “the funds belonging to a Jain religious trusts cannot be invested for earning interest 
with such persons or institutions which may utilise them for causing Hinsa or for other purposes 
prohibited by the Jain religion.”89 The Court rejected this claim as well, declaring,  
What was injuncted was that investments will not be made by the trustees themselves for 
the [p]urposes forbidden in the scriptures. From this it cannot be inferred that the Jain 
religion has forbidden the deposit in banks or any institution mentioned in s 30 of the 
Act. We, think that such an argument is far fetched.90 
 
Regarding several other sections of the impugned Act, the Court held, “These provisions appear 
unexceptionable and do not in any way conflict with any of the tenets of the Jain religion.”91 
 This case is certainly an intriguing one as far as the essential practices test is concerned. 
Scripture was treated as an authoritative source for determining religious doctrine, although not 
exactly as the practitioners themselves understood it. Thus, along with the Devaru and Quareshi 
cases, Sajjanlal Panjawat upheld the authority of scripture to ascertain religious doctrine and 
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practices. Furthermore, the Court has taken on the role of interpreting scripture when it is 
relevant to legal disputes. The respondents provided a unique argument by presenting an 
alternative conception of the religious and secular, rooted in Jain teachings. Indeed, the ethical 
principles of Jainism encompass many of those very aspects that the Court has deemed secular. 
Nonetheless, the Court was not swayed by their argument and upheld the validity of legislation 
regulating the management of religious institutions. 
 
Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta, Etc. v. Commissioner Of Police, Calcutta & Anr, 1983 
 
  Also known as the Ananda Marga case (1983), Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta, 
Etc. v. Commissioner Of Police, Calcutta & Anr is perhaps the most exemplary model of a case 
where the notion of essential practices was almost entirely decisive to its outcome.92 Behind this 
case is a lengthy and complex history of litigation, stretching across several decades. The 
Supreme Court took up the issue again in 2004. That case will be considered separately, as its 
contributions to the essential practices doctrine were significant on its own merits. The analysis 
of the 2004 case will also summarize the events that transpired subsequent to the 1983 case, 
leading to another round of litigation. 
 It was noted in the previous chapter that the Ananda Margis, or followers of Ananda 
Marga, were found to constitute a religious denomination. Their complaint was that the 
respondent had been making repetitive orders preventing them from performing the tandava 
dance in public—a religious rite performed with a skull, a small symbolic knife, a trishul, and a 
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damroo.93 While the petitioners claimed protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, 
the Commissioner of Police of Calcutta cited section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which declared that “no member of a procession or assembly of five or more persons should 
carry any fire arms, explosives, swords, spears, knives, tridents, lathis or any article which may 
be used as weapon of offence or any article likely to cause annoyance to the public, for example 
skulls.”94 Not only did the petitioners claim that they were entitled to perform tandava dance 
without interference, they also contended that the issuance of repetitive prohibitory orders is an 
abuse of the law. Although the Court agreed on this latter point, it concluded that the tandava 
dance could not be taken as an essential religious practice of Ananda Marga; thus, the petitioners 
cannot invoke Articles 25 or 26.  
 Most relevant to this section is how the Court arrived at such a conclusion. First, we will 
examine the petitioners’ argument, that tandava dance “is an essential part of the religious rites 
of the Ananda Margis and that they are entitled to practise the same both in private as also in 
public places.”95 According to the petitioners, the tandava dance or ananda tandava has its origin 
in Shaivite literature, which describes Shiva as the originator of tandava around 6500 years ago. 
The head of the denomination, Ananda Murtiji, is said to have introduced the practice to Ananda 
Marga in the year 1966. Since then, the practice has been considered part of the daily religious 
rites of the group. In addition to processions carried out in public places, Ananda Margis also use 
a tandava dance lasting several minutes to greet Ananda Murtiji. The religious symbolism behind 
the various objects involved in the dance was also described: 
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It is explained that the knife or the sword symbolises the force which cuts through the 
fetters of the mundane world and allows human beings to transcend towards perfection; 
the trishul or the trident symbolises the fight against static forces in the three different 
spheres of human existence- spiritual, mental and physical; the lathi which is said to be a 
straight stick stands out as the symbol of straightforwardness or simplicity; the damroo is 
the symbol to bring out rhythmic harmony between eternal universal music and the 
entitative sound; and the skull is the symbol of death reminding every man that life is 
short and, therefore, every moment of life should be utilised in the service of mankind 
and salvation should be sought. 96 
 
By affirming its religious significance, the petitioners sought to defend the act as both a matter of 
religion and an essential practice of the denomination.  
 The Court considered a variety of factors to arrive at its decision, all of which are 
relevant to understanding the development and breadth of the essential practices test. It was first 
pointed out that the tandava dance was not considered an essential practice when the order was 
first established in 1955; rather, the tandava dance was a later addition. This fact, in the Court’s 
opinion, weakened the petitioners’ case. The Court held, “Ananda Marga as a religious order is 
of recent origin and tandava dance as a part of religious rites of that order is still more recent. It 
is doubtful as to whether in such circumstances tandava dance can be taken as an essential 
religious rite of the Ananda Margis.”97 Implicit in this statement is an appeal to antiquity: as 
religions are formed, their essential components are already in place. Therefore, later accretions 
are unlikely to comprise the most fundamental aspects of a religious tradition. There is 
something to be said for this idea, that the basics of a religion are established at its inception; 
however, it is dubious whether this concept can apply to new religious movements such as 
Ananda Marga.  
 Another point of contention was whether the dance must necessarily be performed in 
public. It was conceded that Ananda Marga literature seems to support the argument that tandava 
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dance is a custom of the sect. This alone however, was not sufficient. The Court held, “Even 
conceding that tandava dance has been prescribed as a religious rite for every follower of the 
Ananda Marg it does not follow as a necessary corollary that tandava dance to be performed in 
the public is a matter of religious rite.”98 To justify this latter point, the Court once again referred 
to scripture: “In fact, there is no justification in any of the writings of Shri Ananda Murti that 
tandava dance must be performed in public.”99 The implication of this statement is that the 
practice could be considered an essential one only if it were justified by scripture—an ironic 
position, as the 2004 Ananda Marga case will demonstrate. The Court ultimately concluded, “We 
are, therefore, not in a position to accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde that performance of 
tandava dance in a procession or at public places is an essential religious rite to be performed by 
every Ananda Margi.”100 In some ways, the reasoning on behalf of the Court is reminiscent of 
the Tilkayat and Quareshi cases. In both cases of these cases, Court rejected the petitioners’ 
arguments because the relevant literature did not prove that devotees must necessarily sacrifice a 
cow or worship in a private temple.  
The Ananda Marga case (1983) makes it clear how rights and legal protections are 
contingent on the concept of essential practices. It further demonstrates the Court’s authoritative 
role in evaluating the claims of religious denominations, and offers insight into the rationale 
behind its decisions. Along with several other cases, the Ananda Marga case (1983) upheld the 
value of scripture in determining essential practices. It also suggested that antiquity is, if not a 
requirement of an essential religious practice, then at least a supporting factor.  
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Between the Ananda Marga case (1983) and its second round of litigation in 2004, the 
Supreme Court heard at least two significant cases related to the essential practices test: Dr. M. 
Ismail Faruqui Etc. v. Union Of India And Others, 1994 and N. Adithayan v. The Travancore 
Devaswom Board, 2002. The former case dealt with the legal issues surrounding the destruction 
of the Ram Janma Bhumi/Babri Masjid complex in Ayodhya.  The primary question for 
determination was whether the state could legally acquire a mosque. Related to this inquiry, the 
Court sought to determine whether prayer in a mosque is an essential part of Islam, in order to 
establish whether Article 25 had been violated. The Court concluded, “A mosque is not an 
essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and Namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be 
offered anywhere, even in open. Accordingly, its acquisition is not prohibited by the provisions 
in the Constitution of India.”101 For such a shocking consequence of the essential practices test, 
there was very little evidence of how the Court arrived at this conclusion and what sources it 
considered. 
 In N. Adithayan v. The Travancore Devaswom Board, the Court sought to resolve a 
dispute between the Travancore Devaswom Board and a Brahmin worshipper. The primary 
question for determination was whether a person who is not a Malayala Brahmin could be 
appointed as the Santhikaran or Poojari (priest) at a particular Shiva temple in Kerala. The Court 
referred to the Agamas in attempt to ascertain whether the exclusive appointment of Brahmins 
was an essential practice protected by Articles 25 and 26. Although the Court consulted 
scripture, it did not accept the petitioners’ interpretation of it, similar to Tilkayat, Quareshi, and 
Sajjanlal Panjawat. According to the Court, even if Brahmins alone had traditionally served as 
Santhikaran in a temple, this does not necessarily mean they did so because other groups were 
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prohibited. It may be that others were not in a position to serve that role, as they were not 
traditionally versed in Vedic literature, performance of rites, etc. It therefore concluded, “there is 
no justification to insist that a Brahman or Malayala Brahman in this case, alone can perform the 
rites and rituals in the Temple.”102 
 
Commissioner Of Police & Ors v. Acharya J. Avadhuta And Anr, 2004 
 
 Several events transpired since the 1983 Ananda Marga case and before its 
reconsideration by the Supreme Court. In response to the 1983 ruling, which denied that the 
writings of the Ananda Marga denomination require tandava dance to be performed in public, the 
founder of the sect inserted that very requirement into its religious texts. Ananda Murtiji 
prescribed that the tandava dance be performed publicly as an essential religious practice in the 
Carya Carya, a book containing the group’s doctrines. There is no doubt that this was in direct 
response to the essential practices test, as applied in the Ananda Marga case (1983). On this 
basis, the Ananda Margis again sought permission to perform tandava dance from the Calcutta 
Commissioner of Police. The Commissioner had allowed the dance to be performed only without 
a knife, live snake, trident or skull, etc. The respondents (the Ananda Margis, in this case) 
challenged this position, and brought the issue before the High Court. In opposition to the 1983 
ruling, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court concluded, “Tandava dance in public 
carrying skull, trident etc. is an essential part of Ananda Margi faith and Commissioner of Police 
could not impose conditions to it.”103 This decision was challenged, as the Commissioner of 
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Police appealed to the Supreme Court. Therefore, the question up for decision in the Ananda 
Marga case (2004) was “whether the High Court is correct in it’s [sic] finding that Tandava 
dance is an essential and integral part of Ananda Margi faith based on the revised edition of 
Carya Carya.”104 
 In short, the Supreme Court, by a 2:1 majority judgment, set aside the High Court 
decision and upheld its decision from the Ananda Marga case (1983). The justification behind its 
position was revealing in that it further expounded the essential practices test. The Court first 
looked back at the 1983 case, to recap the grounds on which it reached its conclusion. Regarding 
the statement, “there is no justification in any of the writings of Shri Ananda Murti that Tandava 
dance must be performed in public,” the Court defended its original position: 
This observation cannot be considered as a clue to reopen the whole finding. By making 
that observation the Court was only buttressing the finding that was already arrived at. 
The learned judges of the High Court wrongly proceeded on the assumption that the 
finding of this Court regarding the non-essential nature of Tandava dance to the Ananda 
Margi faith is due to the non-availability of any literature or prescriptions by the founder. 
The High Court is under the wrong impression that an essential part of religion could be 
altered at any subsequent point of time.105 
 
In other words, the lack of scriptural evidence was not the disqualifying factor in the original 
Ananda Marga case; rather, the fact that tandava dance was a later addition to the tradition 
barred it from being considered an essential part of religion. In defense of the High Court 
however, this opinion was not entirely clear from the 1983 case. 
 The Court then proceeded to elucidate “what is meant by ‘an essential part or practices of 
a religion.’”106 It was reiterated that the essential parts of religion can include beliefs, acts, 
rituals, ceremonies, and modes of worship, and that these are to be determined with reference to 
																																																								
104 Commissioner Of Police at 2. 
105 Commissioner Of Police at 3. 
106 Commissioner Of Police at 3. 
	 99 
a religion’s “doctrines, practices, tenets, historical background, etc.”107 In perhaps the most 
detailed explanation to date, the Court then explained the features and characteristics of essential 
religious practices: 
Essential part of a religion means the core beliefs upon which a religion is founded. 
Essential practice means those practices that are fundamental to follow a religious belief. 
It is upon the cornerstone of essential parts or practices the superstructure of religion is 
built. Without which, a religion will be no religion. Test to determine whether a part or 
practice is essential to the religion is to find out whether the nature of religion will be 
changed without that part or practice. If the taking away of that part or practice could 
result in a fundamental change in the character of that religion or in its belief, then such 
part could be treated as an essential or integral part. There cannot be additions or 
subtractions to such part. Because it is the very essence of that religion and alterations 
will change its fundamental character. It is such permanent essential parts is what is 
protected by the Constitution. No body can say that essential part or practice of one’s 
religion has changed from a particular date or by an event. Such alterable parts or 
practices are definitely not the ‘core’ of religion where the belief is based and religion is 
founded upon. It could only be treated as mere embellishments to the non- essential part 
or practices.108 
 
This extraordinary and lengthy statement reflects the development of the essential practices test 
over the previous fifty years. In concise language, it details the Court’s de facto theory of 
religion and how it translates that theory into a legal test. It clarifies the Court’s previously 
expressed positions on essential practices, and introduces new ones as well. The Court identifies 
a religion’s essential features as the sine qua non—the ingredients without which, a religion 
would cease to be. These fixed and static entities at the core of a religion are, according to the 
Court, the real objects that the Constitution protects.  
 Having expounded the characteristics of essential practices, the Court then reiterated its 
argument concerning Ananda Marga. Noting that the Ananda Marga was in existence without the 
practice of tandava dance between 1955 and 1966, it denied that the practice was part of the core 
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on which the order was founded. As a practical necessity, the Court altogether rejected the 
possibility that a religion can change its doctrine in response to Court rulings: 
As a matter of fact if in the earlier litigations the Court arrives at a conclusion of fact 
regarding the essential part or practice of a religion it will create problematic situations if 
the religion is allowed to circumvent the decision of Court by making alteration in its 
doctrine… We are clear that no party could ever revisit such a finding of fact. Such an 
attempt will result in anomalous situations and could only be treated as a circuitous way 
to overcome the finding of a Court. If subsequent alterations in doctrine could be allowed 
to create new essentials, the judicial process will then be reduced into a useless formality 
and futile exercise. Once there is a finding of fact by the competent Court, then all other 
bodies are estopped from revisiting that conclusion.109 
 
On this basis, the Supreme Court had no difficulty in setting aside the High Court decision and 
allowing the appeal of the Commissioner of Police. In addition to clarifying the previous 
elements of the essential practices test, the Ananda Marga case (2004) was notable for 
introducing an important new feature of the test: “If the taking away of that part or practice could 
result in a fundamental change in the character of that religion or in its belief, then such part 
could be treated as an essential or integral part.”110 This aspect of the essential practices test was 
emphasized in future cases. 
 Taking issue with the Court’s approach, Justice Lakshmanan represented the sole 
dissenting opinion in the Ananda Marga case (2004). His dissent attests to the multivalence of 
the essential practices test. Because there are multiple ways to determine essentiality and myriad 
factors to consider, it is unsurprising that judges’ conclusions occasionally differ. Lakshmanan 
noted that the Court seemed to change its justification for declaring the practice a nonessential 
one. In the earlier judgment, the Court rested its finding on the fact that the practice was not 
supported by scripture; in the later judgment, the Court relied on the recentness of the practice. 
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Lakshmanan then rejected that the recentness of a practice could be grounds for determining its 
essentiality. He held, 
Although the specific introduction of Tandava dance in public procession may have been 
recent, this does not detract from the fact that the Tandava dance is part of the religion of 
the Ananda Margis. In any religion, practices may be introduced according to the 
decisions of the spiritual Head. If these practices are accepted by the followers of such 
spiritual Head as a method of achieving their spiritual upliftment, the fact that such 
practice was recently introduced cannot make it any the less a matter of religion.111 
 
Lakshmanan also referred to the respondents’ claim that “Tandava dance has been closely 
associated with Hinduism from time immemorial.”112 Furthermore, he assailed the Court’s 
reliance on literature, as many religions have tenets that are oral rather than written. In almost 
every prior judgment relating to essential practices, the author of the decision traced the history 
of the test and situated their current opinion within the continuously evolving dialogue on 
religion and law. In this respect, Lakshmanan was no different, citing the relevant cases from 
Shirur Mutt to the present one. In doing so, he expressed a partiality for the liberal interpretation 
of the test offered in Shirur Mutt and Ratilal Gandhi, and condemned Justice Gajendragadkar for 
going against those decisions in the Durgah Committee case. He concluded,  
In our view, the performance of Tandava dance in public procession forms part of the 
Ananda Margis religion and is also a matter of religion within the meaning of those 
articles and that the Ananda Margis cannot be deprived of their right to practice their 
religion in the manner prescribed by their religious preceptor, except on the grounds of 
public order, morality and health.113 
 
That being established, he also rejected that the practice conflicts with any of those provisions of 
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Dr. Noorjehan Safia Niaz And Anr v. State Of Maharashtra And Ors, 2016 
 
 Dr. Noorjehan Safia Niaz And Anr v. State Of Maharashtra And Ors (called here the Haji 
Ali Dargah case) is the only High Court case included in this chapter as its circumstances justify 
inclusion. Heard in the Bombay High Court, the Haji Ali Dargah case attests to the development 
of the essential practices test in the 21st century. Like other contemporary cases, it prefaces the 
question of essential practices by reflecting on the history and evolution of the doctrine, from 
Shirur Mutt to the current case. There are three primary reasons why the Haji Ali Dargah case 
deserves a place in an analysis otherwise reserved for the Supreme Court: it illustrates the 
essential practices test applied to Islam; by drawing from the Ananda Marga case (2004), it 
shows how that decision influenced the notion of essential practices; and it deals with the same 
issue contemplated in the infamous Sabarimala case—namely, exclusion from religious 
institutions on the grounds of gender. 
 The petitioners of this case were women representing a social activist organization, 
Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (Indian Muslim Women’s Movement). When visiting Haji 
Ali Dargah in 2012, one of the petitioners discovered a steel barricade put up at the entry of the 
sanctum sanctorum, preventing the entry of female devotees. The Dargah is the tomb of the Sufi 
saint Pir Haji Ali Shah Bukhari, and one of the most iconic landmarks of Mumbai. Located on a 
tiny islet 500 meters from the coast, the Dargah is only accessible via a narrow causeway, 
dependent on the tides. According to the petitioners, they have been visiting the Dargah since 
childhood, and have always been permitted to enter the sanctum sanctorum where the saint’s 
tomb is located. Upon approaching the authorities to explain the restriction, the President of the 
Haji Ali Dargah Trust cited three reasons for the ban: 
	 103 
(i) women wearing blouses with wide necks bend on the Mazaar, thus showing their 
breasts; (ii) for the safety and security of women; and (iii) that earlier they were not 
aware of the provisions of Shariat and had made a mistake and therefore had taken steps 
to rectify the same.114 
 
Aggrieved by the situation, the petitioners sought an order by the Court declaring that female 
devotees have an equal right of entry and access to all parts of the Haji Ali Dargah. The 
respondents argued that the restriction was well within the scope of their rights guaranteed by 
Articles 25 and 26. Accordingly, the Court sought to determine whether the restriction of 
women’s entry is an essential and integral part of Islam. 
 Before delving into the question, the Court reviewed the previous decisions relevant to 
the essential practices doctrine, and then acknowledged the difference between integral practices 
and those that are “peripheral or merely matters of tradition or custom.”115 In describing the 
essential practices test, the High Court relied on the principle introduced in the Ananda Marga 
case (2004): “the test to be followed should be whether the practice is such that without it, the 
essential character of the religion would stand destroyed or its theology rendered irrelevant.”116 
Prior to the Ananda Marga case (2004), this particular aspect of the essential practices test had 
never attracted much emphasis, yet became the cornerstone of the present case. 
 The respondents referred to certain verses of the Quran to support their submission that 
“close proximity [by women] to the grave of [a] male Muslim Saint was sin in Islam”—one 
rationale for the ban.117 The following is a selection of the verses cited: 
Tell the believing men to lower their gaze and to be mindful of their chastity: this will be 
most conducive to their purity - (and) verily, Allah is aware of all that they do. And tell 
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the believing women to lower their gaze and to be mindful of their chastity, and not to 
display their charms beyond what may be apparent thereof; hence let them draw their 
veils over their bosoms – Quran, Surah 24, ayat 30-31.118 
 
The respondents also referred to the Hadiths: 
I know that you women love to pray with me, but praying in your inner rooms is better 
for you than praying in your house, and praying in your house is better for you that 
praying in your courtyard, and praying in your courtyard is better for you than praying in 
your local mosque, and praying in your local mosque is better for you than praying in my 
mosque.119 
 
The Court denied that the selected verses support the respondents’ argument. It held, “Reliance 
placed on the aforesaid verses would not assist the respondent No. 2 Trust in any way or throw 
light on ‘how close proximity of the women to the grave of a male Muslim Saint was sinful in 
Islam,’” and “there is nothing in any of the aforesaid verses which shows, that Islam does not 
permit entry of women at all, into a Dargah/Mosque.”120 It was conceded however, that these 
verses have been interpreted to support separate doors for men and women in mosques. This the 
petitioner did not dispute.  
 The petitioners not only challenged the argument based on the submitted verses, but even 
argued its opposite: “learned Counsel for the petitioners also relied on several Qur’anic verses 
and Hadiths in support of their contention, that Islam believes in gender equality and that the ban 
was uncalled for.”121 Although they could have simply argued that gender restrictions were 
nonessential components to Islam, they went even further by claiming that such restrictions were 
contrary to the faith. The petitioners in the Sabarimala case presented a similar argument, 
claiming that Hinduism is against any form of gender discrimination.  
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 The criteria introduced in the Ananda Marga case (2004) made proving the essentiality of 
a practice even more difficult. Not only must it be shown that a practice is supported by religious 
doctrines, but also that the religion would cease to exist or be fundamentally altered without it. 
By this very logic, the public tandava dance was rejected as an essential practice, as the Ananda 
Marga was in existence without it for over a decade. The respondents in the Haji Ali Dargah case 
were burdened with proving that “if women were permitted to enter the sanctum sanctorum, the 
very nature of its religion would change,” which was clearly at odds with the fact that women 
were being permitted to enter up until 2012.122 Because the restriction on women cannot be held 
to alter “the very essence of Islam and its fundamental character,” the High Court concluded, “It 
therefore cannot be said that the said prohibition ‘is an essential and integral part of Islam’ and 
fundamental to follow the religious belief.”123 The Court also dismissed the respondents’ other 
justification for the ban, that it served the safety and security of women. The petition therefore 
succeeded, and the state along with the Haji Ali Dargah Trust were ordered to permit women to 
enter the sanctum sanctorum on par with men, and ensure their safety and security at the Dargah. 
 
Shayara Bano v. Union Of India And Ors, 2017 
 
 Along with the Sabarimala case, Shayara Bano v. Union Of India And Ors, or the Triple 
Talaq case for short, is one of the most contentious Supreme Court decisions in recent history. 
Shayaro Bano, the petitioner, was divorced from her husband Rizwan Ahmad on October 10th, 
2015.  Her husband pronounced divorce by talaq-e-biddat. Also known as triple talaq, talaq-e-
biddat is a sudden, irrevocable divorce that involves uttering talaq (divorce) three times in front 
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of witnesses. The petitioner approached the Court seeking a declaration that the divorce 
pronounced by her husband is invalid on the grounds that the practice of talaq-e-biddat is not a 
part of Muslim personal law and violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 
15, and 21 of the Constitution.  
 The Supreme Court therefore had to examine whether the practice of talaq-e-biddat was 
constitutionally protected. It should be noted at the outset that while the concept of essential 
practices did feature in the Triple Talaq case, the case was exceedingly complex and involved 
several major legal questions. The argument that the practice of talaq-e-biddat is essential to 
Islam, and therefore protected under Article 25(1), was but one aspect of an incredibly 
multifaceted case. In Justice Nariman’s description of this argument, it is clear that essentiality 
was not the core issue at play: “It has been argued somewhat faintly that Triple Talaq would be 
an essential part of the Islamic faith and would, therefore, be protected by Article 25 of the 
Constitution of India.”124 Nevertheless, the question of essential practices was not irrelevant to 
the Triple Talaq case, and it certainly contributes to an analysis of the essential practices test 
overall. 
 One argument on behalf of the petitioner was that “the practice of ‘talaq-e-biddat’, could 
not be regarded as a part of any “essential religious practice,” and as such, could not be entitled 
to the protection of Article 25.”125 There were several components to this argument. First, it was 
noted that several countries have done away with talaq-e-biddat by way of legislation, including 
many Muslim-majority countries. The petitioner therefore contended, “had ‘talaq-e-biddat’ been 
an essential part of religion, i.e., if it constituted a core belief, on which Muslim religion was 
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founded, it could not have been interfered with, by such legislative intervention.”126 This follows 
the same principles seen in the previous two cases, and introduced in the Ananda Marga case 
(2004)—that the essential parts of religion are basically unalterable. Furthermore, it was 
submitted that talaq-e-biddat is a social practice rather than a religious one, similar to polygamy. 
Most importantly perhaps, the petitioner considered a phrase often applied to talaq-e-biddat: that 
it is “bad in theology, but good in law.”127 It was argued that while talaq-e-ahsan and talaq-e-
hasan are both approved forms of divorce, talaq-e-biddat is not recognized by either the Quran or 
the Hadith.128 Even the schools of Islam that acknowledge talaq-e-biddat describe it as “a sinful 
form of divorce.”129 On that account, the petitioner denied that the practice could form an 
essential part of Islam:  
The practices of triple talaq (as well as, ‘nikah halala’ and polygamy) have been referred 
to as “undesirable”. It was accordingly submitted, that no “undesirable” practice can be 
conferred the status of an “essential practice”, much less one that forms the substratum of 
the concerned religion.130 
 
On the above grounds, it was argued that talaq-e-biddat does not merit protection under Article 
25 of the Constitution.   
 The respondents presented a sophisticated argument to defend the practice, one that 
highlights some of the issues central to the essential practices test. First, the respondents took 
issue with the fact that the petitioner largely relied on the Quran and Hadiths. They argued that 
																																																								
126 Shayara Bano at 79. 
127 Shayara Bano at 16. 
128 Talaq-e-ahsan involves one revocable pronouncement of divorce when the wife is not 
menstruating, followed by a waiting period (iddat). Talaq-e-hasan involves three successive 
pronouncements of divorce when the wife is not menstruating, with a menstrual period 
separating each pronouncement. 
129 Shayara Bano at 16. 
130 Shayara Bano at 129. 
	 108 
the Court was not competent to interpret the various verses submitted, which do not even give a 
definite opinion on the issue of talaq-e-biddat: 
Based on the factual position recorded in the previous three paragraphs, it was submitted, 
that this Court should not attempt to interpret the manner in which the believers of the 
faith had understood the process for pronouncement of talaq. It was pointed out, that 
matters of faith should best be left to be interpreted by the community itself, in the 
manner in which its members understand their own religion.131 
 
This speaks to one of the earliest tensions surrounding the essential practices test: whether 
essential practices are to be decided by religious communities themselves, as proclaimed in 
Shirur Mutt and Ratilal Gandhi, or decided by the Courts, as declared in Saifuddin and Tilkayat 
(and performed in many more). Unsurprisingly, the respondents cited Shirur Mutt to support the 
following argument: 
In this behalf, it was also submitted, that while deciding the issue whether a belief or a 
practice constituted an integral part of religion, this Court held, that the above question 
needed to be answered on the basis of the views of the followers of the faith, and none 
else.132 
 
It was also shown that the submissions advanced both on behalf of the petitioner and respondents 
resulted in “absolute contradictions” regarding the validity of the practice.133 Thus, reliance on 
the community itself was imperative, the respondents argued. They also criticized the 
interpretations of the Quran and Hadith offered by the petitioner, as they “were mostly of 
scholars who did not belong to the Sunni faith, and were therefore irrelevant, for the 
determination of the interpretation of the believers and followers of the Hanafi school of Sunni 
Muslims.”134 Above all, they encouraged the Court to consider that the practice is held to be both 
legitimate and based upon Islamic tradition by the believers of Islam, despite what the Quran or 
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Hadiths may say. Although this seems to be a legitimate position, the Court has rarely accepted 
the validity of essential practices on the testimony of believers alone.  
 Not only did the respondents deny that either the Court or the petitioner could validly 
interpret the Quran and Hanafi jurisprudence, they maintained that talaq-e-biddat is sanctioned 
by Islam. They went even further to declare that the whole of Muslim personal law stood 
protected under Article 25. It was argued, 
Based on the ‘hadiths’ depicted in the foregoing, and in the paragraphs preceding thereto, 
it was submitted, that for the Hanafi school of Sunni Muslims ‘talaq-e-biddat’ – triple 
talaq was a part and parcel of their ‘personal law’, namely, a part and parcel of their faith, 
which they had followed generation after generation, over centuries. That being the 
position, it was submitted, that ‘talaq-e-biddat’ should be treated as the constitutionally 
protected fundamental right of Muslims.135 
 
Although the petitioner and respondents disagreed on whether talaq-e-biddat could be considered 
an essential practice, it is interesting to observe which sources they relied upon to arrive at their 
respective conclusions. The petitioner argued that the practice was not sanctioned by scripture—
a familiar and often successful argument in the Supreme Court. To support their claim, they 
presented verses from the Quran and Hadiths. They added that the practice had been disposed of 
in many Muslim countries, and is therefore not an essential part of Islam. The respondents, while 
also referencing scripture, argued that the impugned practice has been followed for centuries; 
they specifically claimed, “it [talaq-e-biddat] has been practised amongst Muslims for the last 
1400 years.”136 This last point is an appeal to antiquity, as detailed in the analysis of the Ananda 
Marga case (2004). 
 Although the Court’s opinion was divided, it ultimately struck down the practice of talaq-
e-biddat by a 3:2 majority. Both the majority and dissenting opinions will be analyzed with 
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respect to their findings on whether talaq-e-biddat is an essential practice of Islam. Justices 
Jagdish Singh Khehar and S. Abdul Nazeer, forming the dissenting opinion, concluded, 
We are satisfied, that the practice of ‘talaq-e-biddat’ has to be considered integral to the 
religious denomination in question – Sunnis belonging to the Hanafi school. There is not 
the slightest reason for us to record otherwise. We are of the view, that the practice of 
‘talaq-e-biddat’, has had the sanction and approval of the religious denomination which 
practiced it, and as such, there can be no doubt that the practice, is a part of their 
‘personal law’.137 
 
It appears that the two judges were convinced of the antiquity and prevalence of the practice. 
They observed, “It is therefore clear, that amongst Sunni Muslims belonging to the Hanafi 
school, the practice of ‘talaq-e-biddat’, has been very much prevalent, since time immemorial. It 
has been widespread amongst Muslims in countries with Muslim popularity….having been 
followed for more than 1400 years.”138 They dismissed the petitioner’s argument, that talaq-e-
biddat does not originate from the Quran, and observed, “even ‘talaq-e-ahsan’ and ‘talaq-e-
hasan’ which the petitioner acknowledges as – ‘the most proper’, and – ‘the proper’ forms of 
divorce respectively, also do not find mention in the Quran.”139 In their view, scripture alone 
cannot always be reliable guide to determining what practices are essential to a faith. The 
dissenting opinion upheld a broad interpretation of Article 25, and affirmed the promise of 
religious freedom: 
We have examined whether the practice satisfies the constraints provided for under 
Article 25 of the Constitution, and have arrived at the conclusion, that it does not breach 
any of them. We have also come to the conclusion, that the practice being a component of 
‘personal law’, has the protection of Article 25 of the Constitution. Religion is a matter of 
faith, and not of logic. It is not open to a court to accept an egalitarian approach, over a 
practice which constitutes an integral part of religion. The Constitution allows the 
followers of every religion, to follow their beliefs and religious traditions.140 
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Even though their opinion represented the minority, it was notable in that it expressed support for 
the right of religious communities to dictate their own religious practices. Justices Khehar and 
Nazeer tacitly approved the respondents’ argument supporting the essentiality of talaq-e-biddat 
due to its prevalence, antiquity, and basis in the hadiths. If the autonomy of religious 
communities proclaimed in Shirur Mutt were taken to its extreme however, even these qualities 
(antiquity, scriptural basis, etc.) would be irrelevant—a practice would be considered essential 
simply because believers say so. 
 The majority opinion consisted of Justices Kurian Joseph, Rohinton Fali Nariman, and 
Uday Umesh Lalit. Justice Kurian Joseph authored one judgment, while Nariman wrote on 
behalf of himself and Lalit. Justice Joseph outright denied that the practice of talaq-e-biddat 
should be considered integral to the Hanafi school of Islam. He relied largely on the Quran in his 
findings, and expressed no doubt that the Quran is the cardinal (and perhaps exclusive) source to 
determine what is essential to Islam. Regarding the submitted verses, he writes, “These 
instructive verses do not require any interpretative exercise. They are clear and unambiguous as 
far as talaq is concerned. The Holy Quran has attributed sanctity and permanence to 
matrimony.”141 Nevertheless, he conceded that talaq is permissible under some circumstances. 
He then describes the “correct law of talaq as ordained by the Holy Quran,” as requiring a 
reasonable cause and several attempts at reconciliation.142 On this basis, he reasons, “In triple 
talaq, this door [of reconciliation] is closed, hence, triple talaq is against the basic tenets of the 
Holy Quran and consequently, it violates Shariat.”143 His approach to the essential practices test 
and the Quran in particular is similar to that used in the Quareshi case, although his 
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conclusion—that the practice is antithetical to Islam—is more dramatic. Both judges ignored the 
actual practices of Muslims and read the translated text of the Quran as if it were any other 
document. They both arrived at conclusions that contradict real, existing traditions among 
Muslims, and the vast histories behind them.  
 Justices Nariman and Lalit arrived at the same conclusion: that talaq-e-biddat “would not 
form part of any essential religious practice,” although they gave a different justification than 
Justice Joseph.144 They noted that the practice is “permissible in law, but at the same time, stated 
to be sinful by the very Hanafi school which tolerates it.”145 Secondly, referring back to the 
Ananda Marga case (2004), they considered whether Islam would be fundamentally altered 
without the practice: “Applying the test stated in Acharya Jagdishwarananda (supra), it is equally 
clear that the fundamental nature of the Islamic religion, as seen through an Indian Sunni 
Muslim’s eyes, will not change without this practice.”146 It is interesting that they considered a 
perspective internal to Islam in the above statement. Continuing this line of reasoning, the judges 
referred to the five categories of human action (ahkam) as expounded in Islamic law: 
i) First degree: Fard. Whatever is commanded in the Koran, Hadith or ijma must be 
obeyed. 
Wajib. Perhaps a little less compulsory than Fard but only slightly less so. 
(ii) Second degree: Masnun, Mandub and Mustahab: These are recommended actions. 
(iii) Third degree: Jaiz or Mubah: These are permissible actions as to which religion is 
indifferent. 
(iv) Fourth degree: Makruh: That which is reprobated as unworthy. 
(v) Fifth degree: Haram: That which is forbidden.147 
 
Reflecting on these categories, the judges deemed that talaq-e-biddat “at best falls within the 
third degree, but probably falls more squarely within the fourth degree.”148 That being the case, 
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they rejected that Article 25(1) protects the practice. It could be inferred that the essential 
practices of Islam consist solely of the injunctions in the first degree, according to their 
assessment. Arguably, their application of the essential practices test was somewhat more 
sympathetic than Joseph’s, as they at least attempted to conceptualize the issue “through an 
Indian Sunni Muslim’s eyes.”149 The judges attempted to enter into the Muslim tradition and use 
Islam’s own “methods of assessing the relative importance of its various elements,” to borrow a 
phrase from Galanter.150  
 The Supreme Court is comprised of individuals and thus, the essential practices test 
inevitably reflects individual attitudes and sensitivities. The dissenting opinion in the Triple 
Talaq case could be indicative of a trend: an increasingly conflicted and self-reflective Court, 
especially concerning issues of religion. The bench in the Sabarimala case remarked upon the 
divergent opinions in the Triple Talaq case:  
While the majority based its conclusion on an examination of the substantive doctrines of 
Islam and the theological sanctity of triple talaq, the minority relied on the widespread 
practice of triple talaq to determine its essentiality. The majority and minority concurred, 
however, that the belief of a religious denomination claiming a particular practice to be 
essential must be taken into consideration in the determination of the essentiality of that 
practice.151 
 
This underscores an important truth. The essential practices test, as it has been called, is 
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Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State Of Kerala, 2018 
 
 The details of the Sabarimala case were sufficiently explained in the introduction. 
Significant for this section is that the case attests to the (perhaps increasing) diversification of the 
Court’s opinion, particularly in regards to the essential practices test. The test, at this point, 
represents a large body of principles, and individual judges emphasize particular aspects of it to 
arrive at their respective conclusions. Even if their findings are the same, the justification may be 
different; this was apparent in the Triple Talaq case. Several of the opinions also express a 
degree of self-awareness and even criticism of the essential practices test, a trend that could 
perhaps alter the Court’s approach in the future. Before analyzing the judgments, a general 
defense of the practice and the grounds for its essentiality will be discussed.  
 The respondents submitted that excluding women between ten and fifty years of age from 
worshipping at the Sabarimala temple is an essential facet of their belief and spiritual discipline. 
The practice, they held, is in accordance with the character of the presiding deity as a Naishtika 
Brahmacharya or eternal celibate. It was explained that the deity himself undertook the forty-one 
day observation of penance known as vratham, which is mandated for all pilgrims visiting the 
shrine. As celibacy is obligatory during vratham, the exclusionary practice is part and parcel of 
this custom. It was argued that “[the prohibition on women] is clearly intended to keep the mind 
of the pilgrims away from the distraction related to sex as the dominant objective of the 
pilgrimage is the creation of circumstances in all respects for the successful practice of spiritual 
self-discipline.”152 The antiquity of the practice was offered as further support. The restriction of 
women, it was argued, was “prevalent from time immemorial,” and a “centuries old tradition of 
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this temple.”153 To support these contentions, the respondents relied on several sources. A M.A. 
thesis by Radhikar Sekar at Carleton University, Ottawa, entitled “The Process of Pilgrimage: 
The Ayyappa Cultus and Sabarimalai Yatra,” spoke to the antiquity of the prohibition, and the 
importance of celibacy. The respondents also referred to the testimony of three persons who 
could “authoritatively testify about the practises of the temple,” as submitted to the High Court: a 
thantri of the temple, the Secretary of the Ayyappa Seva Sangham (who was also a regular 
pilgrim of the shrine), and a senior member of the Pandalam Palace.154 The testimony of these 
witnesses supported that the restriction on women “was being followed since the past several 
centuries.”155 
 The preview of the Sabarimala case in the introduction demonstrated that the question, 
“Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an ‘essential religious practice’ 
under Article 25,” was central to the case.156 Dipak Misra authored the judgment for A.M. 
Khanwilkar and himself, and concluded, “The practice of exclusion of women of the age group 
of ten to fifty years being followed at the Sabarimala Temple cannot be regarded as an essential 
part as claimed by the respondent Board.”157 They provided several justifications for this 
decision, most of which are consistent with prior applications of the essential practices test. Most 
important for this analysis is how their judgment attests to the relationship between the religious 
denomination test and the essential practices test. Upon finding that the devotees of Lord 
Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination, they reasoned, “This leads us to a 
mathematical certainty that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are the followers of Hindu 
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religion.”158 From this point onwards, they considered whether the exclusionary practice was 
essential to Hinduism as a whole: “Now, what remains to be seen is whether the exclusion of 
women of the age group of 10 to 50 years is an essential practice under the Hindu religion in the 
backdrop of the peculiar attending circumstances attributable to the Sabarimala temple.”159 
Recall that the Court has consistently upheld a socially progressive vision of Hinduism ever 
since the Satsangi case. Upon failing the religious denomination test, the respondents now faced 
the burden of proving that the practice is essential to a religion of over a billion people, rather 
than a specific community in Kerala. The judges applied the maxim from the Ananda Marga 
case (2004): “the practice to exclude women from entry to the Sabarimala temple must be shown 
by the respondents to be so fundamental to the religious belief without which the religion will 
not survive.”160 Of course, this was untenable when dealing with Hinduism broadly. Misra thus 
determined, “By allowing women to enter into the Sabarimala temple for offering prayers, it 
cannot be imagined that the nature of Hindu religion would be fundamentally altered or changed 
in any manner.”161 The absence of any scriptural or textual evidence also was pointed out.  
Finally, one last aspect of the essential practices doctrine was brought forth: that the essential 
parts of religion are unalterable. It was submitted that women of all ages would visit the 
Sabarimala temple for the first rice feeding ceremony of their children, prior to a 1950 
notification. According to Misra and Khanwilkar, the exclusionary practice therefore amounted 
to a “custom with some aberrations” rather than an essential religious practice.162 
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 Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman also ruled in favor of the petitioners, yet he did not deny 
that the restriction on women’s entry is an essential religious practice. Rather, he accepted the 
respondents’ plea: “For the purpose of this case, we have proceeded on the footing that the 
reasons given for barring the entry of menstruating women to the Sabarimala temple are 
considered by worshippers and Thanthris alike, to be an essential facet of their belief.”163 To 
justify this position, he conceded that “all the older religions” relate menstruation with impurity, 
and therefore impose restrictions on women’s participation in religious activities.164 It seems that 
Nariman was also convinced by an affidavit filed by a thantri of the Sabarimala temple, which 
argued that a woman’s presence in the temple would conflict with the practice of vratham. 
Nevertheless, the held that Article 25 applies to all, even women of the restricted age group: 
Even otherwise, the fundamental right of women between the ages of 10 and 50 to enter 
the Sabarimala temple is undoubtedly recognized by Article 25(1). The fundamental right 
claimed by the Thanthris and worshippers of the institution, based on custom and usage 
under the selfsame Article 25(1), must necessarily yield to the fundamental right of such 
women, as they are equally entitled to the right to practice religion, which would be 
meaningless unless they were allowed to enter the temple at Sabarimala to worship the 
idol of Lord Ayyappa.165  
 
This serves as an important reminder: when considering the scope of legal protection, even 
essential practices are subject to certain conditions, and must be balanced with other 
constitutional rights.  
 Although Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud concurred with the majority judgment, he 
was reluctant to uphold the doctrine of essential practices. Rather, he described and commented 
upon some of the most prominent critiques of the essential practices test. Relying on articles by 
Gautam Bhatia, Jaclyn L. Neo, and Professors Faizan Mustafa and Jagteshwar Singh Sohi, 
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Chandrachud agreed that the Court lacks competency to adjudicate on religious tenets.166 In light 
of scholarly criticisms, Chandrachud advised, “The essential religious practices test should merit 
a close look, again for the above reasons, in an appropriate case in the future.”167 Despite his 
reluctance, he proceeded to consider the essentiality of the practice: “For the present, this 
judgment has decided the issues raised on the law as it stands.”168 First, he reflected on the High 
Court decision, which affirmed that the exclusionary practice is an essential one. Noting that the 
High Court conferred complete autonomy to the devotees to determine the essentiality of the 
practice, in accord with Shirur Mutt, he maintained that the High Court ignored the “evolution of 
precedent thereafter, which strengthened the role of the Court in the determination [of essential 
practices].”169 On that account, he criticized the High Court’s findings: “the approach of the High 
Court is incorrect. The High Court relied completely on the testimonies of the Thanthris without 
an enquiry into its basis in religious text or whether the practice claiming constitutional 
protection fulfilled the other guidelines laid down by this Court.”170 This makes for a strange 
juxtaposition: moments after he criticized the essential practices test, he proceeded to also 
criticize a relatively liberal interpretation of it, and uphold the Court’s role as an authority on 
religious doctrine. He concluded, 
It must be proved that the practice is ‘essential’ to religion and inextricably connected 
with its fundamental character. This has not been proved. This is sufficient reason to hold 
that the practice of excluding women from Sabarimala does not constitute an essential 
religious practice. 171 
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Chandrachud added that the practice is a form of untouchability, is contrary to constitutional 
morality, and is subordinate to other constitutional values. Although he reluctantly applied the 
essential practices test and found that the practice does not meet the Court’s standards, the test 
was of little consequence to his final judgment. 
 Indu Malhotra was the sole dissenting opinion in the Sabarimala case. She, like 
Chandrachud, discussed the problems inherent to the essential practices test, relying on Religion, 
Law and State in Modern India by J. Duncan M. Derrett. Although she did not discard the 
essential practices test entirely, she did uphold the right for religious communities to decide what 
is essential themselves. Malhotra thus criticized Justice Gajendragadkar’s remarks in the Durgah 
Committee case not only for his reference to superstition, but also for going against the trend 
established by Shirur Mutt and Ratilal Gandhi. She held, “the reference to superstitious practises 
is singularly unfortunate, for what is ‘superstition’ to one section of the public may be a matter of 
fundamental religious belief to another.”172 She also denied that rationality was a relevant factor: 
“Notions of rationality cannot be invoked in matters of religion by courts.”173 Citing Ratilal 
Gandhi and a 1986 case, Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors v. State Of Kerala & Ors, she supported the 
notion that the personal views of judges are irrelevant in determining which practices warrant 
legal protection.174 In line with her opinion on the religious denomination test, Malhotra also 
argued that the High Court’s conclusion on the essentiality of the practice is final, as per res 
judicata. Regarding the test itself, it seems that she held the opinion of the devotees themselves 
to be the most convincing evidence. In her own words, “The issue of what constitutes an 
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essential religious practise is for the religious community to decide.”175 She also upheld antiquity 
as an important factor: 
The only way to determine the essential practises test would be with reference to the 
practises followed since time immemorial, which may have been scripted in the religious 
texts of this temple. If any practise in a particular temple can be traced to antiquity, and is 
integral to the temple, it must be taken to be an essential religious practise of that 
temple.176 
 
Her judgment therefore concurred with the High Court:  
The religious practise of restricting the entry of women between the ages of 10 to 50 
years, is in pursuance of an ‘essential religious practise’ followed by the Respondents. 
Any interference with the mode and manner of worship of this religious denomination, or 
sect, would impact the character of the Temple, and affect the beliefs and practises of the 
worshippers of this Temple.177 
 
Malhotra’s opinion reflects a distinct interpretation of the essential practices test. By validating 
earlier judgments such as Shirur Mutt and Ratilal Gandhi and criticizing the Durgah Committee 
decision, her position allows for a degree of intervention in religious affairs (particularly those 
she calls social evils), but not for the Court to evaluate the essentiality or rationality of particular 
practices. 
Malhotra’s main issue with the petitioners’ case was that they did not claim to be 
devotees of Lord Ayyappa themselves, and were not personally aggrieved by the temple 
practices. As social activists, they were challenging religious practices of a faith to which they 
did not subscribe. According to Malhotra, this is a slippery slope:  
Permitting PILs in religious matters would open the floodgates to interlopers to question 
religious beliefs and practises, even if the petitioner is not a believer of a particular 
religion, or a worshipper of a particular shrine. The perils are even graver for religious 
minorities if such petitions are entertained.178 
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Acknowledging India’s pluralistic society, she warned that such a trend “could cause serious 
damage to the Constitutional and secular fabric of this country.”179 Indeed, the majority of the 
reviewed cases were disputes between a religious community (or a representative of one) and a 
state entity—not a third party. Even in the Haji Ali Dargah case, where the petitioners 
represented a social activist organization, they had personal connections to the religious 
institution in question. As more cases involving religion inevitably reach the Supreme Court, it 
will soon become apparent whether or not the Sabarimala case set a dangerous precedent for 
religious minorities, as Justice Malhotra cautioned. 
 
What Makes an Essential Practice? 
 This chapter tracked the gradual unfolding of one the Supreme Court’s most criticized 
innovations. The entire nature of the test shifted in the late 1950s, from inquiring whether a 
practice was religious or secular, to whether a practice was essential to religion. The former 
question has a basis in Article 25(2)(a), and was posed to interpret the scope of that clause. The 
latter question, which has been criticized for its lack of Constitutional basis, is used to 
circumscribe the range of protection guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26. Between the time of the 
Devaru (1957) and the Durgah Committee (1961) cases, the lines between these two inquiries 
began to get blurred. Essential, as used by the Court, meant both the opposite of secular, and an 
integral part of the respective religion. In later cases, these both became aspects of the same test.  
 There were also significant changes regarding who holds the authority to determine 
essential practices. The 1954 cases of Shirur Mutt and Ratilal Gandhi conferred the freedom of 
determining essential practices to religious denominations themselves. To this day, many judges 
																																																								
179 Indian Young Lawyers Association at 28. 
	 122 
cite these decisions in support of a more liberal interpretation of the essential practices test. The 
Devaru case marked a departure from the early precedents, in that the Court began to assume a 
more authoritative role as the arbiter of essential practices. Its authority was reinforced further 
and justified in the Tilkayat case of 1963. By and large, the Court is settled in this position today, 
and rarely considers arguments to the contrary.  
 The essential practices test, representing an array of different components, has evolved to 
include more and more principles over time. Each of these can be applied at the judge’s 
discretion to determine the essentiality of a particular practice. The first guideline formulated by 
the Court was to look to the doctrine and tenets of the religion itself, a commendable but vague 
approach. In many instances, this involved referencing religious texts. In the Quareshi case, the 
Courts added another condition: the practice must be of an obligatory nature to the respective 
religion. Optional practices, even if religiously sanctioned, cannot be held to be essential. This 
standard was applied in the Tilkayat and Ananda Marga cases (1983) as well. In the Durgah 
Committee case, the Court attempted to distinguish between religious beliefs and superstitious 
ones. This notion, although frequently cited, did not become a cornerstone of the test. On the 
contrary, it represented one of the most controversial statements relating to the essential practices 
test. In Saifuddin case of 1962, the Court upheld the essentiality of a practice deemed necessary 
to a religious group’s self-preservation. In the Ananda Marga case (1983), the Court established 
antiquity as a factor for determining essentiality: more recent practices are treated as accretions 
to the core of religion, while essential practices are those observed from a religion’s very 
inception. The Ananda Marga case (2004) confirmed those observations, and added that 
essential practices are basically unalterable. It also introduced a new method to determine 
whether a practice is an essential one: inquiring whether the fundamental nature of the religion 
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would be altered if the practice were to be removed. Essential practices, the Court had 
established, were practices without which a religion’s fundamental character would change. The 
subsequent cases have largely been decided on the basis of these criteria. Furthermore, 
essentiality alone is not a determinative factor. Even essential practices are subject to restraints.  
 Based on these standards as the Supreme Court has applied them, what practices are 
essential to religion? The Court’s pattern of adjudication tells us more about which practices are 
not essential than which ones are. Overall, the Court has been consistent in insisting that the 
management and administration of religious institutions is a secular activity, subject to regulation 
and restriction by the state. Thus, it cannot be claimed by any faith to be an essential religious 
practice. The Court has denied that worship in private temples, hereditary succession to the 
office of archaka, public performance of the tandava dance, exclusive appointment of Brahmins 
as temple priests, exclusion of women from temples were essential religious practices to various 
Hindu communities. Although the decision in the Devaru case revealed that regulating temple 
entry was an essential matter of religion according to the tenets of Hinduism, it declared that 
those rights are subject to Article 25(2)(b). In Islam, sacrificing a cow for Eid, praying in a 
mosque, talaq-e-biddat, and the exclusion of women from a dargah were all rejected as essential 
practices. The practice of excommunication however, was found to be essential to one Muslim 
sect, the Dawoodi Bohras. The management of endowments was rejected as an essential practice 
of the Jains. 
 It would be prudent to consider the various sources that the Court consults to arrive at 
these conclusions. The most obvious source is religious texts. Scripture, it is assumed, contains 
the exposition of religious doctrine in its most accurate and comprehensive form. Thus, it has a 
special role in helping the judiciary understand its position on the essentiality of a particular 
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practice. Accordingly, the Court has consulted the Agamas, the Quran, various Jain scriptures, 
the Carya Carya, the Hedaya, and Hadiths. Similarly, lack of scriptural basis is sometimes taken 
as a mark against essentiality. Sen claims that the Court’s use of sacred texts is “skewed towards 
the canonical, rationalist versions of high-culture texts such as the Vedas and Upanishads,” and 
has therefore contributed to a rationalization of religion and religious practices.180 I would 
concede that the Court’s interpretation of Hinduism is biased in this direction, as strongly 
evidenced in the Satsangi case. However, for means of determining essential practices, the texts 
(if any) the Court chooses to reference have more to do with its desired outcomes than a 
rationalist bias. In the cases reviewed in this chapter, it is more likely that the Court uses 
whatever sources are expedient in any particular case. When the Court does rely on high-culture 
texts, it is often at the behest of the religious group involved; it is sometimes even to their 
benefit, as seen in the Devaru case. While the opinions expressed by judges from time to time do 
marginalize what Sen calls “popular religion,” I do not believe that these the Court has 
systematically based its judgments on rationalist high-culture texts at the cost of dissident 
communities.181  
 Scholarship has also been relied upon to determine which practices are essential to 
religion. In the Tilkayat and Sabarimala cases, representatives of religious groups cited 
scholarship in order to argue that their impugned practices were necessary to their respective 
religions. The view of religious communities is another factor that the Court takes into account. 
The Court emphatically has asserted that this is not a conclusive factor; rather, it is but one of 
several facets to be considered. In his critique, Bhatia noted that the Court “has even decided 
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cases without taking testimony from the affected parties.”182 The Court’s selection of sources 
necessarily influences its overall findings on the essentiality of a practice, and commentators on 
the test have observed this connection. Neo, for instance, expressed concern about the selective 
use of sources: “When courts choose one set of criteria over another in their definition of 
religion, there is legitimate concern that this may effectively be an endorsement of some 
religions over others or some interpretation of a religion over others.”183  
 In the long span since its creation, the usage of the essential practices test has remained 
largely undiminished. Recent judicial commentary indicates that a reconsideration of the test as a 
viable jurisprudential approach might be imminent. Particularly in the past 15 years, there has 
been an increasing skepticism towards the test, and its application is becoming more inconsistent 
among judges. The fact that Supreme Court Justices are citing criticisms of the test in their 
judgments is particularly revealing. The opinions of Lakshmanan, Khehar, Nazeer, Chandrachud, 
and Malhotra, discussed above, all attest to this trend. Their judgments, although largely in the 
minority, reflect either criticism of the essential practices test as a whole or of the dominant 
interpretation of it.  
 
The Ecclesiastical Court: Responses to the Essential Practices Test 
 Among the numerous commentaries and criticisms of the essential practices test, one 
particular metaphor is strikingly ubiquitous: the role of the Court has been consistently likened to 
that of religious authorities.184 In their scathing critique, Rajeev Dhavan and Fali S. Nariman 
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write, “With a power greater than that of a high priest, maulvi or dharmasastri, judges have 
virtually assumed the theological authority to determine which tenets of a faith are ‘essential’ to 
any faith… Judges in India who delve into sacral facts and ancient texts and scripts acquire a 
further exalted status as ersatz dharmasastris (sages)—ostensibly being the wisest among the 
wise.”185 Occasionally, such rhetoric appears in the Court itself. Regarding the Court’s role in 
deciding which matters are religious, Justice Nariman observed, “These compulsions nonetheless 
have led the court to don a theological mantle.”186 Similarly, upon reviewing the history of the 
essential practices doctrine, Justice Lakshmanan noted, “Here, the Court has assumed the role of 
the theologian after making a roving enquiry.”187 The image evoked is one of a judiciary 
untrained in theology acting as the expert on faiths with which it is unfamiliar. This impression is 
not entirely unwarranted; in interpreting and dictating religious doctrine, the Court has 
encroached upon tasks traditionally reserved for the religious orthodoxy. By virtue of the 
essential practices test, judges actively interpret religious texts, and their interpretations carry 
legal authority. This section will examine several critiques of the essential practices test, and 
explore alternatives offered by the critics. 
  J. Duncan M. Derrett discussed the essential practices test in Religion, Law and the State 
in India. As early as 1968, he noted the Court’s excessive authority as well as its incompetence 
in applying the test: “Therefore the courts can discard as non-essentials anything which is not 
proved to their satisfaction—and they are not religious leaders or in any relevant fashion 
qualified in such matters—to be essential, with the result that it would have no constitutional 
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protection.”188 He also assailed the test’s lack of constitutional basis: “The Constitution does not 
say [in Article 25] ‘freely to profess, practise and propagate the essentials of religion’, but this is 
how it is construed.”189 Despite these remarks, his overall impression of the essential practices 
test is not entirely negative. He also defends such jurisprudence as “traditionally Indian,” and 
denies that it reflects a conflict between “intellectual Hinduism” and popular Hinduism, as 
Ronojoy Sen later claims.190 Rather, Derrett suggests that the Court’s inquiry into matters of 
religion and then the essentials of religion is part of a vital state function: balancing the 
relationships between religion, the individual, and the state. He therefore argues that the essential 
practices test, being an element of the Court’s broader involvement in religion, is part of an 
important process—namely, “a working out of a balance in such a way that the claims of a 
practice to be ‘religious’ naturally submit themselves to scrutiny if protection from the State is 
required.”191  
 Much later, after the essential practices test had evolved considerably, Rajeev Dhavan 
and Fali Nariman, two senior advocates to the Supreme Court, give a more lengthy and critical 
assessment. Like Derrett, they point out that the test effectively divests certain practices of 
constitutional protection. They write, “Created as a principle of inclusion to make some practices 
more sacral than others, it [the essential practices test] was interpreted in later cases as a 
threshold principle of exclusion to deprive supposedly non-essential practices of constitutional 
protection altogether.”192 Also in line with Derrett’s critique, they argue that the Court is 
unqualified to adjudicate on matters of religious doctrine: “The judges are unequipped to deal 
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with such issues, relying as they do on limited material in the form of selective affidavits 
presented to the courts in adversarial litigation, amidst the chaos of overcrowded dockets and 
congested court calendars.”193 In reviewing the major decisions related to the test, they highlight 
the absurdity of the Court’s findings. They also criticize the Court’s “invocation of ambiguous 
history” and “overt reliance on intuition” associated with the essential practices test.194 Although 
they concede that many of the Supreme Court’s decisions on religious freedom may be 
“consequentially satisfying,” they nonetheless warn against an unprincipled decision-making that 
places constitutional secularism under threat.195  
 Ronojoy Sen discusses the essential practices test as it relates to Hinduism in Articles of 
Faith: Religion, Secularism, and the Indian Supreme Court. His claim is as follows: “the Court’s 
use of the essential practices doctrine has served as a vehicle for legitimizing a rationalized form 
of high Hinduism, and delegitimizing usages of popular Hinduism as superstition.”196 In his eyes, 
the essential practices test is but one apparatus of a larger state project, the reformation and 
rationalization of religion. This agenda, partially a product of the colonial era, is furthered by 
Hinduism’s “lack of ecclesiastical organization,” as well as judges inspired by a Vedic-rationalist 
Hinduism.197 Recall that this is precisely the explanation that Derrett earlier rejected.  
 Former Supreme Court Justice Aftab Alam commented on the essential practices test in a 
speech on secularism and the Indian Supreme Court. In his assessment, the test is responsible for 
both “socially negative and positive results.”198 For instance, he condemns the Saifuddin 
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decision, and approves of the decision in the Satsangi case. Noting that the Court has chosen to 
apply the essential practices test rather than simply imposing the tests of public order, morality, 
and health, he suggests: “in a country like India, it is easier to say something is not essentially 
religious than to say that religion is against public order. This may be another reason why Courts 
have generally preferred the essential practices test as compared to subjecting religious freedoms 
to secular public order restrictions.”199 Nevertheless, he warns of the “inherent limitation and 
danger” in this “extremely interventionist approach,” one which the Court arrogates to itself the 
right and authority to interpret scripture.200 
 Gautam Bhatia analyzes the essential practices test (or the “three-step test” as he calls it) 
as part of a broader discussion on group and individual rights. Along with other critics, Bhatia 
speaks to the ineptitude of the judges: “[The essential practices test] is unworkable in practice, 
since it involves judicial intervention into questions that judges are fundamentally unsuited to 
resolve.”201 Similarly, he observes that the Court lacks a “rigorous methodology” for determining 
the content of essential practices, relying as it does on a hodgepodge of dubious sources.202 He 
brings up another familiar point, that the test has no basis in the Constitution. Bhatia traces the 
genesis of the essential practice test to Ambedkar’s remarks during the Constituent Assembly 
debates. Ambedkar, he argues, sought to distinguish between the essentially religious and the 
secular—the same distinction found in Article 25(2)(a). Bhatia accuses Justice Gajendragadkar 
of conflating two different tests in the 1960s, the religious/secular test and the 
essential/inessential test—the former with a Constitutional basis, the latter without.203   
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 Faizan Mustafa and Jagteshwar Singh Sohi offer a rather straightforward critique of the 
essential practices test. Likening the judiciary to clergy, they claim, “the essentiality test denies 
religious adherents of constitutionally granted rights and impermissibly substitutes the judgment 
of the Court for religious conscience.”204 The test, they argue, is dangerously inconsistent and 
effectively undermines the guarantee of religious freedom. Mustafa and Sohi highlight the 
contradictions in the Court’s decisions, particularly in the sources it entertains. They point out 
how the Court, seemingly randomly, relies on a scholar’s interpretation of a religious text in one 
case, and “unscientifically gathered anecdotal evidence of practice” in another.205 In some cases, 
it exclusively examines religious texts at the expense of empirical evidence. The authors 
comment on the absurdity of a principle introduced in the Ananda Marga case (2004): “The 
approach of the Supreme Court seems to identify a religious practice as an integral practice only 
if it existed when the religion was founded. This absurd logic would freeze religious practices in 
time so that no religious reform could ever take place. This regressive decision has virtually 
closed the doors on reform and evolution for religions.”206 In their view, the essentiality test is 
not only inconsistent with the Court’s guarantee of autonomy to religious denominations, but 
also with the vision for religious liberty enshrined in the Constitution. 
 Jaclyn Neo broadly critiques the use of definitional tests in religious freedom 
adjudication. She identifies the essential practices test as a variation of the definitional test, 
because it “demarcates what religious practices are protected and what are not.”207 Though she 
examines cases in Malaysia in Singapore, Neo notes the Indian origin of the essential practices 
test. Like other critics, she brings up the problem of competence: “courts simply lack the ability 
																																																								
204 Mustafa and Sohi, “Freedom of Religion,” 925. 
205 Mustafa and Sohi, “Freedom of Religion,” 935. 
206 Mustafa and Sohi, “Freedom of Religion,” 935-36. 
207 Neo, “Definitional Imbroglios,” 576. 
	 131 
to address religious questions.”208 Most problematic in her view is that the definitional test 
“effectively denies religious individuals’ self-definition” by imposing an “objective” external 
view of religion.209 These views often reflect “dominant social and cultural attitudes towards 
preferred religions” at the expense of minority religions.210 At the very worst, definitional tests, 
she argues, “could result in the criminalization of religious and belief systems, and their 
practices, where these fall outside the definitional boundaries.”211  
 Several themes are consistent among the various critiques of the essential practices test: 
its lack of constitutional basis, deviation from the early precedents, requirement that so-called 
secular judges pronounce on matters of faith, and indiscriminate reliance on random sources. In 
light of such criticism, how should the Court deal with religious practices? Critics have presented 
several alternatives. Dhavan and Nariman offer some general advice: “The Supreme Court must 
take religions as it finds them, even if the claims made are unusual. Obvious cases of fraud can 
be easily detected.”212 In their opinion, practices should be restrained by “the extensive range of 
permissible restrictions” rather than by “judges playing high priests of each and every faith.”213 
Indeed, religious freedom is already conditional to public order, morality and health, in addition 
to provisions for social reform and legislation regulating other aspects of public welfare. Bhatia 
concurs that “existing constitutional provisions were clearly sufficient for the Court to achieve 
the outcomes that it did, without the further invention of the essential religious practices test.”214 
He also advocates the “anti-exclusion principle” as a replacement for the essential practices test, 
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which stipulates that “group rights and group integrity are guaranteed to the extent - and only to 
the extent - that religious groups do not block individuals’ access to the basic public goods 
required to sustain a dignified life.”215 Holding steadfast to the possibility of adjudicating without 
the essential practices test, Bhatia gives more specific advice on the Haji Ali Dargah and 
Sabarimala cases: 
What is there [in these cases] is an ostensible clash between two claimed rights: the 
constitutional right of women to worship under Article 25(1), and the right of the 
religious denomination to manage its own affairs under Article 26(b). In such a 
situation…the claim will be overridden by the stronger individual right under Article 
25(1). This, I would submit, is a solution that allows the Court to give effect to the 
Constitution’s transformative purposes without getting entangled in knotty questions of 
religious and theological doctrine.216 
 
Considering that Bhatia’s article was cited by Justice Chandrachud in the Sabarimala case, it is 
possible that this advice, at least to a small degree, influenced the outcome of that case. 
 Mustafa and Sohi are categorical in their rejection of the essential practices test: “[W]e 
argue that one way to strengthen religious freedom in India would be to remove the essentiality 
test from Supreme Court jurisprudence.”217 They concede however, that a more liberal 
interpretation of the test—as championed by Indu Malhotra—would also be favorable: “We 
argue that this test should ideally be rejected by the Court itself. If not, then it should be applied 
consistently based on the original method of determining the essentiality of a religious 
practice.”218 Neo argues that a deferential approach to religion is preferable to a definitional test, 
especially in religiously pluralistic societies like India. Such an approach would rely “primarily 
on the self-definition of the religious claimant,” rather than a jurisprudential standard.219 She 
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elaborates, “My modest response to this is an approach that reduces the relevance of the 
definitional question for judicial decision-making and shifts the burden of the inquiry into the 
more important question, which is whether the limitation imposed by the state on religious 
freedom is justifiable.”220 Thus, the self-identification of religious (and non-religious) groups 
would be taken seriously. Neo suggests a two-step test to adjudicating religious freedom claims. 
First, the court would generally accept a claimant’s self-definition of religiosity, except where 
“there is clearly a lack of sincerity, fraud, or ulterior motive.”221 Then, the court would inquire 
whether the religious freedom claim is outweighed by a competing state or public interest. In this 
system, a claimant would not be burdened to “establish their constitutional entitlement” to 
freedom of religion.222  
 Individuals both inside and outside of the Court have reflected on the consequences of the 
Court’s approach. The internal criticism of the essential practices test, I suggest, shows that 
judges are acutely aware of the risks inherent to India’s unique method of adjudication on 
religion. The external criticism of the test reflects an attempt to hold the Court accountable for its 
approach, and improve its delivery of justice. In both cases, the criticism is not confined to the 
question of whether the essential practices test is effective or fair. Rather, it demonstrates the 
relationship between the test and the larger themes of secularism and religious freedom. 
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Conclusion 
Indian jurisprudence on religion has evolved around two primary themes: what 
constitutes a religious denomination, and what practices are essential to religion. The religious 
denomination test is invoked when a group claims its right to manage its religious affairs has 
been contravened. If it is unclear that the group constitutes a religious denomination, than the 
Court examines its features to render a decision. The essential practices test is invoked when 
religious practices come into conflict with the law. The Court examines whether the impugned 
practices are essential to the faith, and if not, denies its constitutional protection. When both tests 
feature in a case, the religious denomination test generally appears first. In this sense, it serves as 
a prerequisite to the other relevant legal questions, including the question of essentiality. Yet 
every case is unique, and the weight of each of these tests is distributed differently according to 
the circumstances. In some cases, the outcome rests substantially on a group’s denominational 
status or the essentiality of an assailed practice. In other cases, other factors are more decisive. 
As it is practiced, the authority of the religious denomination and essential practices tests 
rests on the constant reaffirmation of their precedents. In the Auroville case of 1982, Justice 
Reddy famously remarked,  
It is, perhaps, necessary to say that judicial definitions are not statutory definitions, they 
are mere explanations, every word of which is not to be weighed in golden scales. Law 
has a tendency to harden with the passage of time and judicial pronouncements are made 
to assume the form of statutory pronouncements. So soon as a word or expression occur 
in the statute is judicially defined, the tendency is to try to interpret the language 
employed by the judges in the judicial definition as if it has been transformed into a 
statutory definition. That is wrong. Always, words and expressions to be interpreted are 
those employed in the statute and not those used by judges for felicitous explanation. 
Judicial definition, we repeat, is explanatory and not definitive.1 
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The Supreme Court’s implementation of the two tests epitomizes the Justice’s fears. As a 
consequence of this approach, the words of judges have not only hardened with time, but also 
been imbued with so much authority as to practically constitute law. Although the term religious 
denomination does feature in the Constitution, its supposed defining elements—common faith, 
common organization, and distinctive name—are merely “explanatory, and not definitive,” as 
Justice Reddy would likely contend. Nevertheless, the religious denomination test has evolved 
based on an unwavering allegiance to these three principles, and never once been reconsidered 
wholly by the Court. The essential practices test is even more exemplary of this trend, for the 
scope of religious freedom under Article 25 has been defined by an explanatory term that is not 
even found in the article itself.  
 It is not clear whether the Court’s judgments on religion would be considerably different 
if it had not subjected litigants to the two tests. As many critics have pointed out, the Court has 
had the resources to render judgments without entering into questions of religious doctrine.2 The 
Constitution specifies that religious freedom is conditional to public order, morality, health, 
social reform, laws regulating the secular activities associated with religion, and other 
constitutional rights. Judges do not employ the two tests instead of these other conditions, but 
rather in concert with them. That being the case, it is impossible to quantify the extent to which 
essentiality and denominational status lead to a particular ruling, although it is clearly greater in 
some cases than in others. Likewise, it is difficult to say how these other limiting factors are 
weighed against established essential practices or denominational rights. One thing is certain: 
when judgments place limitations on religious freedom, they are generally influenced by the 
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results of either of the two tests. Rarely does the Court rule against religious groups on the basis 
of constitutional limitations alone.  
 The Supreme Court’s adjudication on religion, I suggest, has a relevance that extends far 
beyond the communities it directly affects. Legal rulings, in the words of Vidhu Verma, 
“defin[e] the boundaries within which religious freedom of individuals and groups must 
operate.”3 There are reasons why these boundaries are defined one way and not another. In the 
Indian case, the Constitution has empowered the judiciary to check religious bigotry, tackle 
corruption in religious institutions, and reform objectionable religious practices. In pursuit of 
these objectives, many feel that the Court has gone too far, and encroached upon one of the most 
fundamental of constitutional guarantees: religious liberty. Indeed, the Court’s approach goes 
beyond the mere intervention in religious affairs. By citing the religious denomination and 
essential practices tests to justify its rulings on religion, it questions the very religiosity on which 
claims for constitutional protection are predicated.  
 As the Indian judiciary is an institution of the state, much about secularism can be 
gleaned from its interaction with religion. The Supreme Court’s approach elucidates the features 
of Indian secularism not just in theory, but also in practice. By doing so, it allows us to better 
situate India in the broader debate on trans-national secularism and religious freedom. The 
present study revealed how the Supreme Court of India has interpreted the freedom of religion, 
and the mechanisms by which it has justified its stance. Furthermore, it brought specificity to the 
scope of rights protected under the Constitution’s religious freedom clauses. Next, I believe, it is 
prudent to reassess the advantages, risks, and limitations of the Court’s approach, although this 
task is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus far, I have refrained from proposing any particular 
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course of action for future jurisprudence. However, I am convinced that scholarship itself, even 
if descriptive rather than prescriptive, has the potential to enrich the Court’s on-going work. As 
former Chief Justice B. N. Kirpal succinctly remarked, “It is through such efforts that the Court 
learns about itself.”4 
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